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Using hitherto unavailable official sources and 
dependent upcn contemporary opinion, this thesis re 
examines the orthodox conclusions about the tank 
controversy in the British Army from 1919 to 1933. In an 
attempt to avoid the bitterness which has characterized 
post war writings on the controversy, it argues, in short, 
that what the tank advocates were urging was not 
practical. The money did not exist, the vehicles did not 
exist and the need did not exist for the large scale tank 
forces for which they were calling. 
The thesis examines the performances of the tanks 
constructed during this period and argues that they were 
not capable of the sort of long range penetrative roles 
that were being claimed for them. The role of the cavalry 
in the ccntrcversy is examined and it is suggested that 
its officers accepted the fact that the tank would replace 
the cavalry in most roles. 
The conclusion of the thesis is that the conventional 
view of the British Army's being divided over the role and 
future of tanks into "progressives" and "reactionaries" is 
over drawn and, in the main, inaccurate. 
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Like other wars, the First World War produced a 
variety of new military inventions. Among these was the 
tank -a machine which combined the protection of armour 
and the offensive power of guns and machine guns with the 
mobility of the internal combustion engine and the 
caterpillar track. Introduced into the Western Front in 
1916, the tank soon demonstrated its ability to make 
significant gains in territory for lower losses in men and 
in a shorter time than any other method of attack. The 
tank played a predominant part in the "Hundred Days#" 
attacks which produced the Armistice. Reactions to the 
tank were mixed from the first - some saw it as a helpful 
adjunct to the traditional arms of cavalry, infantry and 
artillery while some saw in it an entirely revolutionary 
device which would supersede the traditional arms. The 
debate continued after the war in the armies of the major 
powers and each army produced a small group of theorists 
who spoke for the tank. These tank enthusiasts had the 
greatest success in Germany and the German Army was 
reorganized around armoured divisions. 
The British Army did not escape the debate. The 
British had first used the tank in war and had developed 
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and proved tactics to go with the new invention. The tank 
controversy in the British Army was greatly complicated by 
the role of the Army. Unlike the armies of most of the 
other major powers, which were free to develop skills and 
weapons appropriate to major wars, the British Army had 
commitments all over the world which were often 
incompatible with preparation for major wars. 
Consequently, the inter war tank debate raged with greater 
intensity there than elsewhere because it was bound up 
with the debate over a continental commitment for the 
Army. (1) The memories of Flanders made many wish that the 
British should never again place a large army on the 
continent of Europe. 
In the British Army tank development proceeded at a 
leisurely pace as a result of doubts about a continental 
commitment, the unwillingness of the governments to spend 
large sums cf money on Army modernization and doubts over 
the future of the tank. The German successes in 1940 
produced an abrupt reversal of the caution of the previous 
years and put the tank enthusiasts in a position from 
which they cculd claim to have foretold the future. The 
debacle of Dunkirk and the fall of France added a venom to 
the retrospective treatment of the tank controversy which 
was absent at the time. This has produced an orthodox 
view of the controversy which has perpetrated a simplistic 
view of "progressives" resisted and thwarted by 
"reactionaries". This thesis will examine and challenge 
this orthodox view of the tank controversy in the British 
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Army. 
A number of books have been written in this subject 
and they are dominated by Sir Basil Liddell Hart's two 
volume official history of the Royal Tank Regiment. He 
was privy to the development, he knew intimately everyone 
associated with tanks, he watched the manoeuvres and 
inspected the vehicles and he was one of the most 
influential men in the development of tactics and strategy 
for armoured forces. But perhaps this close association 
may be seen as a hindrance rather than a help. Because he 
was so close to the development and because he lived to 
see his country's forces defeated by an enemy who claimed 
to be following his ideas, he saw the inter war tank 
development in terms of how it ended - his approach was 
teleological. He could not but see the inter war period 
in terms of a preparation for the Second World War. His 
post war writings give the strong impression that be 
perceived the inter war period as being a twenty year 
hiatus in which the British Army had to prepare for a 
resumption of the war against Germany on a new and higher 
level of technology and expertise. The tank controversy 
viewed from this standpoint wears a melancholy aspect: it 
is a tale replete with missed opportunities. Many other 
historians have taken the same approach. 
However, there are other ways of viewing it, There 
is nothing wrong with perceiving the inter war period as a 
largely botched preparation for the next war - that is, 
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after all, what it finally turned out to be. But is this 
a fair view? It is not true to the way in which that 
pericd was perceived at the time. No one knew for certain 
that there would be another war so soon. Many may have 
sensed it, but no one was certain. Indeed, until 1932, 
the British armed services were repeatedly told that they 
must not expect a major war for ten years. The soldiers 
cannot be held responsible for a Cabinet decision. They 
could only do what they were told by their superiors. 
Because of this fact, any interpretation of the period 
which sees it as an opportunity to rearm against a second 
German attempt to conquer Europe cannot be entirely 
realistic - it was not so perceived at the time. 
This thesis is an examination of contemporary sources 
and contemporary thought on the tank question. It ends in 
1933 for two reasons. The first is that 1933 may be taken 
as a convenient dividing point - before that year, there 
was a reasonably high degree of confidence that the future 
did not hold a major war. After that year, the rise of 
Hitler and the activities of Italy and Japan became more 
obvious and could not be ignored. The ten year rule was 
finally abandoned showing that the climate had changed and 
that no one dared be certain of peace for the near future. 
The period of "true peace", both in actuality and 
psychologically may be said, so far as such distinctions 
may be made, to have ended in 1933. There is a second 
reason. There was a policy which directed tank 
development and this policy had been largely fulfilled in 
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1933 with the formation of the 1st Brigade, Royal Tank 
Corps. By 1933 a decision had been reached regarding tank 
formations and their use in war and, although many details 
remained to be solved, the peace time organization and 
employment of tanks had been largely settled. Generally 
speaking, after 1933, with the growing threat of war, the 
tank cadre was expanded (and not very efficiently) as 
planned. Therefore, for these two reasons, 1933 marks a 
convenient stopping point to this study of the tank 
controversy in the British Army in peacetime between the 
wars. 
Armed with hitherto unavailable documents, and with a 
point of view that attempts to see the controversy in its 
setting, free from hindsight, this study suggests a number 
of new conclusions. The most important is simply that 
what the tank enthusiasts were calling for was not 
practical. The tank enthusiasts wanted the British Army 
to be thoroughly and quickly mechanized with a large 
proportion of its forces organized into armoured units. 
This was completely unrealistic between 1919 and 1933 (and 
for a good while after): the machines did not exist, the 
money did not exist and the need did not exist. 
The material has been handled thematically because 
this work is the history of an argument. The tank 
controversy was a continuing debate and it breaks down 
into themes. Were tanks useful and in what way? what 
sort of tanks should be built? How should they be 
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organized? What are they to do? what did the cavalry 
have to do with the tank controversy? The chapters deal 
with these matters. 
Chapter 2 argues that the First World War tank 
experience did not offer a conclusive lead for post war 
tank development; that the governments were not prepared 
to countenance an expensive programme of Army 
modernization; that the near impossible scale of 
responsibilities of the Army greatly cut into whatever 
programme of modernization the governments would permit; 
that the Army (and the other Services) was expressly 
ordered by its civilian superiors not to think about, plan 
for or organize for a "great war" against a first class 
power - the only war in which tanks would be really 
essential. 
Chapter 3 outlines the reasons for having tanks and 
shows, contrary to many of the opinions expressed above, 
that there was no objection in the Army to tanks. It also 
deals with the increasing doubts about the tank's future 
that resulted from developments in anti-tank weapons and 
the failure of the Vickers Medium. 
Chapter 4 is probably 
because it deals with the most 
tanks themselves. It is argued 
the Royal Tank Corps - the 
adequate for its tasks; that no 
was available. The rise of 
the most important chapter 
important matter - the 
that the tank possessed by 
Vickers Medium - was not 
satisfactory replacement 
the light tank will be 
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described and the reasons for its rise given. 
Chapter 5 deals with the problems of organizing tanks 
and describes the various experimental formations which 
were tried out. It will be shown that, although final 
decisions were not yet possible, by 1933 the British were 
set on their doctrine of all tank forces which they were 
to hold until the war. 
Chapter 6 discusses the beginnings of operational 
doctrine. Although these were not complete by 1933, once 
again, the groundwork had been laid for tanks being 
reserved for dramatic dashes and wide circling movements. 
Chapter 7 treats of the cavalry and why it was kept. 
It is argued that the British reduced their cavalry (in 
1933 it was a third of its 1914 strength) and that the 
cavalry was retained, not for sentimental reasons, but for 
practical and sensible reasons. it will also be 
demonstrated that the tank 
_nioneersthemselves -werg 
prepared to retain the cavalry for_a modest role right- to 
1933. It will be argued that the picture of cavalry men 
opposing tank men is overexaggerated and, in the main, 
quite inaccurate. 
In the conclusion of the thesis (Chapter 8) it will 
be argued that there was a clearly worked out and 
consistent policy on tanks and that this policy was 
adhered to. it will be argued that it was a reasonable 
policy and probably, given the situation, an inevitable 
1 
and unavoidable one. 
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In the simplest terms, the argument of this thesis is 
} that what was done was thought to be the best thing at the 
time. And it is hard to see how it could have been 
different. 
It will be noted that the Vickers Medium tank is 
continually referred to in what follows. The Vickers 
Medium is vital to an understanding of the controversy. 
From 1923 until 1933, the important years for the 
controversy, the Vickers Medium was the only tank the 
Corps had. The tank theorists had to prove their 
contentions and they had to prove them with that tank. If 
it was toc slow, or too vulnerable, as it will be shown to 
have been, their a rguments. lost much of their force as a 
result. The Vickers Medium influenced every major step in 
the formaticn of British tank thinking - the fear of anti- 
tank guns, the rise of the light tank, the conviction that 
tanks were too complicated for conscript armies to learn, 
the development of orderly (and perhaps over orderly) 
tactics - all owed their origin to that tank. After the 
money situation, it was the most important single factor 





Like other historical problems, the tank controversy 
took place in a certain, unique historical context. Had 
certain facts not been true in the background of the 
controversy, the progress of mechanization in the British 
Army would have taken a very different course than it did. 
The tank had been invented and designed for a certain 
specific use; it was a solution to a particular problem at 
a particular time although men with vision might read 
another future for it. It was a solution to the military 
problem of the Western Front as it revealed itself to be 
in 1915 and the development of the tank was shaped in that 
event. Therefore, when the tank controversy began after 
the war, the tank already had a history from which 
conclusions could be drawn for the future. The tank's 
activities in the First World War is the first of the 
background factors which must be made clear. The war had 
cost the United Kingdom a great deal of money; thousands 
of millions of pounds were spent and great damage was done 
to her investments abroad and to her principal sources of 
income. It was therefore imperative that the post war 
governments make every endeavour to economize so that 
Britain's financial affairs could be set straight and her 
massive debts paid off. The second of the background 
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factors was the constant pressure for economy that all 
government departments felt and, not least, the pressure 
on the Army. The war, at such a cost of blood and 
treasure, had done at least one thing: Britain had rid 
herself of her great enemy. It appeared that, for the 
first time in many years, Britain could look to a future 
free from the threat of a great war. This is the third of 
the background factors: the officially given decision that 
the Armed Services should plan on the assumption that 
there would be no great war in the immediate future - the 
Ten Year Rule. The end of the war presented the British 
Army with many new responsibilities and the combination of 
the drive for economy and a balanced budget ensured that 
the Army would be too weak to fulfil these massive new 
duties. This is the fourth background factor: the British 
Army's weaknesses in coping with its day to day problems. 
These four background factors are the legacies of the 
war that created the tank, the war that cost Britain so 
much, the war that destroyed her greatest enemy, the war 
that created turmoil that made the Army's problems so much 
greater. 
These four circumstances had their effect on the tank 
controversy. The tank's history was short and the lessons 
from that history were not clear to all; the tank was so 
expensive a weapon that thrifty governments were unwilling 
to pay for very many; the tank was principally a weapon 
for that great war for which the Army was told not to 
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prepare; the tank seemed little use for the Army's role of 
keepinq order over a quarter of the world. These four 
factors are too often omitted in accounts of the tank 
controversy in the British Army between the wars. The 
fact was that these four inflexible facts reduced the 
tanks to possibly the lowest position in the Army's long 
list of priorities. 
The Tanks in the War 
A necessary prerequisite for understanding the 
background to the tank controversy is a brief account of 
the tanks in the First World War. The war was the only 
practical experience which the Tank corps had to form its 
opinions and desires for further development. Two pitched 
battles stand out in the war time history of the Corps: 
Cambrai in 1917 and Amiens in 1918. Only in these two 
battles were there large numbers of tanks used as the 
planners in the Tank Corps wanted them to be used. The 
battles share a common structure. In each case there was 
no preliminary bombardment and, probably as a result, in 
each case there was surprise. The first day of each 
battle saw substantial gains in ground, material and 
priscners for relatively low casualty returns. In each 
case, after the first day, the impetus of the battle 
slowed as tank casualties mounted although Amiens was a 
greater success than Cambrai partly because German morale 
was lower. Each battle produced heavy casualties among 
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the machines but, in each case, it seems that these 
casualties were caused more by mechanical failure than by 
enemy action. In what follows, a very brief account of 
each battle will be given, followed by figures supporting 
the conclusions that tanks represented a great economy, 
that their casualties were very high and that these 
casualties, in most cases, were probably not caused by the 
enemy guns. The symmetry of the two battles extends 
further for each gave rise to a mythical event; one was 
"pro tank" and the other was "anti tank". The tank men 
saw the breakaway action of the lone whippet tank, 
"Musical Box", as an example of the future; those who 
argued against tanks saw the exploits of the German gunner 
at Flesquieres Ridge as showing how vulnerable tanks 
really were. 
The first major tank action in history was the battle 
of Cambrai in November 1917. The plan for the battle had 
its origin in a suggestion by J. F. C. Fuller, the Tank 
Corps' GSO1, for a tank raid on St. Quentin but, when 
finally determined upon, the small scale raid had become a 
large scale attack involving about 380 tanks, six infantry 
and four cavalry divisions. The Tank Corps developed a 
complicated tactical drill which was accepted by all but 
one of the divisional commanders. (1) The attack began on 
the morning of 20 November with a short hurricane 
bombardment which caught the Germans completely by 
surprise. By noon it was clear that something 
unprecedented on the Western Front had happened. The 
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assaulting troops had advanced nearly five miles on a 
13,000 yard front capturing 8000 prisoners for losses of 
about 4000. After this first success, the battle 
continued for about a week with minor gains. At the end 
of this period, the British commanders judged the battle 
to be over, withdrew what tanks were left and settled down 
to enjoy their new positions. However, the Germans 
counter attacked on 30 November and, by 7 December, had 
gained back most of the ground lost on the first day and 
equalized the casualties. The battle that had begun so 
promisingly had ended in the usual disappointing 
stalemate. (2) 
A year later was fought a greater tank battle which 
had longer lasting results. The great German offensives 
of March and April 1916 had left a vital railway line 
threatened in front of Amiens. It was determined by the 
Allied High Command that a tank attack would be launched 
in order to push the Germans away from Amiens and recover 
as much of the old Allied trench line as possible. About 
600 tanks were assembled with most of them going to 
support the Canadian and Australian Corps. The flanks of 
the attackers would be held by the British Third Corps to 
the north and the French XXXI Corps to the south. The 
attack began at dawn on 8 August and, as at Cambrai, the 
absence of long preliminary bombardments secured surprise. 
By evening the attackers had advanced seven and a half 
miles for about 5000 casualties; German losses were in the 
range of 27,000 men and 400 guns. Allied attacks 
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continued until the 11th and, this time, there was no 
German counter attack. (3) From this battle until the end 
of the war, tanks were constantly in action along the 
whole Western Front in support of the unceasing Allied 
attacks. The battle of Amiens was a considerable shock to 
the Germans and Ludendorf described it as the "black day 
of the German Army". (4) 
In these two battles three conclusions stand out. 
Tanks, in sufficient quantities and properly handled, 
resulted in a great savings of lives, time and effort: 
each of these battles, on its first day, achieved results 
that the conventional pattern of infantry-artillery 
battles took months and hundreds of thousands of lives to 
gain. Seccnd, tank attacks, if properly planned, were 
usually successful: no adequate defence against them was 
developed by the Germans. Third, casualties among the 
tanks themselves were very high: 40% to 50% per day were 
destroyed or became disabled. These three conclusions are 
important for they were to reappear in the post war 
debates. The First World War represented almost all the 
experience of tank fighting that the British Army was to 
have until the next war and continual references were made 
to the "the lessons of the war" in the post war years. 
The Tank Corps had always claimed that, given a 
chance, tanks would save lives and so it was found to be. 
The first day of the battle of the Somme in 1916 had cost 
the British Army 60,000 casualties (5); in return, the 
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line had been advanced one and a quarter miles at most. 
The first day at Cambrai saw gains of five miles for 4000 
casualties. An equivalent gain at the third battle of 
Ypres in 1917 took three and a half months and cost some 
quarter of a million British casualties. (6) The battle of 
the Somme in 1916 lasted about five months and saw more 
than 400,000 casualties for an equivalent gain in 
territory. (7) The first day of Amiens gained seven miles 
at a cost of 5000 men; 20,000 men were killed on 1 July 
1916 for an insignificant gain in ground and 2000 German 
prisoners. At Amiens the Australian Corps had 83 men 
killed (8) ; on the Somme over 600 men of the Newfoundland 
Battalion were casualties. (9) There can be no doubt 
whatsoever that the tanks saved thousands of lives in the 
First World War. A square mile of ground gained by the 
British cost 5,277 men in 1916,8,222 in 1917 and, with 
the greater use of tanks, 86 men in 1918. (10) So effective 
and so economical were tanks that Sir Eustace d'Eyncourt 
(one of the "fathers" of the tank) suggested in a 
memorandum in 1917 that one tank with a crew of eight or 
nine men was worth 400 infantry men in an attack (11) and 
Haig "having regard to the proved utility of tanks" 
recommended in mid 1917 a doubling of the Tank Corps. (12) 
Not only were tanks effective but also they 
represented a savings in money. Because a tank was 
relatively unaffected by barbed wire, the long artillery 
bombardments designed to cut the wire could be dispensed 
with. Assuming the average price of a shell to have been 
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3 Pounds, the preliminary bombardments at the first battle 
of the Somme, the battle of Arras and the third battle of 
Ypres had cost a total of 7,250,000 Pounds. This sum, at 
5,000 Pounds per tank, would have bought 3500 tanks or, 
with one tank being used four times, 14,000 tank 
"sorties". Since the first days of Cambrai and Amiens 
were conducted with less than 1000 tank sorties, the 
effect of another 13,000 sorties is difficult to 
imagine. (13) The clear conclusion of these two tank 
battles is that a one day tank battle would gain results 
that would cost several hundred thousand less lives, three 
or four less months and two or three million less Pounds 
than any other method. The rapid expansion of the Tank 
Corps is proof that these facts were recognized by the 
High Command. 
The tanks saved lives among the attacking infantry 
but they themselves suffered heavily. One of the reasons 
why Cambrai had had such a disappointing ending was that, 
after the first few days, there were virtually no tanks 
left and the battle had become an infantry-artillery 
assault with all the usual problems of high casualties and 
impossible communications. At Amiens too, there were few 
tanks left by the end of the battle. At Cambrai 378 tanks 
were available (although not all were used) and by the end 
of the day 179 were out of action - 47.35%. (14) At Amiens 
270 out of 415 fighting tanks were lost - 65.06% - on the 
first day. The second day of Amiens saw 39 of 145 
disabled or destroyed - 26.9% - the third 30 out of 67 - 
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44.78%. (15) That is an average of 45.58% of tanks 
destroyed or disbled per day of attack. Enemy gun fire 
accounted for only part of the total. At Cambrai on the 
first day 36.31% of the casualties were from hostile fire, 
the rest were a result of mechanical problems or 
ditching. (16) At Amiens the proportion of enemy inflicted 
casualties rose day by day - 37.04%, 50% and nearly all of 
the casualties on 10 August - as the German gun crews 
gained in skill and the attacking troops tired. (17) The 
rhomboid tanks were very delicate and prone to breakdown 
and they had not been built to last. (18) Between 8 August 
1918 and the Armistice there were 1995 tank sorties; 887 
tanks became casualties (44.46%) but the majcrity of these 
were reissued and, in fact, only 89 (4.46%) were 
permanently knocked out. (19) These figures suggest that 
the majority of tank casualties were breakdowns, ditchings 
or other mishaps and not the result of enemy action. 
The greatest enemy of the early tanks was their own 
mechanical unreliability and not the enemy guns. The 
German gunners seem to have been neutralized and put out 
of action by a combination of the speed and surprise which 
tanks achieved and the hurricane bombardments which 
preceded the attacks. The war experience did not provide 
a definite answer to the question of how effective 
artillery would be against tanks and there was no guide 
for the post war controversy in this respect. Guns had 
achieved a success against tanks at Flesquieres Ridge in 
the battle of Cambrai (20) but at the Messines Ridge on 7 
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June 1917, the preliminary bombardment was found to have 
destroyed the five anti-tank guns that had been placed 
there. (21) Indirect fire stopped the French tanks at le 
Chemin des Dames but failed to do so at Laffaux (5 May 
1917) or at Malmaison (24 October 1917). (22) In balance, 
it would seem that guns were not especially effective 
against tank attacks but this may be because the Germans 
did not take tanks seriously until it was too late for 
them to develop counters to them. Certainly accuracy of 
gunnery left something to be desired: on 31 July 1917 a 
British tank spent 30 hours under continuous fire without 
being hit cnce (23); another tank held out for 72 hours 
against fire from both sides without being put out of 
action. (24) Even when a tank was hit there was sometimes 
no damage -a tank officer told of a German shell's 
entering his tank's roof and exploding inside; the only 
damage was a $'scratched finger". (25) At Cambrai a tank 
which had moved ahead of its infantry charged a battery 
and destroyed four guns without mishap. (26) It seems 
therefore, that gunnery as practiced by the Germans in the 
War did not prove to be an effective antidote to tanks 
and, in fact, that there was very little that they were 
able to do in the face of a tank attack. But it cannot be 
denied that the Germans did not foresee the challenge of 
the tank - Cambrai, as seen from their side, did not 
suggest that the tank was much to fear. In 1918 they 
began to pay more attention to the problem and they began 
to develop tactics and weapons but the war ended before 
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they could prove these in battle. (27) 
It seems that the tanks could claim, at the least, to 
have hastened the end of the war. The Supreme War Council 
"considered that there was no possibility of the Allies 
gaining the final decision or even a substantial victory 
in 1918". (28) The battle of Amiens was a tank battle and 
would not have had the same results had the tanks been 
absent and Amiens seems to have been a decisive factor in 
the collapse of German morale. The First World War proved 
the utility of the tank under the conditions of the 
Western Front and demonstrated that the high tank 
casualties were not primarily caused by enemy 
countermeasures. The question that remained in 1919 was 
whether the lessons of the First World War were a guide to 
the future. Was the pattern that emerged from the tank 
battles a pattern that would be followed in different 
conditions at a later time? (29) 
The_Pressure 
_of_Economy 
No consideration cf the background of the tank 
controversy can be complete without some consideration of 
the attempts continually being made to reduce Army 
expenditure. Zhese reductions as they affected the Tank 
Corps will be referred to throughout this work but it is 
appropriate to describe the two major economy drives 
between the Wars. The first of these ran from the end of 
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the war until 1924/1925 and reduced the Army from its 
extraordinary war time levels to a level at which it was 
to remain until the Great Depression. This period 
included the famous "Geddes Axe" instituted by a 
government fearful that reduction was not proceeding fast 
enouqh. The second cut - the May Committee and the 
temporary cuts - was a result of the financial and 
economic crisis of 1931. The Army was under continual 
pressure to reduce its expenditure and then to further 
reduce it with the result that, from 1919 to 1932, each 
year's Army Estimates was lower than the previous year's. 
The Estimates rose in 1933 and 1934 but only back to the 
level which preceded the May Committee cuts. From 1926 to 
1934, the Army had an average of less than 40 million 
Pounds a year to spend of which about 8 million was spent 
on non effective services (pensions and the like). Every 
arm of the Army was under pressure and not least that 
newcomer, the Tank Corps. (30) 
The Army Estimates of 1919/1920 inform us that the 
British Army (exclusive of India) stood at two and a half 
million men costing the taxpayer over four hundred million 
Pounds. (31) It was imperative that these figures be 
reduced as soon as possible and by 1924/1925 the Army 
contained 161,000 men and cost about 45 million Pounds. A 
Treasury memorandum of 1921 pointed out the facts of the 
matter. The maximum government revenue in 1922/1923 would 
be 950 million Pounds; debts created by the war would 
necessitate payments on principal and interest of 465 
2 27 
million; that would leave 485 million available for 
Supply; the Supply Estimates of 1921/1922 had been 974 
million; neither taxation nor public debt could be 
increased; therefore, the Supply Estimates must be 
reduced. (32) In this reduction the Army was expected to 
play its part. 
In the Army Council in 1920 Churchill (33) stressed 
the need for economy on the 1921/1922 Estimates and the 
Council agreed to reconsider its needs; in a further 
meeting Churchill stated that the non fighting services 
must be reduced by three or four million Pounds. (34) When 
Churchill left office, he had left behind draft Estimates 
of some 119 million but this was not good enough; the Army 
Council had subsequently reduced the Estimates to 113.6 
million but that was not good enough. That sum had been 
divided between 32.3 million Pounds for the Middle East 
(which the Foreign Office was expected to return to the 
War Office) and 81.3 million for other Army expenses. The 
first figure must be cut to 30 million and the second to 
not more than 78 million Pounds. And this was only the 
beginning. Among a list of proposed reductions, the Army 
Council agreed to cut 3000 horses and three cavalry 
regiments, 100,000 Pounds from the tanks and another 
100,000 Pounds from the Army Technical Schools. (35) 
However, by May 1921, only 1200 horses had gone and the 
cavalry regiments had not begun their reduction. (36) Next 
month the Army Council was told of '#the necessity for 
drastic reduction" in the Estimates. The Secretary of 
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State for War (37) demanded reductions of 10 million 
Pounds (this not to include the Middle East) and ordered 
each member of the Council to consider how he could make a 
15% cut in his department. Appended to the minutes of the 
meeting was the Treasury report already mentioned. (38) In 
November 1922, the Secretary of State (39) demanded cuts 
of 6 million Pounds of which the fighting part of the Army 
had to find 3 million Pounds. (40) Further reductions were 
made in the 1924/1925 Estimates but when the Secretary of 
State, acting at the Chancellor's request, asked whether 
further cuts could not be made, he found that, in the 
opinion of the Military Members, "no further reductions 
could be made without prejudice to efficiency. "(41) 
Nonetheless, the pressures were too strong for the 
soldiers to resist and, between, 1924/1925 and 1931/1932, 
the Estimates drifted down a further five million Pounds a 
year and a further 12,000 men. 
In order to supervise the post war reductions, the 
government had set up a committee under Sir Eric Geddes 
(42) which repcrted on February 1922 on possible economies 
in the Supply Estimates. In the debate in Parliament 
which followed, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated 
that the Committee had recommended a savings in the Army 
of 15.5 million Pounds and 39,000 men; the Army had 
actually reduced by 17 million and 33,000 men. (43) In its 
examination of the Army, the Committee had asked the Army 
Council scme searching questions. It was suggested that 
the Cardwell System might not be an economical relief 
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system and the war office was asked to consider an 
alternative. It seemed to be the intention of the War 
office to have a Ere war scale Expeditionary Force (44) 
notwithstanding the fact that there was no longer a German 
Army and that there was now a Tank Corps and an Air Force. 
Why was there a pre war ratio of cavalry to infantry and 
what kind of savings could be made if the cavalry were to 
be reduced by half? Why were there four infantry 
battalions surplus to the Cardwell requirements? Why were 
there three Household Cavalry regiments and could they not 
be reduced to one? The Committee concluded by asking for 
a statement on the future of mechanization: 
The Tank Corps is a new arm of the 
Service... The Committee would like to 
know what savings have been realized in 
other arms of the Service through the 
adoption of this form of mechanical 
warfare, and what will be the total cost, 
including provisions of tanks, of the 
Corps in 1922/1923. 
These were important and difficult questions; 
unfortunately the Army Council did not answer them: 
reductions in cavalry, the future structure of the Army 
and savings through mechanization all depended on the 
tanks: 
As soon as satisfactory designs of tanks 
can be approved and sufficient numbers 
produced, further reductions of other arms 
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will be considered. 
The existence of the Tank Corps had already alloyed four 
cavalry regiments to be disbanded and the Corps' cost in 
1922/1923 was expected to be 1.8 million Pounds of which 
half a million was to be spent on material. (45) 
Although disappointing, the answer was reasonable 
enough for there were no tanks in the Corps at that time 
except for a number from obsolete war stocks and further 
consideration obviously did depend on the Tank Corps' 
getting a decent machine. (46) But it is a pity that the 
Army Council did not say just why the 1914 establishment 
and the Cardwell System were being retained. (47) 
After the Geddes Committee reductions the Estimates 
continued at about the same level until 1931/1932. In 
1931 another economic crisis occured and again a committee 
was created to oversee spending cuts. The May Committee 
recommended reductions of some four million Pounds in the 
Service budgets, to this the Labour government added a 
further cut of some five million for a total of about nine 
million Pounds. Before any further action could be taken, 
the Labour government was replaced by the National 
government. The new cabinet reduced the Air Force's 
reduction to about 500,000 Pounds so that the total 
Service reduction demanded was about 8,600,000 Pounds. (48) 
The reductions which were expected from the Army 
confronted the Army Council on 31 August 1931. These were 
now in two parts. The May Committee had proposed a 
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permanent cut of 1,693,000 Pounds and to this the Council 
agreed although it reserved to itself the right to make 
the savings in the areas it chose. (49) The second part was 
a government recommended temporary reduction of 2,000,000 
Pounds. The Council agreed that this could be realized by 
"standing fast" for one year. (50) In conclusion, the Army 
Council pledged itself to reductions totalling 3,683,000 
Pounds. The May Committee's reductions were to come 
chiefly from a 1,255,000 Pounds reduction in the pay of 
officers and men. It was determined that up to 2,108,000 
Pounds could be shaved off expenditure by standing 
fast. (51) 
When the 1932/1933 Army Estimates appeared they duly 
showed a reduction of 3,442,000 Pounds - slightly less 
than promised although, when actual expenditure was 
calculated, the total savings were found to be about 3.8 
million Pounds. These cuts were spread fairly equitably 
and did not affect the RIC too much: RTC Central Schools 
were down about 8%, Tracked and Half Tracked Vehicle 
Expenditure dcwn about 10% and the experimental 
establishments were about the same while petrol 
expenditure had increased about 4%. Next year, most of 
the temporary cuts were lifted and the Estimates increased 
by about 1.4 million Pounds. After 1933/1934 the Army 
Estimates began to creep higher until a large increase of 
13 million Pcunds in 1937/1938 saw rearmament begin in 
earnest. 
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The Ten Yeur_Rule 
In scme respects, the most important of the 
conditions within which the tank controversy must be 
considered was that official principle which has come to 
be known as the "Ten Year Rule". The burden of this 
principle, within which the Service Estimates had to be 
framed, was that no major war involving the United Kingdom 
was likely within the near future. Broadly speaking, the 
history of this assumption was as follows. It was 
introduced in 1919 as a guide for the next year's defence 
estimates, was extended one by one to each of the Services 
and in 1928 was formally adopted by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence as a guiding principle of expenditure 
which it remained until abandoned in 1932. The Ten Year 
Rule has incurred some controversy and has even been cited 
as beinq to blame for the deficiencies of British defence 
in the middle and later 1930s. (52) Whether or not such an 
extreme view is justified, the rule, at least in its first 
years, was a reasonable and even necessary assumption and, 
certainly before the early 1930's, there was little 
prospect of Britain's becoming involved in a major war. 
It first made its appearance at a meeting of the 
Cabinet Committee on Finance on 11 August 1919. The 
Fighting Services were to be required to draw up fresh 
Estimates based on the assumption that no "great war" was 
to be anticipated within the next ten years, that the 
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"principal responsibility" of the three Services should be 
the maintenance of order in the Empire and that the 
"utmost should be made of air power and other mechanical 
devices in order to save manpower". (53) A few days later, 
the War Cabinet agreed to a very similar provision adding 
to the earlier decision (among other points) that no 
Expeditionary Force was required for a great war and that 
"in framing the Estimates, the following maximum figures 
should be aimed at: - Royal Navy 60,000,000 Pounds, Army 
and Royal Air Force 75,000,000 Pounds". (54) Of interest in 
these two earlier versions of the rule is a provision 
absent from later ones, that use should be made of 
mechanical devices in order to conserve manpower. These 
two rules were to apply to the next year's Estimates only 
and there is no reason to suppose that it was anticipated 
that the "Ten Year Rule" would become a primary principle 
of British defence policy. Indeed, Hankey's opinion was 
that "the decision of the Finance Committee has been 
interpreted rather more widely than was intended". (55) 
After 1919 the principle that no major war was to be 
expected for ten years was extended to each of the three 
Services without becoming a general basis of Estimates for 
all the Services. In 1925 the CID accepted the view of 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that 
in existing circumstances, aggressive 
action against the British Empire on the 
part of Japan within the next ten years is 
not a contingency to be seriously 
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apprehended. 
To this the Cabinet agreed a month later. (56) In 1925 the 
Cabinet accepted the report of a sub-committee postponing 
a programme of air expansion until 1935-1936. (57) In 1927 
the Cabinet agreed 
that it should be assumed for the purpose 
of the Estimates that the British Empire 
will not be engaged in a European War 
during the next ten years and that the 
immediate plans of the Army should be 
based upon preparedness for an extra- 
European War. 
The CID took note of this Cabinet conclusion in 1928. (58) 
The Ten Year Rule proper, that is to say, a provision 
affecting all Services and one which moved forward day by 
day was adopted by the CID in 1928. In that year Winston 
Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer asked the CID to 
consider adopting his proposal 
That it should now be laid down as a 
standing assumption that at any given date 
there will be no major war for ten years 
from that date. (59) 
This matter was discussed at a meeting of the CID held on 
5 July 1928. Churchill observed that a ten year period 
had been mentioned before in the Committee as a "rough 
guide" f or naval or military preparations and that he now 
wished to see such a principle regularized and advance 
"day by day's with an annual review. After considerable 
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discussion, in which Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign 
Secretray, stressed the difficulty if not impossibility of 
prediction, the Committee accepted Churchill's 
suggestions. The Committee agreed 
That it should be assumed, for the purpose 
of framing the Estimates of the Fighting 
Services, that at any given date there 
will be no war for ten years. 
Two other conclusions laid down the principle of annual 
review and stressed that any department of the British 
government or any Dominion government could, at any time, 
ask the CID to review the conclusion in the light of 
changed circumstances. (60) The CID reaffirmed its 
conclusion in 1929, (61) 1930 (62) and 1931 (63) with 
little discussion although the Foreign office registered a 
mild caveat in 1931. 
in 1932 a near unanimous attack was made on the Ten 
Year Rule in the committee of imperial Defence. MacDonald 
sugqested that the Committee should accept the 
recommendations of the COS Committee (that Committee had 
devoted virtually the whole of its annual report to an 
attack on the rule) and report them to the Cabinet "who 
would consider them on the understanding that the matter 
could not be allowed to drift". Accordingly, after some 
further discussion, the Committee agreed in exactly the 
words of the COS Subcommittee: 
(1) That the assumption governing the 
Estimates of the Defence Services, that 
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from any given date there will be no major 
war for ten years, should be cancelled. 
(2) That a start should be made in 
providing for commitments which are purely 
defensive, including the defence of bases. 
First priority should be given to 
requirements in the Far East... 
(3) That a decision should not be delayed 
until the results of the Disarmament 
Conference are known. Recent events in 
the Far East are ominous. We cannot 
ignore the Writing on the Wall. (64) 
"No dissent was expressed" by the Cabinet from this 
decision when it met on the next day although it was 
stressed that "this must not be taken to justify an 
expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without 
regard to the very serious financial and economic 
situation that still obtains". (65) 
And so the Ten Year Rule ended - two years too late. 
Post_War_Responsibilities of the Army 
Between the wars the British Army was trapped in an 
ever tightening vise: the war had left, on the one hand, a 
legacy of increased responsibility for the Army and, on 
the other hand, an inflexible demand that costs be pared 
as closely as they could be. Because the Cabinet ruled in 
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Britain and because it was a Cabinet of civilians, the 
Army was dictated to on the matters of both its 
responsibilities and its assets. A consideration of the 
Army's duties and its capacity to carry out these duties 
will complete this examination of the parameters within 
which the tank problem must be seen. 
The post war settlements left the United Kingdom with 
greatly increased responsibilities most of which fell to 
the Army tc grapple with. Roughly speaking, Britain was 
left with all the responsibilities that she had had in 
1914 (except that of the German threat) and new ones of 
the mandated territories in the Middle East, vague but 
potentially large commitments as a result of the various 
European pacts and the League of Nations. 
The mandate was a new idea. Germany and Turkey had 
had extensive possessions and these had been taken from 
them by the peace treaties. In order to disarm the charge 
of "imperialism" or "colonialism" the notion of a mandate 
was invented which allowed the imperial powers to take 
these colonies and "lead them by the hand" to self- 
government. (66) The German Empire in Africa was divided 
among Britain, France, Belgium and South Africa and her 
Pacific ocean possessions went to Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan. Britain's acquisition of her new African 
mandates caused her little trouble but it was not so with 
her ex-Turkish territories. These, for the most part in 
the Middle East, were divided among France and Britain 
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with the creation of a new Arab state. As is well 
evidenced today, these were troubled areas and the 
situation was not improved by the Balfour Declaration 
establishing a "Jewish Homeland" and the vague and 
imprecise promises made to the Sherif of Mecca concerning 
an Arab self governimg nation. Britain's share consisted 
of all or part of modern Israel, Jordan, Iraq and Persia 
with a paternal interest in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States. (67) These mandates were to cost Britain much and 
profit her not at all. So troublesome was Palestine that 
British pclicy was described as simply a matter of 
"hoping... tha t something will turn up. " (6B) 
The vague promises 
Nations and the increase 
and mandates, combined 
that was full of menace 
strategic pressures were 
1927: 
of Locarno and the League of 
of nationalism in her possessions 
to create a strategic situation 
for Britain. These and other 
summed up by the General Staff in 
The situation as it exists today, shows a 
very different Picture <from the 'more 
clearly defined' one of 1914>. Though the 
danger of another European war, in which 
we should be called upon to participate is 
remote, we have accepted certain 
liabilities under the Pact of Locarno 
which demand the maintenance by us of 
military forces adequate to meet this 
obligation. In addition, not only have we 
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accepted mandates for large territories, 
such as Palestine and Iraq, for the 
defence of which we are pledged, but, in 
the general upheaval of the world which 
has resulted from the war, our military 
liabilities in the East have been 
considerably increased by such disturbing 
factors as the Russian revolution, the 
chaotic condition of China, the growth of 
the Swaraj movement in India, and the 
political ambitions of an independent 
anti-British Egypt. Added to all this we 
have the problem of maintaining the 
internal security of our own country 
against subversive activities which are 
largely prompted and financed by Russia, 
and which have shown, in the General 
Strike of 1926, what proportions such a 
danger can very rapidly assume. (69) 
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There was no lack of things for the British Army to 
do between the wars. It may have been a time of peace for 
the country as a whole, but for the Army it was not. 
Between 1918 and 1933 the British Army had extraordinary 
problems in Russia, Ireland, Germany, Turkey and China. 
In addition it was wholly or partly responsible for the 
peace in India, the North West Frontier, Palestine, Egypt, 
the Sudan, Mesopotamia, Iraq, Persia, various colonies and 
bases scattered throughout the world and internal problems 
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connected vith labour unrest at home. 
How well equipped and manned was the Army for all 
this? A report from the CIGS in 1923 (70) gives the 
answer for that year. At the time, the British Army had 
forces stationed in Britain, Ireland, on the Rhine, near 
Constantinople, in Egypt, in Iraq and in the Colonies. (71) 
There were, of course, forces in India as well. in the 
case of local hostilities developing in these places, 
reinforcements varying in size from two divisions to 
fourteen divisions would be required. (72) In 1923, there 
was no force in Britain fit to take the field without 
mobilization. Given two weeks, one cavalry brigade and 
two infantry divisions could be ready to sail. This force 
was considered adequate for trouble in Palestine; 
everywhere else it would be insufficient. (73) 
Overall, the situation in 1927 was no better than it 
had been in 1923: the Army was just able to cope with its 
responsibilities so long as there was no trouble. A 
meeting of the Army Council considered what forces could 
be sent to India in the event of a war with the Soviet 
Union "necessitating operations on the North West 
Frontier". The total forces, arriving over six months, 
would consist of five infantry and one cavalry divisions - 
still not as many as the 1923 report considered 
necessary. (74) Milne (75) prepared a memorandum to the 
Secretary of State for War in that year protesting against 
further reducticns of the Army: 
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... we have already reduced too much as far 
as the infantry is concerned, whilst, as 
regards the other arms, they are barely 
able to fill the role required of them in 
peace, and they are admittedly short of 
the reserves that are necessary to enable 
them to mobilize for war. (76) 
The Report explained that the Expeditionary Force was 
organized haphazardly on the basis of the Cardwell System 
and bore "no relation either to the size of any particular 
foreign army or to any of the liabilities which it may be 
called upon to meet". (77) Despite the increase in her 
commitments, Britain's army was smaller than it had been 
before the war. (78) Indeed, so great was the pressure for 
men, that even so comparatively small an emergency as that 
at Shanghai in 1927 had stretched reserves. (79) Britain's 
greatest problem, Milne continued perhaps unrealistically, 
was the defence of India against the Soviet Union, but she 
had less than half the strength necessary to deal with 
this threat. (80) Turning from the infantry, the Report had 
this to say about the Royal Tank Corps: 
As regards tanks, we have only four 
battalions on a peace footing and those 
only partially equipped; it is improbable 
that we could now place in the field more 
than 2 battalions each with a reduced 
establishment of 48 fighting tanks, i. e. 
96 of these weapons for our five 
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divisions. As the exiguous reserves of 
men and material thus do not meet the 
requirements of initial mobilization of 
even the existing battalions there is no 
means of creating additional tank units. 
The part that tanks are likely to play in 
the next war can be estimated when it is 
recalled that in 1918 when we had 61 
divisicns on the Western Front, it had 
been decided to construct 8,000 of these 
weapons for the 1919 campaign; this would 
have given an average of about 130 tanks 
per division. 
Cavalry, because of the demands of the Cardwell System, 
could not be reduced further. (81) Even at this, the 
Expeditionary Force could not be mobilized "until a 
considerable number of post-mobilization recruits have 
been enlisted and trained". Milne's conclusions were as 
follows: 
(a) In the Near, Middle and Far East, we 
have greater commitments than in 1914, but 
we have reduced garrisons to meet them. 
(b) To increase these garrisons to the 
minimum strength reqiired for reasonable 
security under present conditions would 
entail an additional 5 infantry battalions 
on foreign service. This would upset the 
balance of line battalions at Home and 
2 43 
Abroad, and, since financial conditions 
preclude an increase in the number of 
battalions, could only be adjusted by a 
modification of the Cardwell System. 
(c) Such a modification would involve a 
reduction of the pool of infantry at home 
from which to organize our Expeditionary 
Force to such figures as to leave 
practically no margin for internal 
security in England. The latter problem 
has assumed increased importance as a 
result of Russian communistic activities. 
(d) Our present proportion of artillery 
and tanks is dangerously low, and any 
further modification in cavalry should be 
in the nature of a conversion of units 
rather than a reduction in number. 
(e) Any further reduction in the Regular 
Army will reduce still further its reserve 
producing capacity. This is already too 
low to enable us to mobilize our present 
British garrison in India and the 
Expeditionary Force within reasonable 
time. (82) 
There was no avoiding the fact - the British Army had been 
given responsibilities with which, given 'financial 
considerations", it could not cope. 
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This short examination of the four delimiting factors 
of the tank controversy - the frame of the picture so to 
speak - has now been completed. To none of these four 
could any activities of the Tank Corps or its civilian 
supporters have made any difference; for that matter, no 
one could have changed them. They were the facts of the 
situation. The First World War had not given a clear 
directive for the future development of tanks (83), 
economy was essential, the Ten Year Rule merely recognized 
the actuality of the situation and the combination of 
these last two ensured that the Army would be kept at a 
dangerously low level. Nothing could be done about it; it 
was the way things were. Little has been said about how 
the Tank Corps fitted into all this but that will be made 
clear in the remainder of this thesis. Again and again, 
we shall find these four factors crossing and recrossing 
the trail of the Tank Corps. It is fruitless therefore, 
to speak of what might have been if only there was more 
money. There was no more money. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Utility_of_the Tank: Froý_Certainý to_guestioning 
34b 
Logically, the place to begin a consideration of the 
tank controversy in the British Army between the wars is 
with the decision to continue with the development of and 
experimentation with tanks after the war. Tanks had shown 
their value during the war, but would they have a future, 
or were they merely a solution for a passing problem? In 
fact, there was little discussion of this point. There 
were two compelling arguments for tanks: they were more 
economical of lives and effort than other land weapon 
systems and they were a great deal more effective than 
other land weapon systems. Therefore, with little debate, 
it was assumed that tanks would continue to have a place 
in the post war Army. Granted this, of course, there were 
many matters of organization and design to be settled; 
these were the subject of much disagreement and will be 
considered in later chapters. But the decision to retain 
the tank was easily taken. 
In the first flush of enthusiasm after the war, it 
was taken for granted by nearly everybody in the Army and 
the War office that tanks offered an opportunity, by 
virtue of their greater effectiveness, for the Army 
Estimates to be greatly reduced with no loss of 
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efficiency. As time went on, however, this principle came 
to be questioned for tanks and tank units were more 
expensive than ether units and the promised economies 
never seemed to materialize. But the connection between 
tanks and economy was generally assumed in the first few 
years after the war. There was a similiar development of 
the conviction that tanks were so effective; towards the 
end of the 1920's some thinkers began to question whether 
the unreliabilities of the various British designs might 
not mean that the tank had a very reduced future. 
However, the greatest doubt about the value of the tank 
came in the later 1920's with the development of anti-tank 
guns. Until about 1927 the tank had seemed supreme and it 
had seemed that the other arms would not be able to defend 
themselves against tank attacks: future land warfare might 
become almost entirely a matter for tank fleets as many of 
the tank propagandists believed. But, with the appearance 
of a host of light rapid-fire armour piercing guns, the 
balance seemed to change and more and more soldiers came 
to the conclusion that the tank might be doomed in future 
battles. 
Generally speaking, the arguments for tanks resolved 
themselves into one: tanks are more efficient. Efficiency 
is a combination of effectiveness and economy and the two 
are interrelated. Tanks were economic because they were 
so much more effective than other and more expensive 
combinations of weapons systems and their effectiveness 
was connected with the fact that they were so economical 
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of men and effort. They were, therefore, efficient. 
There was never very much doubt about whether the British 
Army would keep its tanks after the war: no one in an 
important position doubted that they would be useful in 
some role not as yet clearly established. Statements 
hailing the utility of the tank were made from time to 
time and they may be divided into two groups on the basis 
already mentioned. In what follows, we shall look at the 
widely accepted beliefs that tanks were ideal for Britain 
because they would save money and because they were so 
powerful that all future warfare would involve them in 
some capacity or other. 
A number of attempts were made shortly after the war 
to examine in detail the cost effectiveness of tank units 
as aqainst conventional units. The first of these 
appeared as an article in the Tank Corps Journal in 1922. 
The author at some length calculated that, in fighting 
values, a mechanized cavalry regiment would be worth three 
regular cavalry units and that a mechanized infantry unit 
would be worth 1.65 ordinary infantry units. Adding in 
cost values (recognizing that a mechanized unit was 
somewhat more expensive than an unmechanized one) he 
concluded that mechanized units would be up to 60% more 
effective than their unmechanized counterparts for the 
same money. He concluded that "mechanicalization (1) 
provides the one sure road towards combining fighting 
efficiency with economy in the Army". (2) In the same year 
a similiar calculation was made by a cavalry officer. He 
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carefully worked out the costs of tank units equipped with 
various types of tanks as compared with a cavalry brigade. 
He was concerned to determine the costs of tank units 
which would have the same firepower as a cavalry brigade. 
He decided that a cavalry brigade costing 441,000 Pounds 
could be replaced by tank units varying in cost from 
270,480 to 39,648 Pounds. (3) In 1927 a further attempt at 
cost efficiency calculations was made when it was proposed 
that the cavalry division of the Expeditionary Force could 
be replaced by two brigades of "cavalry tankettes" and one 
brigade of "artillery tankettes": this substitution would, 
for the same sum of money, replace the horses with 480 
tankettes with a greatly increased military efficiency. (4) 
The economies to be brought by the tanks were not 
restricted to money however and in 1919 Fuller, proposing 
a "new model army", gave no less than seventeen ways in 
which such a mechanized force could effect economies. 
Tanks saved men and weapons, organization and maintenance 
were simplified, tanks saved fighting manpower, infantry 
casualties (and enemy casualties would be correspondingly 
increased), artillery and cavalry personnel, ammunition, 
manufacturing manpower, transport, weight carried by 
infantry, labour on the battlefield, property, forage and 
food, time and cost in production. This was a very 
complete list and summed up the ways in which tanks, by 
their increased efficiency, could reduce effort. (5) He 
returned to the subject in 1921 and gave a similiar list. 
From this he concluded that mechanization offered Britain 
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considerable benefits: the war had increased the territory 
that her forces had to police but AFVs could, by virtue of 
their greater speed, patrol more territory than a slower 
conventional force. Thus, the Army could be reduced in 
manpower and money without reducing its capabilities if it 
were mechanized at the same time as it was reduced. (6) 
These were good arguments and they were convincing 
arguments. They were supported by war time experience. 
In the great tank battles, a few thousand men in tanks 
were able to do what hundreds of thousand of infantry men 
were. not able to do; and the tanks could do it in less 
time. (7) Indeed, these articles and arguments summarized 
above were hardly even necessary - almost everyone 
accepted that tanks and mechanization held out the promise 
of more force for less money. Fuller assumed in 1922 
Without argument that tanks kept "men, movement and 
weapons alive". (ß) Martel stated the axiomatic belief in 
the connection between tanks and economy more bluntly in 
1927: 
The object of mechanization is to render 
an army more efficient in the performance 
of its duties without increasing the cost 
to the country. (9) 
In 1928 General Burnett-Stuart turned the axiom around 
when he stated that money for mechanization could be found 
by a reduction in the number of horses and their riders in 
the Army. (10) 
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The axiom was prevalent in Parliament as well as in 
the Army. In 1924 two Members argued that tanks sa ved 
lives in battle. (11) The following year, Stephen Walsh 
(12) supported the economy axiom by saying that if the 
Army was to be small, it must be made efficient. (13) Again 
in 1925 a Member stated that 
Nechanicalization ought to be encouraged, 
because it means <a saving of> manpower at 
the expense of firepower. (14) 
In 1929 a critic of the Army Estimates argued that too 
much was being spent on the Army and that there were too 
many soldiers in a day in which, with more modern 
equipment, a smaller army would be just as effective. (15) 
In the same year it was argued that, thanks to 
mechanization, fighting strength had greatly increased, so 
that, despite reductions in expenditure, the British Army 
was still very powerful. (16) There are many more examples 
of the tank/economy axiom which could be given but these 
are sufficient to show that many from soldiers to 
pacifists agreed that mechanization gave increased 
efficiency for decreased spending. 
The axiom was officially assumed to be the case: 
indeed the Secretaries of State for War used the increase 
in mechanization as a defence against the charge that they 
were allowing the Army to become too weak. (17) In 1921 
Worthington-Evans gave a clear statement which was to be 
accepted by his successors: 
The ultimate practical use of tanks and 
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armoured cars and their relation to the 
other arms of the service has not yet been 
finally settled. The general view is that 
mechanical means of fighting must be 
developed to the fullest extent. The cost 
of maintenance in peacetime is less and 
the economy of manpower in actual war is 
likely to be greater. (18) 
The Geddes Report had accepted the axiom and it was 
repeated to the House of Commons by the War Secretary (19) 
in 1922. (20) In 1923, in answer to charges that the Army 
was much weaker than it had been in 1914, Lord Derby 
stated that the increase in mechanization had made the 
reduction in numbers no matter for concern. (21) In 1930 a 
similiar charge was made and a statement on policy was 
asked for. The answer was short and to the point: 
The principal object of mechanization is 
the efficiency of the Army. (22) 
As the foregoing makes clear, there was wide 
agreement on the connection between tanks and economy 
through their increased efficiency, so much so that the 
matter was never much debated or discussed. (23) 
There were some who, against this widespread 
agreement, raised unpleasant questions. Tanks could save 
lives; so they had done during the war and so, it was 
assumed, they would do ever after. But in 1925 Lieutenant 
Colonel F. A. Pile predicted that a future war would open 
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with quite bloody tank battles in which it was possible 
that the opposing armies would completely exhaust their 
tank forces in a fairly short time. (24) In saying this 
Pile, an RTC officer himself, may have been guided by the 
high tank casualties in the war. At any rate, his warning 
appears to have been ignored. (25) Undoubtedly the most 
persistent critic of the exaggerated claims of the tank 
enthusiasts was victor Wallace Germaines. He was not 
convinced that tanks would lead to economy. He bolstered 
his arguments (and, at the same time, somewhat weakened 
them) by deductions drawn from naval history. The battle 
of Trafalgar had seen 31 ships and 18,500 men in Nelson's 
fleet and his fleet had suffered 9% casualties. Between 
Trafalgar and Jutland there had been an incalculable 
progress in naval mechanization. if the 
mechanization/economy relationship was as the tank 
enthusiasts claimed, one could expect Jellicoe to have had 
less men and ships than Nelson and many less casualties. 
In fact the Grand Fleet at Jutland had had 147 ships (any 
one of which could have easily sunk Nelson's entire fleet) 
and no less than 56,883 men; the casualties at the later 
battle were higher both relatively and absolutely - the 
fleet lost 11% of its crews. Germains insisted that 
"tanks and aircraft substitute nothing". (26) 
In fact, the Second World War was to show many 
examples of tank attrition battles (27) and it seems that 
Pile and Germains were more correct in their reading of 
the future than the majority. Nevertheless, whether or 
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not the assumption was correct, it was almost universally 
accepted throughout the inter war tank controversy: tanks, 
because of their greater efficiency, would effect 
economies in lives, manpower, effort, money and time. 
Tanks, in short, were the arm of the future. 
Machines were the future. One of the points that 
Fuller never tired of making was that mechanization would 
be continuing the evolution from '#muscle power" to 
"machine power" that had already occured in civilian 
affairs. (28) To him tools were essential and they won 
wars: 
... the outstanding lesson of the 4000 
years of the known history of war <is> 
that Zwar is a matter of tools, and that 
the highest mechanical weapon nearly 
always wins". (29) 
At another time he stated flatly that tools always won; 
the incompetent general with the up to date weapon could 
not fail to defeat the less well equipped military 
genius. (30) This notion of the evolution from muscle to 
machine was echoed in other circles. Milne agreed that 
Foch's opinion that future wars would be determined by 
factories and mechanical resources was shared by "every 
thinking soldier". (31) General Kirke, in the Report of the 
Committee on the Lessons of the Great War, agreed in this 
very Fullerian passage: 
A modern army has become like a muscle- 
bound boxer... The only alternative appears 
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to be a greater reliance on AFVs... They 
alone at the present time appear to be 
capable of restoring that power to deliver 
a quick and powerful blow, which was lost 
by the armies of yesteryear. (32) 
Milne agreed with this ability of the tank to "revive the 
possibility of the art of generalship"; the world could 
not survive another war with the bloodshed of the Western 
Front: tanks and their mobility could ensure against 
stalemate. (33) 
This is of course the reason for the widespread 
belief in the connection between tanks and economy that 
was so prevalent during the period - tanks were simply so 
much more effective than anything else. Tanks were more 
mobile than anything else (34) and it was the combination 
of mobility with hitting power and protection that made 
them so effective. Indeed the tank was incorrectly 
described as being "unique" because it combined these 
three elements. (35) It was frequently stressed how 
helpless the other arms, and the infantry in particular, 
would be when faced with tanks (36) and it was noticed 
that the presence or threat of tanks "not infrequently 
sufficed to cause arthritis in the opposing command". (37) 
Fuller prefaced his famous "Plan 1919" with a 
statement that the tank had changed the art of war (38) 
and this was echoed by a CID sub committee in 1928. (39) 
Warfare after the tank would never be the same. Brigadier 
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Spears spoke for many when he said in Parliament that the 
lesson of the war had been that infantry could not attack 
machine guns without tank support. (40) This was supported 
by the findings of the Committee on the Lessons of the 
Great War: 
If the use of heavy guns and tanks is 
denied to us... we shall be severely 
handicapped. (41) 
It seems that we should not be wrong in 
expanding our resources in tanks to clear 
the way for the infantry. (42) 
Should we again have to intervene on the 
Continent, we must be prepared for mobile 
warfare supported by every possible 
mechanical or scientific contrivance. (43) 
Mechanization was inevitable as a report on the reduction 
of cavalry units in 1921 admitted when it spoke of 
The necessity for fostering those methods 
of mechanical warfare, the utility of 
which was demonstrated by the late 
war. (44) 
Mechanization was coming and nothing could keep it back: 
Milne told the Secretary of State for War in 1927 that 
"Ultimately cavalry must give way to a mechanized 
arm... ". (45) The conclusion from the war was that the 
movement of unarmoured men on the battlefield was 
impossible and that only artillery and AFVs could solve 
the problem. (46) 
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It was not just in so called progressive circles that 
the inevitability and desirability of mechanization was De 
felt: cavalry men knew it too. The Cavalry Committee 
agreed in 1926: 
... that, while it would eventually be 
possible to replace mounted men, to some 
extent at any rate, by men carried in some 
form of armoured car, there can be no 
question of doing this until a cross 
country armoured car has been produced and 
proved, by thorough trial, to meet all 
requirements. (47) 
Grudging agreement no doubt, but agreement none the less. 
Not grudging was an editorial in the Cavalry--Journal by 
the Editor, Major General T. T. Pitman, on the subject of 
the mechanization of the 11th Hussars and the 12th 
Lancers. He condoled with them for the loss of their 
horses but stressed that the future of cavalry depended 
upon its being made hard hitting and that that meant that 
they must adopt AFVs. (48) Pitman was the Colonel of the 
11th Hussars. 
There can be no question whatever that mechanization 
was supported in the highest levels of the Army and the 
governments and by a wide cross section of other soldiers. 
Tanks were too effective and too useful to ignore. And 
that is why the Tank Corps had been established in the 
first place; the delay was caused not by searching 
discussion of whether or not the Army should have tanks - 
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that was not in question - but by uncertainties over the 
future strength of the Army and problems with tank 
production. 
Sufficient evidence of a broad spectrum of agreement 
that the Army should equip itself with tanks has now been 
demonstrated. Were there any who thought that the tank 
had no future? So much has been written about the 
opposition that the Tank Corps suffered that there must 
have been a lot cf people who dismissed the tank 
completely. This is not the case. Research has turned up 
only three people who thought that there was no use for 
the tank. Sir Charles Townshend gave it as his opinion in 
the House of Commons on 15 March 1921 that tanks were no 
use: the Germans had strewn land mines in the war and 
stopped them and he told the House "do not rely on your 
tanks in Germany today". (49) Thomas Henderson in 1924 saw 
no future for them nor for the Army either: in the next 
war "whole tracts of the country... will be destroyed by 
poison gas" dropped from aircraft. (50) Major General Sir 
Louis Jackson stated in 1919 that the tank was already 
obsolete. (51) But, even these apparently definite opinions 
were not so against the tanks as would seem at first 
glance. Townshend thought that tanks might have some 
future for crowd control or in open spaces. Jackson, 
having made that statement, went on to talk about the 
utility of mechanical transport and armoured cars in 
battle and ccncluded his speech by describing a future 
battle in which armoured cars and motor cycles assisted by 
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aircraft and motorized infantry would strike a hundred 
miles into the enemy's rear. 
The foregoing is not to be understood as an assertion 
that everyone was a tank enthusiast. There were many who 
doubted the future of the tank. Given that the British 
Army was to utilize tanks, there were many problems left 
to solve. How vulnerable were they? Could they 
successfully operate independently? Were they 
sufficiently mobile to act as the Army's sole mobile arm? 
These questions were not matters of faith to be settled by 
quasi theological arguments about future masses of non 
existent fast tanks cutting through thousands of helpless 
infantry. They were issues that had to be settled by 
experimentation with actual vehicles. These will be dealt 
with later, but we shall now turn our attention to 
considering the lingering doubts that remained about tanks 
given the acceptance that they had an important future. 
The tank theorists were prone to making exaggerated 
and unrealistic claims for their machine. There are 
strong parallels between the claims of the RAF bomber 
theorists and the extreme claims of the tank men. In 
neither case could the claims be supported by the 
performance of the machinery. This parallel has received 
scant attention and the reason is not hard to find. The 
great bomber and airpover myth has been adequately 
exploded by events; the tank myth has proved more durable. 
In fact, the Second World War was dominated on land by 
3 60 
armoured vehicles as the tank enthusiasts had claimed. 
But the tanks of that war were not the tanks of the inter 
war period and this is particularily true of British 
Tanks. British tanks were found to be quite inadequate 
for their tasks and remained, until the very end of the 
war, at least a generation behind Soviet and German tanks 
and perhaps half a generation behind American tanks. In 
fact, as subsequent pages will show, the tanks of the 
Royal Tank Corps between 1919 and 1933 could not do what 
was claimed for them. Tank claims could not be supported 
by trials. 
From the earliest beginnings of the tanks in British 
use, grandiose claims were made on their behalf by their 
partisans. Lieutenant Colonel Giffard Mattel, an 
Engineer, in 1916 or 1917 made the first statement of what 
was to become a cornerstcne of ETC faith: 
Unless this war ends in a disarmament and 
a temporary universal peace, there can be 
little doubt that the present unarmoured 
and unprotected Soldier will cease to 
exist and a tank army take his place. 
For the future he saw tank bases dotted around the world 
defended by trenches, land mines and "pillars" (presumably 
concrete tank obstacles) from which tank armies would 
sally forth to do battle with each other. (52) Depending on 
one's bias this may be hailed as brilliant prediction 
(which has yet to come true) or dismissed as outright 
fantasy. Tanks would in the future take over everything - 
3 61 
that was a cardinal axiom of the leading tank theorists. 
In 1921 Fuller was "certain that the infantryman's future 
place is in a tank". (53) He was also quite certain that 
the tank had won the war and that future wars would begin 
and end with a "knockout blow" delivered by the tanks. (54) 
Captain Basil Liddell Hart, the third of the leading 
theorists and publicists of the tank, was equally 
convinced that in future the tank would replace every 
other arm in land warfare: 
Military operations in the future, the 
exact date being still indefinite, will be 
carried out almost exclusively by fleets 
of tanks and aircraft which will be 
maintained by communications based on 
caterpillar tractors, with the aeroplane 
transport as an auxilliary or secondary 
line of supply. (55) 
By 1926 Liddell Hart had slightly modified his earlier 
opinions to the extent of adding "tank marines" to the 
"#land fleet # of battleships". (56) As late as 1927, 
despite growing signs to the contrary, Martel was still 
convinced that an army of light tanks and Vickers Mediums 
could do anything. (57) 
Especially marked down for takeover by the tanks was 
the cavalry. In 1919, it was stated that the Medium D 
could replace cavalry entirely and, it was evidently 
thought by the author, it could replace them 
immediately. (58) Fuller reiterated this in 1922. (59) 
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Unfortunately, the Medium D turned out to be an expensive 
failure thanks to its extreme mechanical unreliability. 
But Fuller was equal to the change: in 1925 he was saying 
that the Vickers Medium could replace the cavalry. (60) It 
was alright to say this in 1925, but in later years it was 
too evident that the Vickers Medium could not race cavalry 
across ground without any hope of being able to go even 
half as fast. But the belief lingered and the line 
usually adopted was, to quote Liddell Hart: 
The tank assault of tomorrow is but the 
long awaited rebirth of the cavalry 
charge... $The cavalry is deadt Long 
live the cavalry! 1. (61) 
The relationship of the cavalry and the tanks in the 
controversy will be treated in greater detail in Chapter 
7. 
The tank men were correct in this at least - the tank 
has replaced the cavalry completely; but they were wrong 
on the other grandiose claim that the tanks would replace 
everything else as well. Military history has yet to show 
an example of "tank fleets" and, as the 1973 Middle East 
War demonstrated very clearly, there is still a place for 
the infantry man on the battlefield. But the belief that, 
eventually, all soldiers would be in tanks was a 
cornerstone of the RTC until well into the next war when 
heavy casualties and hard won experience convinced them 
that an armoured formation without infantry was too 
vulnerable to exist. (62) 
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Another curious belief of many in the RTC was that 
Britain would gain more benefit from mechanization than 
any other nation. The argument went basically as follows. 
Britain has a professional, long service army and any 
ma-jor enemy which she is likely to meet will have a short 
service conscript army. It is very difficult to learn how 
to use a tank and it takes a lot of time. Only British 
soldiers, because of their longer service with the 
colours, have that time. Therefore, Britain's tank forces 
will always be better skilled than her enemy's. This was 
nonsense as the German panzertruppen were to show, but it 
was long believed. 
Martel came out with this notion in 1929. After 
describing a formation for a mechanized army, he admitted 
that his article assumed British superiority in this area. 
This is reasonable enough, as there is 
little chance of our meeting such 
opponents <i. e. with other armoured 
forces> in our small wars, and any 
conscript army that we might meet in a 
great war is very handicapped compared 
with ourselves in the production of 
armoured formations. Whereas we can 
create very large savings by comparatively 
small reductions in strength, because our 
pay bill is a large one... (63) 
This was too optimistic: in the first place, it was not 
clear at all just how the British Army could have made its 
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"small reductions" considering the fact that it was over 
stretched already; and, in the second place, suppose the 
other country just spent more money? In 1929 he was still 
certain of British superiority in mechanization: 
In any case we are already far ahead and 
will be far better equipped mechanically 
than anyone else if we went to war in the 
near future. (64) 
He was taken to task for these lighthearted statements by 
Major J. C. Tilley, one of the few propagandists for tanks 
whose articles demcnstrated a real knowledge of tank 
capabilities. (65) Martel defended himself: there were no 
small powers with tanks and there was no sign that any 
large power was switching from a large conscript army to a 
small mechanized one. (66) He failed to consider the 
possibility of a major power developing a large conscript 
mechanized army or even a large conscript unmechanized 
army with just enough mechanization to make all the 
difference. In fact, civilians can learn to use tanks in 
a surprisingly short time; they are not as difficult as 
all that. Perhaps the reason why these thinkers thought 
that tanks were so hard to learn was that the idifficultl 
Vickers Medium demanded an extremely high standard of 
mechanical and driving skill to get it on the road and 
keep it there. 
There were other dogmas of the Tank Corps which were 
neither accurate nor supported by the facts and were to be 
abandoned with war experience - the over emphasis on 
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mobility, the dominance of the light tank, the emphasis on 
machine guns as tank armament and the lack of careful 
thinking about future tank/tank battles. These will be 
considered later. But the two convictions given above - 
that tanks would replace the other arms, and that Britain 
would keep her supposed lead indefinitely - were basic 
convictions which permeated the RTC's thinking. When, in 
the next chapter, the actual capacities of the tanks of 
the period are described, we shall see how ridiculous they 
were. There is a strong parallel - neither Bomber Command 
nor the Royal Tank Corps could demonstrate their doctrines 
in practice on the outbreak of war. 
As has been shown, it was generally accepted in the 
early days of the Tank Corps that mechanization and saving 
money were connected. There was, of course, one rather 
obvious flaw in this notion. While in the long run, tanks 
might save money, in the short run they certainly didn't. 
For example, the 1928/29 Estimates give the cost of a tank 
battalion as 185,200 Pounds for 535 all ranks; by contrast 
a line infantry battalion with 791 all ranks and 21 
animals cost 109,800 Pounds and a line cavalry regiment 
with 479 men and 277 animals cost 86,400 Pounds. Now, of 
course, this comparison is unfair, because a tank 
battalion was considerably more powerful than either of 
the other two units. But that was just the problem: 
mechanization had been continually defended in Parliament 
and other forums of discussion as being a step towards 
reduction of the Estimates. This was true enough - 
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mechanization did provide "more bang for the buck" - but 
only in the lonq run and, even then, only if there were 
large scale replacements of the other arms by tanks and 
other AFVs. But, as was shown in the previous chapter, as 
it was, the British Army had too little and was expected 
to do too much. Members of the House of Commons, having 
heard for so lcnq about how mechanization would save 
money, were naturally a little restive after six or seven 
years of "mechanization" with no savings to show for it. 
And, to make matters worse, the Secretaries of State for 
par did not make clear to their listeners the 
unreasonableness of expecting instant savings especially 
on the small provision of vehicles that there was. 
Accordingly, there was a certain amount of criticism 
of the cost of the new arm. In a thoughtful speech in 
1926, Captain H. P. Holt, who had had the unusual 
experience of having served both in the cavalry and in the 
tanks in the war, attempted to walk the middle line in the 
cavalry/tank debate that periodically came up but 
concluded by reminding his audience that a tank battalion 
cost more than twice as much as a cavalry regiment. (67) 
Brigadier H. Clifton Brown, upon discovering that a 
mechanized cavalry regiment cost 5% to 10% more than it 
had when it had had horses, reminded Duff Cooper that one 
of the reasons that mechanization had been introduced was 
that it was supposed to be cheaper. (68) In 1932 he 
suggested that the regiment be re horsed in order to save 
money. (69) 
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The trouble was that mechanization was too expensive 
in the short run to save money in the long run. 
Worthington-Evans as much as admitted this when he said 
that the mechanization of the Army's transport would have 
to await a machine with commercial possibilities because 
the Army could not afford to develop such a truck 
alone. (70) In 1929, in a statement by Worthington-Evans, 
is discovered a revealing example of mechanization in 
practice as distinguished from mechanization as described 
in official statements. Lord Apsley had asked about 
armoured cars for Territorial units of the Tank Corps. He 
was told that there was no money actually to supply these 
vehicles to the units; instead, each Territorial unit had 
been provided with two six wheeled trucks which they would 
have to pretend were armcured cars. (71) There just wasn't 
enough money to do the job properly - in 1936 the British 
garrisons in Egypt were strengthened: this reinforcement 
stripped the Tank Corps in England of every single one of 
its light tanks and most of its radio setsl (72) In these 
circumstances it was patently impossible ever to mechanize 
sufficiently to start enjoying the savings. 
It must therefore be 
there was something unreal i 
arriving in the train of 
theoretical suggestion and 
those who were expected to 
promised economies were 
assumption: there would have 
concluded that, in practice, 
n all the claims for economy's 
the tank. It was a very 
it was never made clear to 
accept the claim that the 
dependent upon one vital 
to be enough tanks and other 
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vehicles in stock before any reliance could be placed on 
their capacity to release other units. Unfortunately, 
this caveat was never mentioned when people were assured 
of the savings sure to result from mechanization. The 
apparent disparity between facts and promises fed the 
groainq conviction that the tank enthusiasts were claiming 
more than they could prove. It was a foolish promise to 
make: the reason for getting tanks had nothing to do with 
saving money - any modern army that wanted to stay in 
business had to have them. That was the only acceptable 
reason. 
Another growing doubt that had far reaching results 
was the reliability of the tanks. We have already seen 
that tank breakdowns in the war were very high and, a 
study of later armoured actions shows that this "lesson of 
the war" was correct and mechanical casualties were and 
are a feature of tank battlefields. The breakdown issue 
was completely ignored by the tank propagandists who, in 
their fantasies of future tank armies, could not, 
apparently, be bothered with such trifles. (73) 
But the reliability question was not a trifle and 
others did not ignore it. When Montgomery-Massingberd 
(74) was GOC of the 1st Division he wrote a memorandum on 
mechanization. He began 
I am strongly in favour of a greater use 
of mechanicalized vehicles in the Army 
both for fighting and for administrative 
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purposes... 
But there were problems. He was sceptical of the tank's 
ability to make long range movements across country. He 
doubted whether the crews could endure a 100 mile cross 
country trip and, in any event, he doubted whether tanks 
would ever be fast enough. He did not believe that 
any vehicle will or can be designed 
capable of mcving cross, -counter in Europe 
at more than an average of 6 to 8 miles an 
h our. 
He continued, tanks (that is, the Vickers Nedium) could 
travel at 20mph on roads (that was, actually, a rather 
doubtful propcsition) but they certainly could not make 
such speeds overland. In conclusion, he believed that the 
British tanks, although a great improvement over those of 
1918, were "not satisfactory. They break down easily, are 
vulnerable and their pace across country is slow". 
Nevertheless, despite his undeserved reputation for being 
an opponent of mechanization, he was in favour of 
mechanizing a division and experimenting with it in the 
near future. (75) 
This breakdown matter was not confined to tanks. In 
1929 the House learned that the armoured car squadrons in 
Palestine were plagued with punctures. (76) In 1932, 
replying to a gibe that the Household Cavalry ought to be 
paid for by the Greater London Council because all it was 
good for was attracting tourists, Brigadier E. Makins 
said that the speaker 
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certainly has not studied the manoeuvres 
of twc years ago when the cavalry 
absolutely walked around all the 
mechanical contrivances of modern times. 
Practically all the mechanical vehicles 
broke down and the cavalry walked around 
the lot. (77) 
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No doubt these comments can be dismissed as yet 
another example of the "chorus of dissent that arose from 
soldiers whose minds did not readily accept the latent 
power of mechanized forces". (78) But, before they are thus 
condemned to ignominy, two events should be considered. 
In August 1925 six tanks (Vickers Mediums) went for a 231 
mile round trip. For most of the journey they travelled 
on roads. Three sets of tracks were broken and one of 
them was completely destroyed; one tank suffered major 
gear trouble and another burnt out its engine. (79) There 
was an even more ludicrous example in January of that 
year. Two Vickers Mediums were sent to India in order to 
see how well they did out there. These were not standard 
issue vehicles for British use; they had been "Indianized" 
with the addition of internal cooling fans and some 
insulation against the heat (and January is not India's 
hottest month). The two tanks were sent by train to their 
barracks and then were moved off the train and began, 
under their own power, to move to the nearby base. On 
this short trip, despite the care that they had received 
on their voyage from their attendent mechanics, one of 
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them caught fire! (80) The reader is again reminded that 
these were special tests under favourable conditions and 
is invited to speculate on what would have happened if the 
first journey had been made across country or the second 
in the hottest months. Perhaps Makins was not 
exaggerating and perhaps Montgomery-Massingberd was simply 
stating the facts. In any event, the unreliability of the 
Vickers Medium design was to long raise doubts about the 
tank's future and was one of the principal reasons why the 
cavalry was retained; the cavalry may not have had much in 
the way of firepower or protection, but at least it was 
reliable and reasonably mobile. 
The doubts remained even though most people were 
prepared to give the tank a tryout, and, as time went on, 
the doubts became strcnger. This explains the peculiar 
fact that there was a decrease in confidence in the future 
of the tank in the 19301s - it was not a "plot", nor was 
it the resistance of reactionaries - these doubts were 
sincere and reasonable. The gradual erosion of the belief 
that tanks and economy were inseparably linked has been 
described above and it has been suggested that the tanks 
themselves were perhaps not reliable enough to act as the 
spearhead of future armies. These were not important 
worries: the Army was committed to mechanization for other 
reasons than saving money and mechanical reliability could 
be (and was being) improved. 
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There was, however, one very serious doubt about the 
validity of the future sketched by the tank propagandists. 
How vulnerable would tanks prove to be when confronted 
with determined infantry equipped with small, mobile 
rapidly firing guns? The military journals give evidence 
of a considerable degree of controversy on this matter and 
they show a clear and interesting pattern. Until the late 
1920's it was believed that only another tank could stop a 
tank; after that time, it becomes evident that tanks will 
prove to be a great deal more vulnerable than had 
previously been thought. The increasing evidence for the 
weakness and helplessness of tanks when faced with anti- 
tank fire had two very important results that, in previous 
descriptions of the tank controversy, have been either 
ignored or slighted as "prejudice". The first result was 
that many came to doubt the promise that the tank had 
seemed to show. This will be discussed in what follows 
and it will be shown that there were very good reasons for 
believing that the British tanks would find themselves 
seriously at risk to modern anti-tank weaponry. The 
second result was the abandonment of the Tank Corps of 
confidence in the medium tank and an increasing reliance 
on light tanks. This will be dealt with in the following 
chapter. 
In 1922 appeared the first of a long series of 
articles in the military journals concerned with the 
problem of anti-tank defence. Cavalry and infantry were 
at the present "helpless" against a tank attack and the 
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only hope which the author, an artillery man, could see 
was that they be protected by a gun, mounted on an 
armoured chassis. In short, his suggestion was that tanks 
(or, in the later German term, Jagdpanzern - "hunting 
tanks") must defend the other arms against tanks. (81) In 
1922 another artillery man suggested the same thing. (82) 
Another article in 1923, after considering and dismissing 
the 18 pounder and the 3.7 inch howitzer as too slow or 
too vulnerable to machine gun fire from tanks, decided 
that a small AFV armed with a .5 inch armour piercing 
machine gun offered the best solution to defence against 
tanks. (83) Others concentrated on passive defence such as 
anti-tank mines or obstacles. (84) Another writer analysed 
war time experience and argued that neither direct nor 
indirect fire had had success in stopping tank attacks and 
concluded that the only chance of defence lay in a 
combination of passive obstacles and the construction of a 
small tank destroyer. (85) The belief that the best anti- 
tank weapon was another tank was defended in 1924. Guns 
were not very effective because they were not in 
sufficient supply and because a tank was a difficult 
target to hit; mines presented problems because of their 
bulk and the time required to emplace them, and then they 
were equally dangerous to friend or foe; aircraft could 
not bomb tanks accurately. Only another tank could meet a 
tank on equal terms. (86) An artillery man, after 
dismissing the present anti-tank guns (the role had been 
tentatively assigned to the 18 pounder or to the 3.7 inch 
3 74 
howitzer) suggested a6 pounder gun on a tank chassis - 
another jagdpanzer. (87) A French article, repeated in the 
the Journal heRoyal_ Artillery4 could suggest nothing 
better than that people should wait until something turned 
up. (88) In 1925 it was suggested that the 18 pounder was 
the best gun that the Army had but that, in order to 
overcome its immobility in the anti-tank role, it should, 
once again, be mounted on a chassis. (89) In 1926 the 
-jagdpanzer was suggested again as the only possible anti- 
tank weapon. (90) Another writer, from the Royal Engineers, 
could only say that tanks presented a very serious problem 
for the defence and all that could be done (given that 
there would never be enough anti-tank guns) was to rely on 
natural and artificial obstacles. (91) A Tank Corps officer 
was confident, relying on war time experience, that guns 
could not stop a tank attack although they could sometimes 
destroy a large number if the tanks were improperly 
handled. (92) Once again, in 1927, it was said that only a 
tank could hope to stop another tank. (93) In 1929 an 
article confidently asserted that the machine guns which 
were in plentiful supply on Vickers Mediums could, in 
every case, so disorganize and frighten a gun crew that 
the tanks had little to fear from anti-tank gunnery. (94) 
This large number of articles from all branches of 
the Army forces the ccnclusion that, until the late 
1920 Is, the Tank Corps had every confidence that it could 
dominate any future battlefield. There was almost nothing 
that the other arms could do to stop them. Guns were in 
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too short supply and, even if there were enough of them, 
they wouldn't be able to hit the target. Passive defence 
measures (tank traps, natural obstacles, mines etc) were a 
weak reed on which to lean: the natural obstacles would 
not always be present, and the artificial ones would take 
time to construct and the time might not be available. 
Aircraft were too inaccurate with their bombing and tanks 
were not always easy to see from the air. There was, 
therefore, nothing left except another tank or a tank 
destroyer. 
The reason for this confidence in the minds of 
drivers of tanks with slow speeds and weak armour was very 
misplaced. The tank men were so confident and the other 
arms so despondent simply because there were no anti-tank 
guns at the time. Evidently the German developments in 
this field late in the war had been forgotten. 
Most of the people writing about anti-tank defence 
before the late 1920's concluded that the tank was the 
only acceptable defence, but there were others who were 
prepared to speculate that a light gun might provide a 
solution. In 1924 an infantry man believed that if a 
portable weapon could be produced which was capable of 
penetrating armour at short ranges, then "the infantry 
would have nothing to fear from tanks". (95) An article in 
1924 was reasonably confident that, if a light gun could 
be built, it could have some success against tanks: as the 
gun would be sited in bad country, the tanks would 
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therefore be travelling more slowly; a gun, hidden behind 
bushes, would have a good chance of hitting the tank. The 
author recommended the Beardmore gun as ideal for the 
purpose. (96) In 1925 a writer was prepared cautiously to 
approve the 18 pounder and suggested a .5 inch Browning 
machine gun as an infantry anti-tank weapon. (97) 
By 1926 or 1927 the proponents of the gun were more 
confident and it was suggested that a3 pounder automatic 
gun was the best anti-tank weapon. This writer was 
prepared to go so far as to state boldly that the gun 
should not be in an AFV - he felt that the armoured 
housing would slow down reloading, limit the gun's 
traverse and would create too large a target. (98) Another 
article, written in response to the last, poured scorn on 
the 3 pounder (which, it was said, would jam too often) 
and suggested a small dual purpose gun with two different 
barrels. (99) Opinion was changing overseas as well: an 
article by a US officer recommended the small gun for the 
infantry's prctection. (100) The small anti-tank gun was 
gaining favour. A conference of the 2nd Division in 1927 
set out the characteristics of an infantry anti-tank gun 
stressing that it must be handy. (101) In 1930 it was 
officially assumed, for the purposes of a new infantry 
organization, that the following should be considered to 
be the infantry anti-tank weapon: .8 inch calibre, 5 
rounds per second rate of fire with an option for single 




The invulnerability of the tank had been something of 
a confidence trick: like so many of the tank enthusiasts' 
articles of faith, it was unfounded. It depended upon the 
absence of an anti-tank gun and, when people turned to the 
question of anti-tank guns for the future, their task was 
made easier by the inadequate armour of the tanks. As 
soon as the lightness of the armour was appreciated, it 
was realized that all that was needed for infantry defence 
was a heavy machine gun. So light was tank armour that it 
was not even considered worthwhile for the 18 pounder to 
carry armour piercing ammunition: 
the present ammunition of the 18 pounder 
is master of any type of AFV likely to be 
met with in quantity at present. if 
future developments render the direct 
perforation of much thicker armour 
essential, we have available for 
production, either an armour piercing 
shell (the design for which exists) or 
hard steel plugs for use on the existing 
shrapnel shell. The latter can be 
produced at quite short notice. (My 
italics) 
It was not considered necessary to produce the steel plugs 
until October 1935. (103) The 18 pounder HE shell with fuze 
101e was effective against 1 inch (25.4mm) armour up to 
2000 yards if the angle of impact was less than 20 
degrees. The heaviest armour to be found on any British 
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tank of the time was the 28mm on the independent (of which 
only one was built) ; the Vickers Mediums heaviest armour 
was 8mm. The anti-tank rifle which had been hurriedly 
produced by the Germans in the war had been capable of 
penetrating 12.7mm of armour at 400 yards. Given the 
armour piercing capacities of these two rather primitive 
anti-tank guns and knowing of the 13mm armour piercing 
machine gun which the Germans were developing when the war 
ended, it is difficult to explain how it was that so many 
people were taken in by the legend of the tank's 
invulnerability. 
The legend began to fade as engineers and gun 
desiqners turned their attention to light anti-tank guns. 
In 1924 a gun weighing 82 pounds was developed; the 
Beardmore gun fired a2 pound shot at 1550 feet per second 
which could pierce 1.18 inches (27.97 mm) at 328 
yards. (104) In 1925 another small gun was produced in the 
USA. (105) The Oerlikon 20mm machine gun, described in the 
Royal__Tank__Corps_Journal of 1926, fired 100 rounds a 
minute at a muzzle velocity of 2,130 feet per second. It 
could penetrate 25mm cf armour at 200 metres and 15mm at 
600 metres. (106) In 1927 seven heavy machine guns were 
described, all of them could have fired a rapid stream of 
bullets which could penetrate any British tank at at least 
500 metres range. (107) In 1928 another four were 
described. The heaviest, the 47mm Bofors, firing 30 
rounds per minute, could pierce 20mm of armour at 3400 
metres and had a 45mm (sic) thick armour shield to protect 
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the gun crew from tank fire. (108) A table published in 
Britain in 1928 indicated that the thickest armour on 
British tanks could be holed at 2000 metres by every type 
of anti-tank gun in existence. (109) A new scheme, aired in 
the Royal Tank_Co ps Journal of 1929, informed its readers 
of two dual purpose infantry guns. The Skoda version had 
a 70mm barrel into which could be inserted a 32mm barrel 
so as to be effective with either HE or AP ammunition. 
The Hollandsche weapon had two interchangeable barrels, 
one of 75mm the other 47mm; in its armour piercing 
configuration it could penetrate 22mm at 3200 yards. (1 10) 
In 1932 the Halger Ultra bullet of . 28 inch calibre was 
developed. With a muzzle velocity of 5000 feet per 
second, it could hole 12 mm of armour with ease at 60 yards 
range; at a range of 50 to 125 metres it was able to 
penetrate 5/8ths of an inch of 1 1/2 inch armour knocking 
off qreat scabs on the inside, several more bullets fired 
at the same spot were able to penetrate. (111) This was 
nothing more than a rather small rifle bullet fired at a 
very high velocity. As can be seen, once attention was 
turned to the problem of constructing heavy armour 
piercing machine guns or light anti-tank guns, gun 
performances were achieved in a very short time which were 
greatly superior to existing armour. These were not 
achieved by heavy immobile guns but by, in most cases, 
very small and easily concealed rapid fire weapons. It 
should come as no surprise that, once over their initial 
pessimism, the infantry began to think that in a tank 
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attack they would be able to beat the tanks back. 
Accordingly, as the articles lamenting the 
helplessness of infantry began to disappear from the 
journals, they were replaced by articles in which reliable 
anti-tank defence was confidently assumed. Reference has 
been made to the occasional article before 1927 in which 
the other arms were advised to keep their hopes up for an 
effective anti-tank gun, but these were only declarations 
of faith. The real attack on the vulnerability of tanks 
began in 1927 with the publication of a book by that 
indefatigable critic, V. W. Germains. He stated his 
conviction that tanks could not win against the gun: no 
matter how fast a tank was, a bullet was faster; guns were 
cheaper and so more could be built; guns were a much 
smaller target than tanks were and, in any case, fire from 
a moving tank could never be as accurate as that from a 
stationary gun. (112) In 1928 he pointed out that a tank 
needed all round armour and it could not counter gun 
development in increasing its armour in one place as could 
a battleship. He did not think that the tank could 
increase its armour sufficiently to be able to counter the 
gun for it was an easy matter for the gun to increase its 
armour piercing capability by increasing the length of its 
barrel. Tanks faced annihilation if they were to charge 
anti-tank guns. (113) In 1930 he returned to the attack: 
the gun armour "race" was over and the gun had won. (114) 
In 1929 an infantry officer echoed the new found 
confidence that an infantry force with the new weapons 
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could hold up a tank attack (115) and another reiterated 
this in 1930. (116) An Engineer warned that in a future 
war, given enough anti-tank guns in the defenders' hands, 
an attacker could lose a tank force in an afternoon. (117) 
In 1931 a writer attempted to moderate the extreme claims 
of both sides in the gun/tank debate but nevertheless 
pointed out that overrun guns often can be remanned but 
that knocked out tanks are useless. (118) 
Neither extreme claim was right: tanks have not been 
able to operate on battlefields free from interference 
from anything except cther tanks but neither has the 
infantry been able to smash tank attacks with ease. The 
truth is in the middle. Tanks have tended to dominate 
land warfare from 1939 onwards but they have always had to 
be mindful of anti-tank weapons. Guns like the famous 
1188" have destroyed many tanks especially when the tanks 
have charged straight at them; the lone infantry man with 
his bazooka or panzerfaust (and today his TOW or SAGGER) 
has always had a chance of destroying a tank given the 
opportunity. 
But it does not, in this context, matter greatly what 
happened in later battle experience. What matters in this 
discussion of the tank controversy between the wars is 
that until about 1928 it seems to have been generally 
accepted by military thinkers in Britain that there was no 
adequate defence against a tank except another tank and 
that from about 1928 it became generally accepted that 
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there were guns which could, at the very least, force the 
tanks to pay a heavy price for their successes. The 
debate about the vulnerability of the tank continued (and, 
for that matter, continues today because of the successes 
of ATGWs in the 1973 Middle East war) until experience in 
battle impressed a more reasonable and pragmatic approach 
to the problem. It is sufficient to say that by the early 
19301's, for right reasons or for wrong, it was the tank 
men who were feeling vulnerable and not the infantry. 
The tank was accepted by the Army without debate - it 
was obviously to be of some use. But, once accepted, 
lingering doubts remained. The expense involved in 
mechanization, the unreliability of the Vickers Medium 
and, above all, the anti-tank question, had, by 1930, 
sapped much of the early confidence in the future of the 
tank. Something must be done about these problems and it 







All tank designs are compromises. The tank is a 
combination of hitting power, protection and mobility but 
these three factors are not compatible. A tank with the 
thickest armour that could be made would have perfect 
security, but it would be so heavy that it could not move. 
Likewise, a tank whose designers concentrated on the 
highest possible speed would be able to carry neither 
armour nor weapons. A tank with the largest possible gun 
would be too large for security owing to the turret ring 
diameter necessary to cope with the recoil of such a gun. 
Therefore, tank designers must continually balance the 
requirements of hitting power, protection and speed with 
one another. It is not possible to build the "perfect 
tank" which would be proof against all anti-tank fire, 
lavishly armed and very fast. Tank designers must decide, 
before they start their drawings, what the balance of the 
three factors must be, otherwise the gun designers will be 
at cross purposes with the armour designers and both of 
them with the engine designers. Normally these decisions 
should be made as part of the first steps of a design and 
they should be made in consultation with the potential 
users of the vehicle. In Britain, in the period under 
consideration, this normally was not done. Ironically, 
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the two tanks in this period which were the product of 
consultation with the users were not put into production. 
The Vickers Medium was designed by the Vickers company. 
The Tank Corps was not consulted on the design. The other 
major design development between 1919 and 1933, the light 
tank, was a private venture which was accepted for a 
variety of reasons of which not the least was its 
cheapness. These two vital constituents of British tank 
design happened, therefore, almost by accident. 
All the major armies of the world experimented with 
tanks between the wars and, except for the Germans, tended 
to follow either the French model of the tanks being 
restricted to an infantry-accompanying role or the British 
of tanks being reserved for exploitative roles in all tank 
formations. The Germans, on the other hand, seem to have 
begun their development with the idea that the tank, 
orqanized into all arms formations with infantry and 
artillery, was a fighting weapon and not merely a 
specialist weapon. The dramatic success of the German 
panzer divisions in 1939 and 1940 made the other armies 
reconsider their armoured organization and they all, in 
varying degrees, adopted the German ideas. 
The French, who were a close second to the British in 
inventing the tank, treated their tanks in the war as 
"assault artillery" and continued along these lines after 
the war and their tanks were made an integral part of the 
infantry in the 1920's. French development was hampered 
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by the fact that a large number of the small, slow and old 
fashioned Renault FT tank was left in service after the 
end of the war and, with the exception of a small number 
of very heavy tanks, this model remained virtually the 
only one in service until the later 1930's. In 1932 
experiments began with large mechanized forces and by 
1934, the cavalry (in which arm the tanks had partly 
broken out of infantry subjugation) formed a cavalry 
motorized division. Just before the outbreak of war, the 
infantry had formed divisions of heavy tanks intended for 
a role as "battering rams". Crudely speaking, French 
inter war thinking was characterized by seeing tanks in 
the role of helping the infantry get through opposition. 
American development, again crudely speaking, 
followed French lines in the 1920's. In 1920 tanks were 
put firmly under the control of the infantry and any 
further development of a more imaginative role had to come 
f om the cavalry. Following the British lead, the United 
States Army established a short lived mechanized force in 
1928 and in 1930 created a rather longer lived force. 
This latter was eventually to form the basis of a 
mechanized cavalry brigade. In 1932 the hold of the 
infantry was broken and mechanized forces were assigned to 
cavalry control. The Americans designed many tanks which 
were much influenced by British developments and, as well, 
a number of Christie influenced designs. Basically 
speaking, then, United States development was infantry 
controlled until the mid 1930's when a more imaginative 
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approach was adopted. It was not until the German 
successes, however, that the US Army was able to 
completely break away from the domination by the older 
arms of the tank arm. 
The Soviet Union managed to combine French and 
British ideas. Following the French pattern, tank 
battalions were assigned to the infantry divisions but, at 
the same time, independent mechanized brigades on the 
British pattern were also formed. Soviet design was 
heavily influenced by foreign initiatives and a number of 
models were cbtained from the British. A very large 
foreign influence was obtained from the designs of the 
American inventor J. Walter Christie some of which the 
Soviets purchased. From these prototypes were developed 
the BT tanks which were some of the best designs of the 
1930's. The Soviets also designed some large multi 
turreted tanks. A characteristic of Soviet design and one 
generally absent in Britain, the United States and France 
was that of using relatively big guns on comparatively 
small tanks. By 1941 the USSR had by far the largest tank 
force in the world with more than 20,000 vehicles many of 
which were, however, obsolete. Soviet organization, which 
approached the German type, was not quite as balanced 
until battle experience convinced them of the wisdom of 
the German scheme. 
Curiously, it was the Germans who, although last in 
the tank field, developed the best armoured formations. 
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They had been slow to take to the tank in the First World 
War and, by the Armistice, had put into the field only 
some 20 tanks of their own design. The Versailles Treaty 
forbade tanks to the German Army but in the 1920's, 
attracted perhaps by this "forbidden fruit'', experiments 
were carried out with dummy tanks and, indeed, several 
prototype tanks were constructed. German development and 
organization was unique in that all arms formations 
grouped around tank units were seen as true fighting 
formations capable of all military roles. The first 
panzer divisions were created in 1935 and by 1938 all 
armoured formations (the panzer divisions and the cavalry 
inspired light divisions) were taken under the same 
Inspectorate. Like the Bed Army, the German Army, after a 
few false starts, believed in designing tanks with fairly 
large guns. After the German victories in the early years 
of the war, the other major powers were compelled to 
reorganize their armoured units after the German 
pattern. (1) 
British development will, of course, be treated in 
much greater detail in what follows. Alone among the 
major tank powers in the 1920's, the RTC was established 
free from the control of other arms. It began in the 
1920's with what was considered to be an "all-round" tank 
but, as time went on, came more and more to stress 
mobility over hitting power and protection. This policy 
reached its culmination with the British tank force of 
1940 which was 85% light tanks. Mobility was considered 
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surer protection than armour. In what follows the 
development of this conviction shall be traced but, first, 
two important British assumptions will be noticed. These 
two assumptions were that tank battles are analogous to 
naval battles and that, rather than one all-purpose tank 
(what is termed the "main battle tank" today)* there 
should be a variety of specialized tanks. The first 
resulted in some rather muddled thinking and the second in 
a large number of prototype tank designs. (2) 
The naval analogy was mildly popular in British 
thinking and each of the leading propagandists - Liddell 
Hart, Fuller and Martel - was struck with it at one time 
or another. The reason for the existence of this analogy 
is no doubt because, in the early days of the tank, the 
thinkers had to create their theory from the beginning. 
The only model available for them to consider was that 
provided by the sole self propelled weapons system in 
existence at the time - the warship. Nevertheless, the 
analogy was not a complete one and there were vital 
differences between ships and tanks. Ships operate on 
what is, for most naval purposes, a flat and featureless 
surface and tanks do not. Ships cannot hide behind 
natural obstacles but tanks make much use of dips in the 
ground and other forms of natural cover. A great deal of 
naval tactics have to do with the facts of ship design. 
Ships are long and narrow and their armament tends to run 
along a centre line. They can, therefore, only bring all 
their guns to fire when they are lying broadside to their 
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target. Tanks, on the other hand, have one main gun in a 
turret mounted so that it can fire in any direction with 
equal facility. In shape they are short and wide. 
Consequently, tanks prefer to fire directly in front so 
that they present less of a target; ships prefer to 
present the larger target so that they may bring all their 
guns to bear. Furthermore, there is no particular limit 
to a ship's size but there is an upwards limit to a tank's 
size. Therefore, taking it all in all, there is only a 
slight analogy between ships and tanks and there is little 
to be gained from comparing the tactics of the one with 
the other. 
Nevertheless, the naval model possessed certain 
attractions for some of the tank theorists. Martel's 
early paper on "A Tank Army" spoke of tank fleets 
operating from secure bases rather as the Grand Fleet 
operated from Scapa Flow. (3) During the war, Fuller had 
spoken of "striking analogies" between naval and tank 
warfare and went on: 
General staffs of both the Army and the 
Navy will have to institute a far closer 
liaison than heretofor if the full weight 
of the mechanical arms is to be developed 
and eventually applied to scientific 
warfare. (4) 
An article in 1928 predicted the beginnings of a land 
fleet with a reconnaissance class (tankettes), cruiser 
class (Vickers Mediums), dreadnought class (Independents) 
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and a monitor class (Birch Guns). (5) Perhaps the high 
point of this analogy came when Liddell Hart, in a book 
written in 1959, could write of the exercises of 1930: 
. . the infantry division exposed itself to 
tactical disaster, and was only saved by 
the intervention of its attached tank 
battalion... Skilfully handled, this 
countered and partly crippled the enemy's 
tank attack, twice bringing off the naval 
manoeuvre of 'crossing the T'. (6) 
Some of the defects of the analogy were admitted by him in 
1936, when he compared tank and sea fighting but qualified 
the comparison by remarking on the opportunities for 
concealment possessed by tanks. (7) Such a qualification 
removes most of the value of the analogy. The naval 
analogy was not dangerous but its existence did reveal a 
certain amount of sloppy thinking in those who held to it. 
More important was the belief that a specialist tank 
is required for a specialist job. This is another idea 
that must be considered erroneous by today's standards. 
Modern armies generally possess only one kind of tank 
which is intended to fulfill all battlefield tasks - the 
"main battle tank". Experience seems to show that there 
is no need for a host of different tanks, none of which 
may be where it is needed. The British, between the wars, 
were convinced of the need for different kinds of tanks. 
There were a number of articles in the military journals 
which allow us to descry a pattern. Until about 1924, 
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opinion seemed to be tending towards many kinds of tanks, 
but, after that year, it seems to have been generally 
agreed that three kinds - heavy, medium and light - would 
be adequate. As these articles are examined, however, it 
would be well to remember that, until 1927, there was only 
one kind in production and, after 1927, only two kinds. 
This belief in the necessity for more than one kind 
of tank may be found from the earliest moments of the 
tank's history. A memorandum sent to the committee 
considering I'landship" design in 1915, suggested two 
vehicles -a "land cruiser'" and a "land destroyer" (again 
the naval flavour). (8) Martel"s early paper called for no 
less than five different kinds -a "destroyer tank", three 
different kinds of ""battle tank" and a "torpedo tank". (9) 
In 1920 a Naval Lieutenant proposed four kinds: a 
transport tank (to carry 100 men - it must have been 
rather large! ),, a scout tank, a battle tank and an 
auxil iary tank. (10) In the same year, the General Staff 
stated that it required four kinds of tanks; it wanted a 
light infantry tank to accompany the infantry, a fast 
cavalry tank with a long radius of action, a heavy tank 
with armour proof against a .5 inch machine gun bullet and 
a transport tank to carry the 18 pounder gun. (11) In 1922 
Sir Hugh Elles, the wartime commander of the Tank Corps, 
thought that an infantry tank, two kinds of 
"administrative tanks" and an independent tank were what 
were needed. (12) In 1922 Fuller called for scout tanks, 
"mobile fortresses"* "moving supply dumps"", mine laying 
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tanks and destroyer tanks. (13) 
A somewhat more thoughtful article in 1924 discussed 
these various proposals. There were six different designs 
being discussed: the super heavy of 100 or more tons, the 
heavy of 35 or 40 tons, the light tank of 8 to 12 tons, 
the medium tank in between the heavy and light in size, 
the armoured car or armoured car tank (it is not clear 
what this last was to have been) and the very light 
"mosquito tank". The author dismissed the super heavy 
outright as impractical and thought the heavy would be 
useful for trench warfare and for little else. He did not 
think much of the medium because it "fell between two 
stools". He favoured the light tank and the armoured cars 
as being the most useful provided that their limitations 
were realized. (14) Martel disagreed with some of the 
statements made in this article. He first maintained that 
a tracked vehicle to carry 300 tons of supplies was a 
feasible proposition. His choice was for the "standard 
tank": the Vickers Medium (which at this time was 
considered to be a light tank) was, he stated, adequate 
for the moment but "what we require both for trench 
warfare and the encounter battle is a tank such as the 
'Standard' tank already described. " (15) This article 
represents both the first and the last time anyone 
attempted to swing British tank thinking behind a "main 
battle tank" for many years; Martel did not continue to 
advocate this policy for he was soon to be suggesting the 
light tank for all things. (16) The author of the first 
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article replied to Martel by insisting that one of his 
specialist tanks could beat Martel's standard tank at a 
specialist job every time but he did not stop to consider 
what would happen to one of his specialized designs if it 
were to meet a standard tank outside of its specialty. (17) 
The debate continued in 1929 but the more futuristic and 
improbable designs had by now been eliminated and three 
designs - light, medium and support tanks - were suggested 
in that year. (18) These three were again advocated in 1930 
(19) but by then there had been sufficient experiment to 
remove most of the cause of the debate. The Royal Tank 
Corps by the late 1920's had been modestly equipped with 
light tanks, medium tanks and support tanks and the debate 
over tank types had changed its force to a consideration 
of the light tank for all roles. 
Speculations about the future evolution of tanks 
provide us with some peculiar and improbable suggestions. 
A story by H. G. Wells which appeared in the Strand 
Magazine of 1903 was sometimes referred to as a 
"remarkable vision of future land war". (20) Wells set up a 
battle of some future war in which appeared "land 
ironclads" moving on Pedrails (a sort of large wheel with 
"feet"). They, of course, swept all before them and 
defeated an army which was long on brawn but rather short 
on brains; cavalrymen, in the story, found these monsters 
"unsporting". It was a prophetic story in some ways, but 
not especially prophetic about tank development for these 
land ironclads were extremely large with engine rooms, 
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catwalks around the interior and turrets bristling with 
guns. Not a tank, but a battleship put on wheels. (21) The 
notion of a super huge tank enjoyed a brief vogue in the 
early 1920's until common sense prevailed. An article in 
1919 proposed vehicles of a thousand or more tons, 
protected by a screen of "mosquito craft" and 
"rammers". (22) Another article in 1920 proposed the same 
sort of thing (23) and we have seen another example or two 
in the articles quoted above. It is difficult to know 
whether these things were seriously proposed or were 
simply flights of fancy: no mention is ever made of what 
sort of engine would be capable of moving them or how they 
would be strategically moved. However, there were only a 
few articles proposing super heavy tanks and it is little 
more today than an amusing side light on the tank 
controversy. (24) 
There was a small amount of controversy over the 
matter of tanks for India and two articles in the Royal 
Tank 
_Corps__Journal offered suggestions. 
The first 
proposed a small tank of six to seven tons and about 20 to 
25mph. In perhaps a typical oversight, given the 
obsession with mobility prevalent at the time, neither 
guns nor armour were mentioned. (25) A later article 
produced a design for an "armoured car tank". This turned 
out to be a peculiarly shaped machine with small track 
sections at each corner; these tracks could be removed and 
replaced by wheels. Under the belly of the vehicle was a 
fifth track section to prevent it from "bellying". 
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Weight, said the author, might be a problem but it could 
be "dealt with, if necessary, by reducing <the> thickness 
of armour plate" -a revealing statement on relative 
priorities. (26) 
Completing this survey of unusual suggestions are two 
that deserve to be taken more seriously. An article in 
1932, after surveying developments in infantry firepower 
and particularily the Hager-Ultra Bullet, (27) concluded 
that tanks must take to the air in their search for the 
safety that only speed could ensure. The writer was not 
speaking of a "flying tank" but an autogyro; he could be 
said to have been anticipating the helicopter gunship. (28) 
Another writer speculated on the value of of an amphibious 
tank to combined operations. (29) The inter war period was 
one fruitful in mechanical invention and, not least, in 
ingenuity concerning tanks. 
But there was a more serious matter and one more 
pregnant in results and that was the growing conviction in 
tank circles that mobility offered the surest protection 
for tanks. The development in anti-tank weaponry has been 
outlined in a previous chapter and it has been shown that 
the confidence that tanks would sweep all before them 
waned with the invention of rapid fire infantry weapons. 
These developments were not lost on the Royal Tank Corps 
and its supporters and they turned their attention to the 
problem of protection. It came to be believed that armour 
could not be much increased because of the resultant 
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weight which the engines would not be able tc drive. Why 
it should have been thought that the Vickers Medium with 
its 4mm to 8mm armour and its 90bhp engine represented 
some upper limit in armour-engine combinations is one of 
the mysteries of the British tank controversy. It is 
doubly mysterious when one looks at the (comparatively) 
heavily armoured French designs and J. Walter Christie's 
designs with their high powered engines. (30) 
Like many of the other important assumptions of 
British tank design, the over-emphasis on mobility to the 
detriment of hitting power and protection began early. 
Liddell Hart informs us: 
In June <1916> the decision was taken to 
build a heavy tank of this shell proof 
type, and an order was given to the 
Daimler firm to construct a double 105-h p 
engine for it. But it was never 
completed, as mobility was thought to be a 
surer protection than heavy armour. (31) 
Col. H. Rowan Robinson, in an article in 1920, predicted 
accurately the future development of the mobility- 
protection debate when he suggested that, for the next few 
years, power would be stressed in tank design and, after 
that, a return would be made to what he termed the 
"normal" peace-time emphasis on mobility. (32) He was 
correct in his prediction of British practice but it is 
interesting to follow British developments in the light of 
an article which had originally appeared in a French 
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military journal . After surveying war time developments 
and various anti-tank gun designs, the author concluded 
that 
no imperative condition prohibits the 
employment cf armour of 30mm thickness or 
more. 
The author was sceptical of the value of the light tank 
because he felt that every improvement in design would 
increase the weight of any given tank. (33) The French were 
to continue their development along this line and the 
British would continue along theirs. 
The weight of armour was already seen as a problem. 
An article by an RTC officer stated bluntly in 1924 that 
speed, handiness and radius of action were more important 
than armour. (34) One rather far fetched solution advocated 
was the creation of "swinging armour" mounted on pivots so 
that it, by moving, could absorb the energy of a 
projectile. The man who suggested this believed that to 
increase armour would be to repeat the mistake of the 
sixteenth century when knights had been so heavily 
armoured that they could not move freely. (35) This 
suggestion met with the response that it deserved a few 
months later - swinging armour would absorb only 6% more 
energy than flat plates and, besides, such complicated 
armour would require very heavy supporting frameworks. (36) 
The idea did not deserve to be taken seriously but it 
shows the concern felt about the weight of armour. A 
warning came in 1927 (although not published until 1930) 
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from an RTC officer. He quite accurately pointed out that 
high speed ought not 'to be pursued excessively - other 
things were more important and high speed could not always 
be used. On the other hand, having delivered himself of 
that perceptive comment, he went on to say that tanks 
should only be armoured against small arms fire and that 
they would have to use their speed as protection against 
bigger guns. The machine gun ought to be the main weapon 
of the tank although an anti-tank gun should be carried in 
case other tanks were met. (37) 
1927-1928 represented a turning point in the anti- 
tank defence debate and the same years saw a great 
increase in the debate about armour and mobility. The 
anti-tank weapons which began to appear at that time gave 
a greater impetus to the search for security in speed 
rather than in armour. It is not a coincidence that these 
years also saw the Experimental Forces. The poor showing 
of the Vickers Medium in those exercises combined with the 
inability of the British tank designers to produce a 
better medium tank and the unwillingness of the government 
to buy one if it had been designed convinced many that the 
medium tank was not a good idea and that its handicaps of 
size and weight were not compensated for by its armour. 
In 1927 Y. W. Germains published The I 'Mechanization" 
of War and he took up the question of armour. To him the 
matter was simple: if armour were to be increased (and he 
pointed out that there would have to be a considerable 
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increase in order to deal with even the existing anti-tank 
guns), the tank would either become so large as to make it 
a wonderful target or so heavy that it could not move. 
And, even if this were done, a new anti-tank gun could 
easily be designed to penetrate the strengthened 
armour. (38) Like much of Germains' writings on tanks (and 
much of other people's writings as well), these 
pronouncements suffered from lack of imagination. Armour 
could be increased, the French had done so and Christie's 
tanks could carry a good deal of armour, and it was by no 
means easy to increase the powers of anti-tanks guns 
indefinitely and keep them reasonably mobile. He repeated 
all this in an article in 1928 (in fact, Germains had only 
one thing to say, but that did not deter him from saying 
it often). (39) in 1928 another article discussed firepower 
and armour. The firepower of a tank was often described 
as "considerable"; but was it really? The author thought 
that, given the effort expended on armour, the firepower 
of tanks was not very great. Further, in future wars, 
only big guns might be met and tanks would find themselves 
armoured against the non-existent threat of small guns but 
not against the real threat. He concluded with a warning 
that sums up much of the thought on the matter at this 
time: 
Mechanization will restore the scope for 
generalship... provided that we do not 
throw away its value by weighing down our 
armies with useless armour. (40) 
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The performance of the Vickers Mediums had a good 
deal to do with this loss of faith in armour. In 1929 
Rowan Robinson was so disappointed with their shoving in 
the exercises that he decided that medium and heavy tanks 
had no future at all - they were simply too large a target 
and they could not protect themselves with armour. He 
stated his conviction that armoured cars offered the only 
future for mechanization. Smallness was the only answer - 
the qua had won the gun-armour race. (41) In the same year 
Martel ccnstructed, in theory, a mechanized force with no 
medium tanks in it at all - gun power was to be provided 
by three pounder guns on light carriers. The reason was, 
in his words: 
I am not convinced of the capability of 
medium tanks in fighting against anti-tank 
weapons. (42) 
Wavell, in the Staff Conference of 1929 called to consider 
the results of the Experimental Forces of 1927 and 1928, 
suggested that in future tank designs mobility should be 
to firepower and armour as 3: 2: 1. (43) Armour, in his 
opinion, should be the lowest priority for tank designers. 
Weight and mobility were not compatible and, if mobility 
were to be stressed, weight would have to be cut down and 
that meant less armour. It also, in at least one man's 
opinion, meant less guns. An artillery officer stated in 
1930 or 1931: 
The weight of the tank itself has already 
reached its maximum when cost and speed 
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requirements are considered. 
Tank armament is tending to become lighter 
in calibre rather than heavier, so great a 
handicap is the weight of weapons and 
ammunition. (44) 
Not only were British tanks without sufficient armour but 
they were becoming dangerously lightly armed. 
The qualities desired in designs of AFVs were set out 
by the Mechanical Warfare Board in its report for 1931. 
Speed, power of manoeuvre, negotiation of obstacles, 
circuit of action, efficiency, comfort of crew and 
reliability were to be stressed. (45) There was no mention 
of armour or, for that matter, guns in this list. In vain 
came another warning that high speed could be used only on 
good roads and was of little military value - there was a 
limit on speed beyond which the crew could not function 
cross-country (46), mobility was to be preferred. An 
Engineer, in one of the most unimaginative articles to 
appear on tanks between the wars, argued that not even 
high speed could be achieved. The central point of tank 
design was the engine. He produced logarithmic curves 
which purported to show that it would take 50hp to go 
7mph, 90h p to go 15mph, 200hp to go 22mph, 300hp to go 
27mph and that a 12 3/4 ton tank could never get to 30mph. 
Therefore, given the internal-combustion engine, the fast 
tank was simply not possible. (47) His figures, of course, 
were wrong. (48) This bald statement attracted some 
controversy in later issues of the journal. One response 
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was that no one could afford to wait for the perfect 
engine to appear (49) but a better one pointed out that 
aero engines built for the Schneider Trophy competition 
developed 2400hp for a weight of only 1200 pounds. (50) 
For some reason Fuller and Liddell Hart did not 
contribute to this debate. The only suggestion of Liddell 
Hart's views is to be found in a report on the 1931 
manoeuvres in which he said that the Tank Brigade had, for 
the first time, used armour as an additional security to 
mobility. (51) This suggests that Liddell Hart accepted the 
doctrine that armour could offer but little security. 
Mobility was seen as the most important factor of 
tank design. It was the mobility of tanks that had 
changed warfare and, if armour interfered with that 
mobility, it was the armour that must go. The light tank 
was the result -a series of vehicles armed with machine 
guns with armour just capable of stopping a rifle bullet 
at about 500 yards. A vehicle that, as war experience was 
to show early, had almost no military value at all: it 
could not protect itself except by running away and it 
could not run away fast enough; a tank, that when it got 
where it was needed, did not have the armament to carry 
out its function. The light tank was a tank designed to 
shoot up infantry columns; when there were no infantry 
columns offering themselves, the light tank could do very 
little. Three factors - mobility, anti-tank guns and the 
medium tank problem all came together to produce the light 
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tank. It is now appropriate to consider the larger tank 
designs which preceded and led to the light tank. 
The following pages will contain technical detail and 
specifications concerning the various British tank 
designs. Such a section is essential in any consideration 
of the tank controversy. The Royal Tank Corps had certain 
doctrines which it wished to prove and it could prove 
these only by demonstration. Argument was sufficient to a 
certain point, but beyond that point, argument must give 
way to demonstration by practical example. This practical 
example could be given only by the tanks available to the 
Corps and therefore, their characteristics must be 
described. 
The first of the post war designs were those of 
Lieut. Col. Philip Johnson at the government established 
Department cf Tank Design and Experimentation. The war 
had shown the need for a truly fast tank and Fuller's 
"Plan 1919" had been predicated upon such a design 
appearinq. (52) The requirements for such a tank were a 
maximum speed of 20mph, a circuit of 200 miles and a 
weight of not more than 20 tons. It appeared that Johnson 
was the man who could design such a tank. The approach to 
higher speeds lay through improvements in suspension, for 
the early tanks had been unsprung and much of their engine 
power had been dissipated in the friction of their crude 
suspensions. Johnson had begun experiments in sprung 
suspension in 1917 and 1918 and is said to have attained 
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the speed of 30mph in a modified Whippet tank. (53) From 
these early steps he developed a "cable suspension" and 
flexible tracks and had successfully displayed these on a 
stripped down Mark V. 
His first complete design was the Medium D which 
appeared shortly after the war. This tank weighed, in its 
early configuration, 13.5 tons and was about 30 feet long. 
This tank was subsequently modified, or another was built 
with amphibious capability, and was known as the Medium 
D**. This latter was a little bigger and heavier and more 
powerful. The Medium D was capable of speeds in the range 
of 20mph and the D** of speeds in the range of 30mph. 
Both of them were apparently equipped with horizontally 
flexible tracks and a cable suspension. In 1920 Johnson 
began work on a7 ton tank for the infantry accompanying 
role - the Light Infantry Tank. This vehicle was capable 
of 30mph speeds and was similar in appearance to the 
Medium D. The Light Infantry Tank was equipped with the 
final form of Johnson's flexible tracks - the completely 
flexible "snake track". (54) 
Johnson's ideas were brilliant in principle but it 
seems (although there is some disagreement among the 
sources) that they could not be made to work in practice. 
Two accounts in 1923, after a display of the Medium D and 
the "snake tracks", stated that the devices performed very 
well. (55) But these two reports may be discounted on the 
grounds that they were written after the authors witnessed 
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carefully staged performances. Probably more accurate is 
an article on the "snake tracks" written in 1930 which 
said that the universal joints connecting the track links 
were an unsolvable problem - each joint had to be 
continually and carefully lubricated and the seals of the 
joints could not keep dirt and grit out and keep the 
lubricating oil in. (56) A further problem was that the all 
important cable or chain in the suspension system could 
break and, if it did, the suspension would be completely 
useless. An historical account in 1927 stated that it was 
no exaggeration to say that, for every hour's running, the 
Medium D had spent a month in the workshop being 
overhauled. (57) It seems clear then that the Medium D was 
very unreliable and that the Light Infantry Tank was 
damned by its unworkable snake tracks. In any event, 
although there have been other attempts to make the system 
work, no one has ever been successful with Johnson's 
ideas. All further work on the projects was stopped when, 
in 1923 as an economy measure, Johnson's design department 
was broken up. 
In 1924 the Comptroller and Auditor General summed up 
the story. In May 1919 the War office had taken over tank 
design from the Ministry of Munitions and had ordered 75 
of the Johnson designs. After the actual model had been 
produced, this order was reduced to ten and, in February 
1922, in face of mounting mechanical problems, further 
work on the tanks was suspended. What tanks had been 
produced by the department were eventually declared 
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useless for either war cr training and they were disposed 
of. The whole programme had cost 267,000 Pounds and, it 
was feared, very little of that loss could be recovered. 
The mistake had arisen from the fact that the tanks had 
been ordered before a prototype had been built. (58) 
The Army had shown great interest in the design and 
had, in fact, stopped further production of the Medium C 
in favout of ccntinuing with the Johnson designs. An Army 
Council meeting in October 1920 (before the Light Infantry 
Tank had appeared and only shortly after the first Medium 
D prototype had been completed) was very taken with the 
Johnson designs. The Medium D was approved by the General 
Staff as suitable for the fast cavalry tank with a long 
radius of action which it required and it was felt that a 
vehicle with sprung track weighing about six tons would be 
suitable as a light infantry tank, a tank for India and a 
vehicle to transport the 18 pounder gun. (59) That is to 
say, the Army Council and the General Staff in 1920 had 
put a good deal of trust in the Johnson promises. But, as 
it turned out, this trust was misplaced and the designs 
were unworkable. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the important points 
about Johnson's designs are as follows. Between 1918 and 
1923 he designed and built a number of tanks of which the 
most important were the Medium D and the Light Infantry 
Tank. Both of them possessed novel features of which the 
two most important were sprung suspension depending on a 
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cable or chain and flexible tracks. The General Staff was 
most impressed by these designs and, before they had been 
tested thoroughly in the one case or built in the other, 
ordered quite a large number and instructed Johnson to 
begin work on other types. Johnson's suspensions and 
tracks did not work properly and, eventually, work was 
stopped on the designs. Finally the department was closed 
down and all the surviving models have since disappeared. 
In 1920 the firm of Vickers was asked to construct a 
tank. (60) This it did and its design appeared in 1921. 
Named the "Light Infantry Tank" and seen as a successor or 
alternate to the Johnson Light Infantry Tank, this design 
incorporated a number of interesting features. it 
possessed hydrostatic transmission, sprung suspension and, 
for the first time on a British tank, a fully rotating 
turret. The transmission was not successful because of 
low efficiency and the Vickers Light Infantry Tank was 
abandoned. (60) Nevertheless, it had shown that Vickers 
could design a tank and the company was asked to try 
again. The next design appeared in 1922. This was the 
famous Vickers Medium of which 160 to 200 were 
produced. (61) Production began in 1923 and the Vickers 
Medium remained the only tank in service with the RTC 
(except for some prototypes) until the arrival of the 
light tanks in the early 1930's. It was the only big tank 
in service until the appearance of the A9 Cruiser Tank 
Mark I in 1937. The Vickers Medium was the tank with 
which the Tank Corps had to prove its convictions and 
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cs. Indeed, because of its long service, 
to do with the formation of British tank 
other tank before or since. Its effects 
and mobility-protection problems have 
above and it is now time to look closely 
The first models of the new tank (originally named 
"Light Tank" but renamed "Medium Tank" in 1924) were 
delivered to the Tank Corps at Bovington Camp, Dorset in 
1923. In shape the Vickers Medium was a high square box 
with a forward driving ccmpartment. It was 17 1/2 feet 
long, 9 to 10 feet high (depending on which model is 
considered) and a little over 9 feet long. (62) The engine, 
a 90bhp Armstrong-Siddeley V8, sat beside the driver in an 
asbestos walled compartment. On top was a round turret 
with a sloping roof upom which perched a commander's 
cupola. The tank had vertical sides and rear while the 
front was a complex arrangement of flat plates set at 
various angles of slope. Above the driving compartment 
sat the small cupola through which the driver looked and 
entered his position. The rest of the crew entered the 
tank through a door in the rear of the body. There was 
very little room in the tank: four men - commander, 
machine gunner, gunner and loader - shared a space about 
six feet square in which none of them could stand erect 
except the commander. There were no seats in the fighting 
compartment and a long trip in one of these tanks must 
have been extremely uncomfortable as the crew had to 
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crouch most of the time. 
The track assemblies were mounted in an armoured box 
(the armour of which was extended almost to the ground in 
the Mark II) . Initial trouble was given by the 24 small 
bogie wheels which were mounted on five units on each 
side. The axles of the original design kept breaking and 
a new road wheel arrangement was designed in 1931 (the box 
bogie) which ended the problem. The first tracks were 
built by rivetting a Flate to connecting pins but these 
proved unsatisfactory and were later replaced by the 
Number 3 track which had the sole plate and the connecting 
Pins cast in one piece. 
The armour plate of the Vickers Medium was rivetted 
to a frame which provided the rigidity of the body. This 
is the least satisfactory way of fixing armour plates 
together. But no other alternative was possible - neither 
cast nor welded armour was in use at that time. But as 
the armour was made the basis of later criticism, its 
disadvantages should be described. In service the armour 
plates, because of vibration, tended to come away from 
their supporting framework thereby opening gaps in the 
hull protection. This made the Vickers tank subject to 
"bullet splash" - bullets hitting the armour flatten out 
and melt, this molten lead then could find its way into 
the tank through the gaps in the protection -a serious 
irritation to the crew if nothing else. Another problem 
with the rivettinq method was that rivets could be shot 
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away by hostile fire, further weakening the armour 
protection. The rivet holes were made by drilling the 
armour when it was soft and then hardening the plates -a 
difficult process that often led to cracks and other 
imperfections in the plate. The armour itself was 
homogeneous plate, in the first models 6.25mm thick and in 
later ones 8mm thick. 
The liqht armour of the Vickers Medium was bad enough 
but worse was the distribution of its fuel tanks and 
ammunition stowage. In the front of the tank, behind a 
vertical plate was a small tank of 8 gallons of fuel and, 
at the rear, also behind a vertical plate, was the main 
petrcl tank containing 90 gallons. 34 rounds of 
ammunition were stowed on clips fixed to the main petrol 
tank. Between the rear petrol tank and its attached 
ammunition and the crew, there was no protective wall. 
The tank was extremely dangerous and the vertical plates 
of armour offered little protection against the risk of a 
hit in the fuel or ammunition stowage. (63) 
The armament of the tank, and that of subsequent 
large tanks, consisted of one three pounder (47mm) quick 
firing gun and a number of Vickers or Hotchkiss machine 
guns. The three pounder was 32 calibres long with a 
muzzle velocity of 1,750 feet per second and a maximum 
range of 7,000 yards and with a well trained crew, it 
could fire 15 rounds a minute. The gun fired armour 
piercing, high explosive or case shot. The armour 
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piercing round was in fact a small high explosive round 
filled with 30.1 grams of "lyddite" or "shellite" ; the 
high explosive shell (which was too small to be 
satisfactory) had a filling of 58.5 grams of explosive; 
the case shot was designed to break up as it left the gun. 
Normally, for practice, the gun fired a flat headed sand 
filled shot with a reduced charge. The Vickers Medium was 
equipped with from three to six machine guns pointing out 
of various parts of the tank. A "close support" version 
was later built in small numbers which had a 3.7 inch 
mortar firing a 15 lb shell, usually smoke but 
occasionally high explosive. (64) 
No less than eight important and seven experimental 
versions of the Vickers Medium were built. There were 
about 80 Marks I and IA (the Mark IA had a bevelled rear 
plate on the turret in which could be mounted a machine 
gun fixed for anti-aircraft fire). The Mark IA* can be 
recognized by a co-axial Vickers machine gun, the absence 
of Hotchkiss machine guns (which proved to be 
unsatisfactory because they jammed) and the "bishop's 
mitre" commander's cupcla. In 1925 the first Mark II 
appeared. Externally, this may be distinguished from the 
Mark I by extended armour skirting on the suspension and 
the repositioning of the driver's cupola on the top of the 
hull so that it looked bulkier and higher than the Mark I. 
The Mark II* had a co-axial machine qua and a bishop's 
mitre cupola moved farther to the rear than it had been on 
the Mark IA*. The Mark IIA appeared in 1930 and was 
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externally little different from the Mark II* save that it 
did not have the anti-aircraft mounting. In 1932 a number 
of Mark Its were converted to co-axial machine guns and a 
very large armoured box was attached to the rear in order 
to house a radio (65); this model became known as the Mark 
II**. The last important modification was the Mark IIA CS 
which was the close support tank with the 3.7 inch mortar 
already mentioned. (66) It should be stressed that these 
different versicns were all essentially the same tank and 
that only a trained eye can recognize the subtle 
differences between one model and another. 
In addition to these more important variants of the 
design, were other versions either experimental in purpose 
or in such limited production as to be relatively 
unimportant except as illustrating the variety of 
experiment. The Light Tank Mark IA Special (L) India was 
an all machine gun armed version produced for India and 
they were the vehicles which featured in that disastrous 
trip to the barracks described in an earlier chapter; for 
some reason these tanks were never reclassified as medium 
tanks. In 1926 an experiment was made which consisted of 
attaching a pair of wheels to either end of a Mark I; when 
tracked travel was desired, the wheels could be swung out 
of the way. This was done in response to the fact that 
track life was very short (before the Number 3 Track 
appeared) and it was hoped that the tanks could travel on 
their wheels and thereby save their tracks. Only one was 
so modified and the experiment was not a success because 
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the wheels were too clumsy and affected the tank's 
performance. In 1928 five Mark Its were modified with 
asbestos sun screens and sent to Egypt for tropical 
trials. One Mark II was produced in 1927 which carried 
bridge sections on the side of its hull. A command tank 
with fixed turret and dummy gun appeared in 1931 and there 
had been a similiar experiment with a turretless tank for 
command purposes in 1928. Finally, four Mark II*s were 
modified and sold to Australia in 1929. (67) 
The Vickers Medium chassis was used for a number of 
other developments which, since they were not tanks, do 
not concern us here. But one, the Birch Gun, deserves 
mention. This was a tedium Tank chassis upon which was 
mounted an eighteen pounder gun. only three of these were 
produced between 1926 and 1929, each one different from 
the others in details of screens and armour. (68) They were 
the responsibility of the Artillery and the British did 
not follow up their early developments with the self- 
propelled gun with further examples and in the Second 
World war used American and Canadian designs for this 
purpose. 
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use; it had sprung suspension; it had a fully rotating 
turret and perhaps mcst important for the later complex 
exercises, it had three men in its turret one of whom was 
free to command the tank. Therefore, in all the criticism 
which came from its users, it must be remembered that, 
with any other design of the 1920's, the RTC would have 
had much more to complain about. The Vickers Medium may 
have been an unsatisfactory design in some respects, but 
there were many worse. (70) 
The Royal Tank Corps was glad to see it as, indeed, 
it would have been glad of any machine which would replace 
obsolete war time stocks. In 1925 Fuller was confident 
that the Vickers Medium would replace the cavalry. (71) In 
1926 a paean of praise appeared in the ßoval_Tank Corps 
Journal. The tank was "the speediest ground weapon in the 
world" and it possessed "tremendous hitting power". It 
was easy to conceal from observation and it could break 
off any action when it suited it. (72) 
But this euphoria did not last long. Pile told 
Liddell Hart in 1928: 
The medium tank is so wide, so cumbersome 
and so expensive, as well as so unreliable 
when called upon to cover long distances 
on macadam roads, that something cheaper 
and less cumbersome if less powerful, 
would appear necessary. (73) 
The experiments of 1927 and 1928 revealed the Vickers 
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Medium to be unsatisfactory. An article written about the 
Experimental Mechanized Force stated: 
They are neither flesh, fowl nor good red 
herring. They are too slow for 
reconnaissance work, and also too bulky. 
They are not sufficently armoured for 
battle work, and again are distinctly on 
the slow side. They are uncomfortable to 
live in... (74) 
General Burnett-Stuart, under whose overall command the 
Experimental Forces had been placed, said in his report: 
Also the low speed of the present Medium 
Tank has slowed down the whole force. (75) 
Brigadier Collins, the Forces' commander, agreed that the 
mobility of the Forces had been limited by the tank. (76) 
An article in 1929 agreed that the Vickers Medium was 
neither whippet nor heavy tank. It had been designed, the 
author said, as an infantry tank but, if it went fast, it 
lost the infantry and, if it slowed down to allow them to 
keep up, it would be shot to pieces. (77) Major General 
S. C. Peck, then Director of Mechanization, further 
criticized the tank in 1929. The chief disadvantages of 
the Vickers Medium were that it was difficult to drive, an 
unsteady gun platform, badly ventilated, the vision from 
it was poor, the machine guns had small arcs of fire and 
there was a great fire risk from the positioning of the 
fuel. (76) Hobart, in his report on the Tank Brigade for 
1934, condemned it as a "death purpose' machine and stated 
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that it was uneconomical even as a training machine. (79) 
He returned to the attack in the following year: 
The present tank is quite unfit for war. 
It is not bullet-proof and has no 
protection against <bullet> splash. Its 
petrol tank is inside the fighting 
chamber. The time and money spent on its 
repair make it uneconomical even as a 
training machine... Battalions are still 
equipped with a machine that is thirteen 
years old and out of date in every 
respect. (80) 
The principal complaint was its speed or, rather, 
lack of speed. Some attempt has been made to inflate its 
maximum road speed but these attempts do not convince. 
Liddell Hart said that he had "on various occasions timed 
it on the road to be travelling at close on 30mph". (81) It 
seems that he witnessed a rather artificial display: 
... the fastest nark I, the C. O. 's tank of 
the 2nd Battalion, RTC, was on many 
occasions timed at 25 mph on good 
going. (82) 
The fact that a prize tank, very carefully maintained, 
could travel on a good road, for short distances, at 25 to 
30mph says very little about actual performance let alone 
cross-country performance. And it was cross-country 
performance by which we must judge it: everyone knew that 
armoured cars were much faster on roads than tanks, but it 
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was the capacity of tanks to leave those roads and strike 
out over land that justified the caterpillar track with 
its slower road speeds. Martel, who also observed many a 
tank in action, had this to say about the tank's normal 
speeds: 
The present Vickers tank is a light tank; 
it has a speed of nearly 20mph on a road, 
but over ordinary bumpy ground the speed 
falls to about 8 or 9mph. (83) 
In fact the normal road speed was even less than the 
figure given by Martel. We are informed that up to 12mph 
the noise level in the tank was "not bad" but "above that 
speed it develops into a scream and rapidly becomes 
unbearable". (84) Obviously, no crew could endure that for 
very long especially when the noise would combine with the 
lack of seats to increase the discomfort. In practice, 
its normal road speed was even lower: the Mechanical 
Warfare Board, reporting on the Medium Armoured Brigade 
exercises of 1930, had this to say: 
It was found that the most economical 
marching speed could be attained by the 
lead tank setting a speed of 10mph. A 
halt of a quarter of an hour was made in 
every hour to carry out minor maintenance 
duties. 
That was an average speed of only 7 1/2 to 8mph on roads; 
higher speeds could be run but flat the expense of 
mechanical efficiency". The Report stated that "The time 
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limit of a normal day's march was found to be seven 
hours... A normal day's march for the Brigade could 
therefore be reckoned to be 50 miles". (85) The Standing 
Orders of the Experimental Mechanized Force of 1927 had 
recognized this when the vehicles were organized into 
three groups on the basis of speed with all the Vickers 
chassis in the slow group held to 7mph and 30 miles a day. 
Liddell Hart criticized these orders and accused them of 
being "too well designed to keep warfare static" (86) but 
the orders had reasons behind them. The tank's speed 
across country has not been described except in what 
Martel stated, but it is possible to give a rough 
calculation based on the engine's power. From this it 
appears that the maximum speed of the Vickers Medium on 
soft clay would have been from 4.5mph to 5mph. (87) 
The reason for this slow speed is simple - the tank 
was underpowered. It weighed 12 to 13 tons and for this 
weight it had but a 90 horsepower engine. The early 
models had a power to weight ratio of 7.7 and the later, 
heavier versions, a ratio of 6.7. This was simply not 
enough although it was not as bad as some contemporary 
writers thought. (88) The low power to weight ratio of the 
Vickers Medium meant that, not only was speed low, but 
acceleration was slow and that the tank would not have the 
reserve power to get itself out of ditches or very muddy 
ground. 
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It was with this slow, ill armed, poorly designed, 
vulnerable, unreliable and dangerous tank that the Royal 
Tank Corps attempted to work out its doctrines and impress 
upon observers its vision of the future. it is small 
wonder that people not already "converted" remained 
sceptical of the future potential of tanks. 
Concurrent with the Vickers Medium was another tank 
which, although more advanced in design, was never to be 
produced. In December 1922 the War office asked Vickers 
to undertake the design of a heavy tank and, after two 
sets of drawings had been made, the detailed 
specificaticns were set out in 1925. The tank as 
eventually built was named the A1E1 or Independent. The 
name may be a clue to its role: perhaps it was to be a 
tank for the "independent" role first suggested by the 
Military Members of the Army Council in 1919. The role of 
an independent tank force was to force or exploit success 
and for this a machine with speed and endurance was 
needed. (89) or perhaps it was to be a heavy tank as the 
Mechanical Warfare Board called it in 1929. (90) There is 
some question about the purpose of the Independent and, in 
any event, only one was ever built. It is also not 
certain whether the design was to have been the prototype 
of a series or a single experimental vehicle: 
No clear guidance on this point was ever 
given, despite the fact that it was of 
great importance both to the test 
organization and to the manufacturers. (91) 
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The Vickers Independent was larger and heavier than 
the Vickers Medium and was armed with no less than five 
turrets - four with machine guns and one with the three 
pounder. It weighed two and a half times as much as the 
Vickers Medium and had much thicker armour. It had been 
designed with the assistance of RTC officers and embodied 
a number of new features: the crew communicated internally 
with laryngaphones, the controls were hydraulically 
assisted, one of the sub turrets had its machine gun 
fitted for high angle fire and the steering was by means 
of a wheel. (92) It was well designed inside and the 
interior was sufficiently roomy for its eight man crew. 
But it was very large indeed: thirty feet long and nine 
feet high, it would have made an easy target for enemy 
gunners and its armour, although an improvement on that of 
other designs, was thin at a maximum of 28mm and a minimum 
of 8 mm. Its maximum speed was low at 20mph and it had the 
same three pounder gun as the Vickers Medium. 
Nonetheless, as an exercise in engineering and as a 
testbed for new devices, it was a valuable machine and was 
probably somewhat in advance of most foreign designs. 
Its suspension gave trouble (suspensions were a 
difficult and largely unsolved problem in the 1920's) and 
the Independent spent most of its time in and out of the 
workshop. It made its first appearance at a display 
arranged to impress the Dominion prime ministers in 
November 1926 and by January 1928 had amassed about 200 
miles running experience. (93) In 1932 it was still being 
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worked on and its suspension was still causing 
trouble. (94) By 1933 trials of this tank had stopped and 
the design had been abandoned. By that time it had run 
about 630 miles and had cost the taxpayer 77,400 
Pounds. (95) After standing guard at Bovington Camp in 1939 
and 1940, it was retired to the Museum where it can be 
seen today. 
The next larqe tank to be designed was a medium tank. 
In May 1926 the Tank Corps was asked to prepare its views 
on the design cf a new medium tank and these were duly 
forwarded to Vickers Armstrong which produced a mock-up in 
March 1927. The new tank, following the precedent of the 
Independent, had one main turret with the three pounder 
and two sub turrets with machine guns. Two vehicles were 
ready for trials in 1928 and a third followed shortly 
after. In the trials it was determined that the gunnery 
layout was unsatisfactory and that the tanks provided a 
very unstable platform for firing on the move (which was 
the accepted ETC practice at the time). Accordingly 
Vickers Armstrong produced another design very like the 
first which appeared about 1930. Three of the last were 
built. The first three were named A6 E1, A6E2 and A6E3 and 
the second three were named Medium Tanks Mark III El, E2 
and E3. From their weight, they were all nicknamed 
"Sixteen Tonners. Trials continued, with the customary 
suspension problems, until about 1933 and at least one of 
them was used (as the headquarters tank) in the 1934 
Brigade manoeuvres. The Sixteen Tonner was an advance on 
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the Vickers Medium in terms of armour, which was 9 to 14mm 
and in its maximum sFeed of 30mph. It was also much 
better laid out inside. But it had the same weapons and, 
as its long period of trials indicates, it was much 
bothered with mechanical problems. Nevertheless, it is 
generally considered to have been a good design (except 
for the matter of armament) but it was too expensive for 
the economic climate of 1933. (96) 
The last design for a big tank before 1937 was the 
A7. But this tank does not concern this thesis because 
work began on it in 1927 and proceeded very slowly until 
the pilot model appeared in 1937 by which time it was 
manifestly out of date. 
Therefore, between 1923 and 1933, three large tanks 
were available for equipping the Tank Corps - the Vickers 
Medium in 1923, the Independent in 1926 and the Medium 
Mark III in 1933. All of these were designed by Vickers 
Armstrong and all of them were similiar in certain 
important respects. Their armaments were identical and 
not very good - the Independent weighed 32 tons and that 
was a lot of tank for so small a gun. They were all under 
armoured although the Independent with a maximum of 28mm 
came the closest to being well armoured. But the Vickers 
Medium could be penetrated by every make of anti-tank gun 
at 2000 metres, the Medium III by every gun at 1000 
metres, and the independent by all at 500 metres and by 
many at 1000 metres in the thickest armour; all could be 
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penetrated in their weakest armour at 2000 metres. (97) As 
to power, while the later two were better powered than the 
Vickers Medium, they were not powerful enough at 11.5 
horsepower per ton. Road speed had been much improved in 
the later tanks but the real problems with the two more 
modern designs were reliability and cost effectiveness. 
The Independent gave continuous trouble and was never out 
of the workshop; the Medium III was more reliable but, 
even so, it was five years before any were released to the 
Corps. But cost was telling: the Vickers Medium cost 
about 8,000 Pounds without guns and the Medium III cost 
about 16,000 Pounds. (98) The solitary Independent had cost 
nearly 80,000 Pounds by the time its development was 
stopped. The Medium III was a better tank than the 
Vickers Medium; but was it twice as good? It does not 
seem so; two Vickers Mediums could bring to bear two three 
pounders and six or seven machine guns as against half 
that number of exactly the same weapons; in the first case 
the armour protection was not adequate but neither was it 
in the second. All that the Medium III had to offer to 
compensate for its doubled cost was an increase in the 
road speed. it was not worth it. 
The above descriptions of tanks should make it clear 
that Vickers Armstrong was not capable of making a good 
tank that the British Government was prepared to pay for. 
So far as heavy tanks were concerned, the French were far 
ahead of the British in terms of armour and gun power - 
the two characteristics most emphasized in a heavy tank. 
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The designs of J. Walter Christie in the United States 
were superior in terms of mobility to any British design. 
Most of Christie's productions were only prototypes but 
they were taken up by the USSR which bought three tanks 
from him. The resulting designs were seen by Martel and 
Wavell when they visited the Soviet Union in 1936; they 
were so impressed by what they saw there that they 
persuaded the War office to buy the one surviving Christie 
model which was landed in England in November 1936. (99) 
From this beginning were designed the British Cruiser 
tanks A13 of 1937, the Covenanter of 1937 and the Crusader 
of 1938. The Christie suspension continued in British use 
until the excellent Comet of 1944. Why the British did 
not buy a Christie mcdel before is not known for it is 
clear that the Vickers Medium was a design which hampered 
the development of the Tank Corps and that the other big 
designs before 1935 offered some improvement but at too 
great a price. 
Three threads have now been traced through the period 
- the over emphasis on mobility, the fear engendered by 
the production of light anti-tank guns and the problem of 
the Vickers Tedium and the lack of an acceptable 
replacement. lo these three must be added a fourth - 
money. We have seen that the confidence of the Tank Corps 
had been eroded by develcpments in anti-tank guns; we have 
seen that it was believed that armour could offer no 
security and that only a tank which could run away could 
be safe from these guns; we have seen that medium tanks 
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could not be designed that were both armoured and fast and 
that the existing medium tank was not adequate; we have 
seen that the Army was under continual pressure to 
economize. The cause of all these problems was one: the 
medium tank could not survive against the guns and it was 
too expensive; the answer to all these problems was one: a 
cheap tank which could survive against the guns must be 
built. The problem was the medium tank: it was too large 
a target, it could not run away and it was too expensive; 
the answer was the light tank: it was a small target, it 
could run away and it was cheap. The Experimental Force 
exercises made manifest the problem of the medium tank but 
also pointed towards the solution, for present at the 
exercises were the first light tanks. 
The light tank was virtually the single handed 
invention of Martel. He described how he had come to 
think of it in three articles between 1927 and 1928. The 
light tank, apparently, had been suggested in the war but 
the idea had been lost until Martel revived it in 1925. 
He did so because he reasoned that the existence of a 
cheap design would enable more to be built and he was 
certain that developments in anti-tank gunnery would force 
the larger tanks to "disperse" into a number of smaller 
tanks. Accordingly, he decided to build one himself in 
January 1925 in order to convince people that they could 
be made. Using commercial parts, for which he paid 
himself, he produced a one man model in his garage for 
less than 500 Pounds. (100) The Morris Motor Company 
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expressed interest and eventually produced seven two man 
models for the Experimental Mechanized Force in 1927. The 
firm of Carden and Loyd also took up the idea and produced 
another eight for the Force. The Morris-Martels, 
following Martel's original, were too high and in other 
ways not a very suitable design, whereas the Carden-Loyds 
had a low centre of gravity and an inconspicuous 
silhouette. The Morris-Martels soon disappeared and the 
light AFV field was left to Card on-Loyd which was in turn 
taken over by Vickers Armstrong in 1928. The Carden-Loyd 
design continued with a variety of models of which the 
Mark VII had a turret. At this point, light APV design 
divided into two different streams. The turretless 
vehicles became known as "machine gun carriers" and were 
assigned to the infantry; this line eventually resulted in 
the Universal Carrier of the Second World War. 
We are here concerned with the turreted version - the 
light tank. The Light Tank Mark I appeared in 1930 and 
was quickly followed by marks II, III and IV by 1933. 
These four marks were in limited production and it was not 
until the Light Tank Mark VI appeared in 1935 that any 
large number were produced. We are here concerned with 
light tanks before 1933 and it is possible to describe the 
first four designs together as they were very alike. They 
all had a two man crew and weighed about four and a half 
tons. Their speed was over 30mph, the first three had 60 
to 65hp engines while the fourth, which was the fastest, 
had an 88hp engine (just less than the 90hp engine of the 
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13 ton Vickers Medium). Their armour varied from a 
minimum of 4mm to a maximum of 10mm or 14mm; they were all 
armed with one Vickers machine gun. (10 1) Their design was 
a private venture from first to last: 
It could almost be said that light tank 
design evolved itself. No military 
specification had been drawn up but the 
product of the evolution appealed to the 
General Staff: it was a tank, it was 
cheap, it was easily produced and did 
little damage <to private property during 
manoeuvres>. (102) 
Not only did the light tanks appeal to the General 
Staff but also they appealed to the Tank Corps. At first 
there was some confidence that the original turretless 
designs might replace the footbound infantry. Liddell 
Hart in 1926, upon seeing Martel's model, believed that 
the "one man tank" might some day replace all fighting on 
foot (103) and Martel was confident of similiar 
results. (104) 
They made a good showing in the manoeuvres of 1927 
and Pile's fast group of armoured cars and "tankettes" (a 
name popular for a time for the original models) moved 40 
miles in one hour and captured some valuable bridgeheads. 
Liddell Hart described this action as "a racehorse pulling 
a plough" - the plough being the rest of the Mechanized 
Force. (105) Another observer gave it as his belief that 
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the tankettes seemed to offer better value than the 
tanks. (106) The tank¬ttes were originally seen as 
providing reconnaissance or as acting as a screen for the 
medium tanks. Rowan Robinson felt that, at last, there 
was a means of providing close reconnaissance for modern 
armies which had previously had to be done by cavalry 
forces. (107) Liddell Hart spoke of their leading the 
attack "to pave the way by drawing the enemy's fire and 
testing his defence"; if the defence should prove strong, 
they could hold up as a string of "minute pill boxes", if 
weak, then they were to rush ahead "bell for 
leather". (108) This was typical of the sort of wishful 
thinking such machines seemed to engender - pillboxes are 
normally more thickly armoured than 4mm and it is 
difficult to imagine how a fast, bucketing tank can 
"smother" an anti-tank gun whose crew is protected by an 
armoured screen. Nevertheless, the tankettes seemed to 
offer more promise than the unfortunate medium tanks: 
Montgomery-Massingberd thought in 1928 that a future 
Armoured Force ought to have more tankettes in it. (109) In 
1928 Liddell Hart was more enthusiastic still: 
... the fighting part of a true Armoured 
Force should be mainly composed of light 
tanks, such as the new Carden-Loyd, with a 
proportion of 'gun tanks' such as the new 
16-ton Vickers... (110) 
In 1929 he reported that most people seemed to like the 
light tanks and found them to be effective. (111) Martel, 
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who was the chief publicist of his invention, wondered in 
1929 whether large tanks could effectively smother anti- 
tank guns with machine gun fire. He thought that they 
could not and that the light tank was therefore the 
answer. He then suggested an Armoured Force composed 
exclusively of light tanks and armoured cars with medium 
tanks "more or less in the role of heavy artillery". (112) 
He continued this advccacy of the light tank in 1930. (113) 
A war game in 1931 suggested that, in favourable 
circumstances, the light tanks armed with .5 inch machine 
guns could put up a fight with medium tanks. The exercise 
was done in the form of a race which the light tanks, with 
their superior speed had won; they were then adjudged to 
have held up the medium tanks long enough for their 
infantry and anti-tank guns to have taken up 
position. (114) 
The light tanks were also welcome in India. Four 
Light Tank Mark TAs were sent to India in 1931 from where 
it was reported that they had proved successful. The 
report mentioned the apprehensions of the Indian 
establishment about the advisability of tanks caused ty 
the "short life and unsuitabilities" of the Vickers 
Medium, the last tank sent out for trials. (115) Three 
other articles took up this point and they were generally 
favourable to the employment of light tanks in India. (116) 
The light tank Froved itself very popular in the 
British Army. In the next chapter, the rapid takeover of 
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armoured formations by the light tanks will be described 
until by September 1939 there were about 1000 light tanks 
in British service and only 146 larger tanks. (117) All 
that need further be said about British light tanks is 
this: between 1938 and the 1970's, only one other light 
tank was designed in Britain - 
the war 
proved the light tank to have been a blind alley of tank 
design. (118) 
British tank design, both theoretical and actual, has 
now been surveyed from the end of the war until 1933. 
During this period, the British lead in design slipped 
gradually from its early preeminent position. The rise of 
the belief that mobility was to be stressed above the 
other factors of hitting power and protection has been 
noted. British designs have been described, that of the 
only medium tank in service in some detail. The Vickers 
Medium has been discussed and the defects of its design 
and performance have been indicated; it has been shown 
that the tank was unpopular among its users. The defects 
of this tank cannot be stressed too such - it was the 
Vickers Medium that the Tank Corps had; if the Corps 
wanted to show that it could take over the battlefield, it 
was that tank that had to demonstrate the taking over in 
practice. This it could not do: it was too big, too 
noisy, too vulnerable and too unreliable for conviction. 
Subsequent large tank designs have been described and it 
has been shown that they offered little improvement, cost 
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too much and, in any case, it is doubtful whether they 
could have been in production before 1933. The 
combination of many factors, the anti-tank problem, the 
mobility problem, the medium tank problem and the 
financial problem all led to the same end - the light 
tank. The early light tanks have been described and it 
has been shown that they were eagerly accepted by the Tank 
Corps and that some wished to replace the medium tanks 





The preceeding chapters have described how the 
British Army decided to keep on with the development of 
tanks and have described the tank designs which were 
available. Granted the decision to have tanks and given 
the existing models, how were the tanks to be organized? 
This question was not completely settled by 1933 and, in 
many ways, it is a question which continues today. But by 
1933 a good deal of progress had been made on the matter. 
By 1933 a permanent tank brigade had been formed and, 
although greviously short of equipment, this was a 
considerable step forward. By 1933 the communication and 
control problem had been, if not completely solved, 
considerably reduced. By 1933 two official handbooks had 
been written about the roles and organization of armoured 
forces. In fourteen years a good deal of progress in 
organization had been accomplished. 
It got off to a slow start, however. Five years 
passed before the Tank Ccrps was accepted as a permanent 
addition to the British Army. From this beginning the 
rate of progress quickened: in 1926 preparations began for 
the first of the experiments which had been proposed in 
1919 and, in the next two years, an experimental 
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mechanized force was put through its paces. As a direct 
result of these experimental formations, after a year's 
pause in which to test the infantry cooperation role also 
proposed in 1919, a brigade was assembled. The brigade 
continued with experiments in 1930,1931 and 1932 and was 
permanently established in 1933. It may be objected (and 
was at the time) that this took too long and perhaps it 
did. But it must be remembered that almost everything 
concerning tanks and mechanization was in its infancy and 
that there were problems that had never been solved or 
dealt with before. Tanks had to be designed and 
developed, tank crews had to learn to drive and maintain 
them, drills had to be created and worked out, there were 
grave control problems, there had to be continual 
exercises to test various roles and organization plans, 
formidable logistic problems had to be solved, the crews 
had to practise the new skills required, commanders had to 
accustom themselves to this new arm. Fourteen years is 
not a long time to build up a practical working tactical 
system for a new invention. 
In what follows, we shall begin with the 
establishment of the corps and the decisions made in the 
early 1920's which were to foreshadow later development. 
This will be followed by a section on the Experimental 
Mechanized Force of 1927. This experiment, and its 1928 
continuation, was an epochal date in the history of the 
RTC. From it stemmed the disappointment with the medium 
tank and much of the downturn in tank enthusiasm noted; on 
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a more positive note, the experiments established the 
utility and validity of the tank force concept. They led 
to the continuation of the experiment in the shape of the 
tank briqade and the establishment of that formation. The 
chapter will close with an examination of the journals and 
the little that was published concerning future 
organizaticn. 
In November 1919 the Army Council agreed in principle 
to a memorandum from its Military Members. In it, the 
Military Members had made a number of recommendations 
concerning the future organization of the Tank Corps. Two 
tank forces were needed they said: an "independent force" 
whose role would be to force or to exploit success - 
whether this force was to be truly independent of the 
other arms was a matter to be settled later - and an 
infantry tank force to be subordinate to the infantry. It 
was suggested that an experimental tank school be set up 
in pool, Dorset in 1920 to prepare the way for the 
formation of tank battalions. Instructors for the school 
were to be found from officers with experience with tanks. 
In late 1920 two or three battalions were to be formed and 
one of these battalions would be broken up into companies 
in order to test the infantry cooperation role. The Corps 
would be officered by volunteers who would then be given a 
six months course. As to the other ranks, of the 3000 or 
so presently in the Corps, those who wished to could 
transfer out and there would be no more enlistments for 
the time being. Finally it was proposed that an 
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experimental all arms brigade with air cooperation be 
formed in 1920. (1) In this scheme, which in fact came to 
very little, may be seen the germ of future development: 
first the Corps was formed, then followed a period of 
experiment both with all tank formations and with infantry 
support and then the ccnclusions of the experiments were 
collected and made the basis of formations. 
However, by October of 1920 the Army Council was 
still debating the future of the Corps. At present there 
were about 400 tanks of various war time designs, Medium 
Ds had been ordered and it was hoped that they would 
appear in the spring of 1921. The General Staff called 
for four different types of tanks: a light infantry tank, 
a fast cavalry tank, a heavy tank with armour proof 
against a .5 inch machine gun bullet and an armoured 
tracked carrier for the 18 pounder gun. The Medium D was 
approved as the second type and it was thought that a six 
ton tank with Johnson's suspension system would serve for 
the first type. Two production programmes were proposed, 
one to cost 650,000 Pounds in 1921/1922 and producing 161 
vehicles and a second to cost 1,300,000 Pounds and 
producing 287 vehicles. Speaking on behalf of the CIGS 
(2) , the DSD (3) called for the larger programme to be 
adopted but, after some discussion, the Army Council 
settled for the smaller. (4) This programme, too, came to 
nothing because the Johnson designs were not successful. 
Again, like the other one, this early suggestion contained 
the germ of future design prior to the rise of the light 
5 138 
tank: the Vickers Medium for the first role, the Medium 
III in the second, the Independent in the third and the 
Birch Gun in the last. 
The decision that led to the permanent formation of 
the Tank Corps was made by the Army Council in July 1922 
on the basis of the Report of the Peyton Committee. (5) The 
Army Council decided that a tank corps, separate from the 
other arms, should be created ending some three and a half 
years of delay on the matter. The Council accepted all of 
the Peyton Ccmmittee's recommendations except the rather 
important one that the Corps' establishment should be 
filled at once and that officers should come partly from 
the existing strength and partly from elsewhere provided 
that 40% of the majors and 25% of the captains had had at 
least six months' tank experience. Instead, the Council 
decided that some officers would be found from the 
military academies and the universities but that the rest 
should await any decision that might follow from the Vesey 
Committee on establishments. (6) 
Fourteen months later, the long awaited moment came. 
The Tank Corps became permanent on 1 September 1923 and, 
in recognition of its war time services, was granted the 
prefix "Royal" by the King. Its total strength was given 
in the 1923/1924 Estimates as 5,109 officers and men with 
six armoured car companies in India, detachments in Egypt 
and on the Rhine and four battalions and a depot battalion 
at home. Its equipment consisted mostly of the Medium Cs 
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and some rhomboids and Whippets from war time stocks; most 
of the armoured cars would have been Rolls-Royce models 
1914 or 1920. Major General Sir John Capper, who had had 
a long association with the corps, was appointed the first 
Colonel Commandant. But Sir Hugh Elles, who had led the 
tanks at Cambrai, was transferred to the infantry and 
Fuller had earlier been sent to the War Office. These 
were not to be the last experienced tank men to be 
transferred out of the Corps. The officer matter had been 
settled by taking volunteers from other arms as well as 
those left in the Corps. (7) 
November 1918 until September 1923 is almost five 
years. That seems rather a long time to establish as 
permanent an organization which had been in existence 
since 1916. It is not clear why it took so long to 
establish the Tank Corps especially as the eventual 
establishment was not greatly different from that proposed 
in 1919. A possible answer concerns the provision of a 
suitable tank: after all, there is little point in having 
a tank corps if no tank can be produced. At the end of 
the war, it was obvious that the existing mcdels were too 
slow but the Medium D held out the promise of a fast tank 
becoming available. The first D was built in 1919 but it 
was clearly still in the experimental stage and there were 
many problems connected with it that needed time for their 
solution. The first Vickers design did not make its 
appearance until 1921 but it was not satisfactory. By 
1922 work on the Johnson tanks was suspended but, shortly 
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after, the first Vickers Medium was built. At last there 
was a decent tank and it is surely not a coincidence that, 
at about the same time, the Army Council decided to 
proceed with its plans for the Corps. It may, therefore, 
be argued that the Tank Corps was made permanent just when 
a suitable tank was built and no sooner. 
The establishment of the Royal Tank Corps appeared in 
some detail in the 1924/1925 Estimates. The strength of 
the Corps (including India) was given as 5,140 officers 
and men organized into four tank battalions, nine armoured 
car companies and a number of training and administrative 
formations in the Regular Army and eight armoured car 
companies (cadres for the most part) in the Territorial 
Army. At home were the tank battalions (except for one 
company on the Rhine) and two armoured car companies; in 
India were six armcured car companies and there was also 
one in Egypt. Next year another two armoured car 
companies were formed in India and the Workshop Training 
battalion at home was abolished with a quarter of its 
engineers "axed". (8) In 1932 was added another battalion 
and a sixth and seventh appeared in 1937 and 1938; the 1st 
(Light) Battalion was added in 1933 after some time as an 
experimental unit. Also in 1933, the armoured car 
companies began the process of conversion to light tank 
units. However, in a thesis dealing with tanks before 
1934, it is only necessary to remember that there were 
four battalions - the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th with the 6th 
added in 1932. (9) 
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The 1919 scheme had called for an experimental 
brigade to be formed but nothing was heard of this for 
some years. In 1926 the 2nd Battalion had exercised with 
the 2nd Division and had practiced assaults on the 
infantry at dark or dusk. This test confirmed the 
enthusiasts in their beliefs and they had found, in this 
period before anti-tank guns, that the mere threat that 
tanks might be operating nearby had greatly constrained 
the freedom of infantry units. (10) It seemed that the time 
was ready for a full scale test of the powers of tanks 
against the older arms and in 1921 Worthington-Evans had, 
somewhat prematurely, announced: 
in the course of the year an experimental 
brigade will be formed at Aldershot whose 
duty it will be to discover the best 
methods of employment of tanks and 
armoured cars, infantry and aeroplanes in 
conjunction with each other. (11) 
But, because of the general uncertainty and delay already 
described, very little useful came of this trial. 
But the idea of a more comprehensive test was not 
lost and in 1926 Milne suggested an Experimental 
Mechanized Force to the Secretary of State for War. At 
least one tank battalion would be needed and there was one 
at Perham Down which would have its full complement of 48 
fighting tanks by the end of the year. One armoured car 
company was necessary. In non RTC units, he thought that 
the cne mechanized field brigade which existed and two 
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other brigades of artillery, some as yet undetermined 
complement of engineers, some of the 3rd Division's 
signals and probably three battalions of infantry would be 
necessary. There should be a reconnaissance unit but, as 
yet, no vehicles existed for this role; perhaps the force 
would have to make do with cavalry. For the force many 
vehicles were required which did not exist and time would 
be needed to supply them. Time would also be needed 
because of the way the Estimates were organized: there was 
no provision for such a force in the 1926/1927 Estimates 
and, therefore, it would have to await the 1927/1928 
Estimates. "It follows that the formation cannot be in 
full working order until 1928". The Secretary of State 
for War approved this twelve days later. (12) Nov that 
permission had been obtained, what infantry units could be 
used? Obviously not those in India, nor those preparing 
to go to India, nor those just coming back from India, nor 
those seriously depleted by a major draft of men to 
India... This problem occupies one file of documents from 
June until November 1926 and all that has been decided by 
then was that Milne's original choice of battalion was 
unsuitable. (13) Eventually, after a lot of prodding from 
Milne, a suitable battalion was discovered. Then Lindsay, 
the Inspector of the ETC, took exception to the suggestion 
that a cavalry unit might have to supply the 
reconnaissance force. He argued that the Army was already 
divided into "innumerable small packets" and that a 
cavalry force would greatly complicate matters. The 
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Experimental Mechanized Force was bound up with the future 
organizaticn of the Army and it should be "the model, in 
miniature, of that future Army". (14) As it turned out, 
Lindsay need not have worried, by the time the Force 
assembled, the tankette had been invented and there was a 
machine which could provide the scout force. 
Another factor combined with these others to delay 
the start of the experiment. In May 1926, Fuller was 
asked by Milne to take charge of the Force. Of course, he 
agreed. A few days later, he received a letter from the 
CIGS appointing him to the command of the 7th Infantry 
Brigade at Tidworth. (15) Naturally in some confusion, 
Fuller asked for clarification and was told that he could 
not be appointed on the proper basis of permanence to the 
command of an experimental force that did not, at the 
moment, actually exist. Here the matter rested until 
February 1927 when Fuller arrived at Tidworth where he 
discovered that he was to command the brigade and garrison 
in addition to looking after the Experimental Force. This 
was too much for him and he wrote to Milne saying that 
these additional duties would prevent him from 
concentrating fully on the more important issue of the 
Force. He asked that the garrison duties be given to 
someone else and that he be allowed a small staff to look 
after the administrative detail connected with the Force. 
He received no answer to satisfy him. He then wrote a 
similiar letter to General Jock Burnett-Stuart under whose 
overall command the Force would come. This second appeal 
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was also fruitless. In March Worthington-Evans announced 
the experiments in the House of Commons: 
In order to gain practical experience of 
the effect of mechanization on tactics, an 
experimental force is being formed at 
Tidvorth, composed of completely 
mechanized units... This force will be 
placed under the command of an officer who 
has made a special study of mechanical 
warfare. (16) 
The last sentence quoted, so obviously referring to Fuller 
himself, prompted him to write to Milne again and again he 
got no answer that satisfied him. He thereupon wrote out 
his resignation from the Army. At last he got action. He 
was persuaded to withdraw the resignation on the grounds 
that it would be a loss to the Army and with an assurance 
that Milne was serious about mechanization. Now, for some 
reason, the offer of the command was withdrawn, Fuller was 
appointed GS01 to 2nd Division and the command of the 
Experimental Mechanized Force was given to one of the 
brigade commanders of 3rd Division, Colonel Robert J. 
Collins, a soldier with no tank experience to speak 
of. (17) It is impossible not to put much of the blame on 
Fuller for this sorry affair. After thirty years in the 
Army, he surely knew what to expect and there seems to be 
no reason why he could not have delegated the 
responsibility for the 7th Brigade and the Tidworth 
garrison to his second in command and devoted himself to 
5 145 
the Experimental Force. (18) 
This was a most unsatisfactory beginning. The 
postponements and delays, the difficulty with the command 
and the fact that it was April suggested that this 
experiment might go the way of the 1919 one. Liddell 
Hart, then military correspondent for the Daily Tel9Araph, 
had been kept in touch with these developments. On the 
day after Collins' appointment, he wrote an article which, 
after detailing these problems, asked whether the scheme 
had broken down. (19) The article prompted some concern and 
on 28 April Viscount Sandon asked Worthington-Evans 
whether there had been any change in the decision to have 
the Force commanded by an "officer experienced in that 
sphere". He answered that there had been no such change 
and that the Force would be placed under Colonel 
Collins. (20) One hesitates to use strong words but it is 
difficult to find much truth in this answer. The original 
announcement had referred to Fuller, and Collins could not 
be considered under any sense of the words to have made a 
"special study of mechanical warfare". However, the 
experiment was not being put off and, on that same day, 
the War Office announced the composition of the Force. 
The Experimental Mechanized Force assembled on 
Salisbury Plain a short time later in May. (21) Although it 
was a fully mechanized force with no unmechanized 
transport, it contained a great variety of machinery. In 
tanks there were the Vickers Mediums. About 15 tankettes 
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made their debut and provided the reconnaissance force. 
In addition, there were the tiny number of Birch Guns 
which had been built, a number of "dragons" (Vickers 
Medium chassis used as gun tractors), various types of 
armoured cars and an assortment of trucks, cars and motor 
cycles. (22) This disparity in designs resulted in a 
disparity of speeds for the Force as a whole. The 
armoured cars had speeds of 35 to 50mph depending on the 
state of the roads, tankettes, tanks and dragons had road 
speeds from 10 to 20mph and cross country speeds of 5 to 
10mph and the rest could travel at 25 or 30mph. Further, 
only the tracked vehicles were not roadbound. An orderly 
solution was found in the Standing orders which were 
issued in June. The Force was divided into three groups 
based on speeds. In the fast group were the armoured 
cars; their "rate of march" was 25mph and a day's "march" 
was put at 100 miles. The medium group, at 10mph and 50 
miles a day included the infantry battalion, the light 
artillery battery and the engineers. In the slow group, 
paced at 7mph and 30 miles a day were all the tracked 
vehicles. 
This division of the Force by speed, suggesting 
caution and an insistence on orderly movement, was not to 
the likinq of some of the tank enthusiasts. Liddell Hart 
felt that the Force should move in a series of bounds and 
believed that the Standing Orders slowed the Force 
down. (23) Martel, who was commanding the engineer 
detachment, "said that Collins, early schemes with the 
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mechanized force seemed to have such narrow ideas'. (24) 
Also current was a gibe that the commanders of the Force 
were like bankers: they operated on the principle of "no 
advance without security". (25) It is not easy to assess 
these charges. One of the problems which had long plagued 
tank manoeuvres had been the difficulty of communication 
both within and between tanks. The former problem had, it 
seemed, been solved with the invention of the laryngaphone 
but the second was still a difficulty because the radios 
of the time were so large. It was not until 1931 in fact 
that it was possible to control large mechanized forces. 
Coupling the communications problem with the disparities 
in speed and, especially, the slowness of the tanks which 
provided most of the "punch" of the Force, it is not so 
easy to criticize Collins for insisting on orderly 
movement. The system of movement by bounds might well 
have resulted in broken down tanks being scattered the 
length and width of Wiltshire and, in all likelihood, 
would not have resulted in much of an increase in 
speed. (26) 
The Force spent the first part of its training 
getting used to manoeuvring together and the scout force 
under Lieutenant Colonel F. A. Pile demonstrated the speed 
and dash that the enthusiasts had hoped for. 
While the Force was thus preparing itself for the 
technical details of its function, Milne arrived one day 
to watch the manoeuvres and deliver a speech to put the 
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Force into the right frame of mind. To this Liddell Hart 
had been invited so that the speech could be made known to 
the public through his newspaper. Milne began by 
stressing the experimental nature of the Force: 
Nov the armoured brigade <his preferred 
name for the Force> and mechanization 
generally is not a solution for war... 
What you worked on this year is only the 
germ of an idea which wants expanding. I 
myself, and most of the senior officers of 
the Army, cannot expect to see a great 
expansion in our time... 
He took as the theme of his speech the text "For if the 
trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself 
to the battle? " But it is not clear whether he thought 
that he was the trumpet blower or the Force was. He 
continued with a survey of military history and concluded 
that mechanization offered the only hope for generalship 
and the possibility of shorter wars in the future: 
civilization could not survive another long war. He 
called on the officers to think in wide terms: 
It is the great cavalry raids by people 
like the Mongols and the Parthians, that 
want your considera tion. 
The mobile forces of the future would coexist with the 
older formations: 
Cavalry, so far as the British Empire is 
concerned, will still remain an essential. 
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It will require bringing up to date with 
modern arms, mechanizing where possible... 
You may have armoured cars and tanks with 
the cavalry but your armoured force is a 
perfectly separate force consisting of 
armoured vehicles for definite purposes... 
It is an armoured force intended for long 
distance work. It may be essential to 
employ it as an armoured force for close 
work, but essentially what I am aiming at 
is a mobile armoured force that can go 
long distances and carry out big 
operations and big turning movements. 
He then spoke of the qualities that generals would now 
need - they must command from the front and be quick 
witted. The armoured force would be self contained and 
there were to be no infantry forces in it: 
My idea, however, is that an infantry 
battalion should not be a definite part of 
the force but that it should be attached 
to the force when the commander who is 
employing it considers that infantry is an 
essential unit. I would rather that the 
force remains entirely armoured because 
there is always a danger if you have 
infantry with it, that you may get them 
mixed up in some sort of scrap out of 
which they may be difficult to 
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disentangle. 
In conclusion he said "It is no longer horsemastership 
that is required, but the study and care of engines". (27) 
Apparently, this speech from Britain's senior soldier made 
a considerable impression on the tank enthusiasts: 
to the happy surprise of the advocates of 
armoured mobility, <he> not only endorsed 
their arguments - but expressed these more 
emphatically than they had dared to 
hope... (28) 
A week later, and thus spiritually fortified, the 
Force began its large scale manoeuvres. The Force was 
pitted against most of the 3rd Division and the 2nd 
Cavalry Brigade. The two opposing forces were placed 
about 80 miles apart and the cavalry/infantry force was 
supposed to move 30 miles and it would be seen what the 
Mechanized Force could do to slow or stop it. From the 
tank enthusiasts' point of view, the operation was a 
success. Pile's group got off to an excellent start and 
moved 40 miles in the first hour capturing the bridgeheads 
that the enemy needed. It then held the enemy up until 
the medium tanks arrived at dusk. For administrative 
reasons, the cavalry/infantry force was allowed to Hove to 
Tilshead where it spent the night. The next day it moved 
a few more miles and was then boxed up tightly by the 
Mechanized Force and spent the rest of the day completely 
immobile. At this point the exercise was called off and 
the cavalry/infantry force was found to have failed to 
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make its distance. (29) 
The reaction to this test will be dealt with below 
but it would be well to keep a few facts in mind. It is 
worth remembering that, until 1927, no British troops had 
ever had to face a real or mock tank attack in any 
strength. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that the 
cavalry/infantry force found itself paralyzed. The second 
point to remember is that the attacked force had very few 
anti-tank guns. Thus it may truthfully be said that the 
Mechanized Forces successes were rather one sided. 
Nonetheless, the enthusiasts' claims had been vindicated 
in that a not very aggressively handled mechanized force 
had tied up a considerably larger force and prevented it 
from fulfilling its mission. 
The experiment of 1927 was continued in 1928. The 
Force (now renamed "Armoured Force") again assembled on 
Salisbury Plain in the summer of that year. Its 
composition was much the same as it had been the year 
before except that there were now more unarmoured six 
wheeled trucks and half tracks. There were, in fact, 280 
vehicles of 15 different types. In July a demonstration 
was laid on in order to impress the politicians but, 
judging from Hansard, this attempt at public relations 
seems to have had little effect. The 1928 exercises were 
devoted to functional practice and, in addition to much 
valuable experience gained, the lessons learned were 
chiefly negative. A practical solution was still lacking 
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to the problem cf controlling such a large force and in 
making it responsive to the will of its commander. Radio 
sets were gradually appearing but they were bulky and not 
very efficient and, in 1928, in no great number. It was 
learned that the practice of requiring the Force to move 
in column and in close order caused excessive wear and 
tear on the tracks and suspension in addition to providing 
a tempting target to air attack. Huch remained to be done 
and, too often, concentration of force was found to mean 
congestion and traffic jams. In the final large scale 
exercise the Armoured Force, in conjunction with a cavalry 
brigade, was used against the 3rd Division and, again, the 
more mobile force succeeded in slowing it down and boxing 
it in. 
1928 marked the end of this round of experiment for 
the Force was disbanded at the end of the year. This news 
"plunged its officers into the depths of gloom" but they 
cheered up by thinking that "the alternative project <was> 
bound to prove a fiasco". (30) Liddell Hart blamed this 
decision cn Montgomery-Massingberd (at that time GOC 
Southern Command) (31) and Montgomery-Massingberd gave the 
impression that it was Milne who disbanded it. (32) In any 
event, the Secretary of State for War announced that the 
Force, having fulfilled its experiments, was to be 
disbanded and the tanks used in forming two new mechanized 
groups which would continue the experiments in a different 
direction. (33) This new direction was to be the 
"stiffening" of two infantry divisions with tank 
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battalions and experiments were duly carried out in a 
limited fashion in 1929. 
This round of the experiment was now over and what 
were the conclusions? The three men most directly 
concerned - Mcntgomery-Ma ssingberd, Burnett-Stuart and 
Collins - submitted reports. Montgomery-Massingberd 
stressed what to him was the artificiality of the tests in 
pitting the Force against the older arms which were denied 
tank support. He was of the opinion that a combination of 
armoured cars, light tanks and cavalry would be more 
useful than the Force as it was constructed because it was 
so noisy and so sensitive to ground. The Armoured Force 
could not carry out strategic reconnaissance and the force 
which would replace the independent cavalry division of 
1914 should not be it but a combination of "cavalry, 
armoured cars, scout cars, light tanks, horse artillery, 
and mechanized light battalions". The horse was slow but 
there was no substitute as yet. He wished to see more 
study of cooperation between tanks and cavalry and 
infantry because, during the first six months of the next 
war, the latter would be used. (34) In this last there was 
nothing unreasonable - Montgomery-Nassingberd knew 
perfectly well that the government would never spend the 
necessary money on modernizing the Army until forced to it 
by war or clear threat of war. 
Burnett-Stuart began by stating that the exercises 
had been handicapped by shortages of money and equipment 
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and by inadequate training and he observed that the 
Vickers Medium had slowed the Force down. The Force bad 
yet to develop its greatest asset - mobility: "An armoured 
force is most formidable when it is at large just below 
the horizon". It was principally a raiding force for it 
could not hold ground and it was extremely sensitive to 
ground. Infantry, he observed, was now more confident 
when it met tanks. 
All this is to the good from an Armoured 
Force training pcint of view. There was a 
distinct danger at first of its having 
everything too much its own way... Most 
of the exercises have been deliberately 
planned to bring out its limitations 
rather than to make a display of its 
powers. (35) 
It is a good thing that none of the tank publicists got to 
hear of that for they would have gone even further with 
their charges of plots. But surely it was just as 
important to learn the limitations of the tank as it was 
to learn its powers. 
Collins reported in more detail. Speaking in 1927 he 
said that the Force had been created to test three roles: 
strategic reconnaissance (possibly to replace the 
cavalry), cooperation with other forces and "independent 
operations at a distance". He stressed the Force's 
vulnerability: 
much of the Force is at present 
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vulnerable, seriously so in fact, to small 
arms fire. 
This was, he thought, the greatest task in front of the 
Force: to iron out the various problems. He said that the 
purpose of the Force was not to hold ground, which he did 
not believe it could, but to strike the enemy. He was 
asked about the defence of the Force and replied that he 
did not want to boast, but in the first week the infantry 
had escorted the guns but, after two weeks, it had been 
the other way around. (36) In 1928 he gave his conclusions 
on the two years$ experiments. The following claims could 
be made: the Force could function on its own in most areas 
excepting forests, swamps and mountains; its mobility was 
at least twice that of a normal infantry force and was 
likely to increase; it had a great moral effect on the 
infantry and could greatly inhibit its freedom of action. 
On the other hand, the force was initially very expensive 
(although probably cheaper in the long term) and required 
such a high standard of training that only a long service 
professional army could handle tanks. The Vickers Medium 
had limited the mobility of the Force and had added to its 
grave problem of protection. That problem was likely to 
get worse as anti-tank guns got better and because up- 
armourinq presented a "prodigious problem". The Armoured 
Force could not, he thought, carry out all of the 
functions of cavalry as yet. He urged balance and careful 
thought for the future because one sided arguments caused 
military opinion to swing from one extreme to the 
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other. (37) 
Another observer in 1927 stated that, in his opinion, 
the Force had attempted too much in the first year and 
that 1928 ought to be spent in "mechanical drill". To 
him, communication was the greatest problem and was far 
more important than embarrassing the other arms. The 
Vickers Medium came in for more abuse as generally being a 
drag and a limit on the activities of the Force. This 
writer continued with a number of suggestions two of which 
were unusual: he wanted three companies of highly trained 
and lightly equipped riflemen to be permanently attached 
to the armoured brigade; and he believed that the "real 
problem" to be solved was the appropriate tactics to be 
used against a similar force. (38) Neither of those 
suggestions were common: tank versus tank fights were 
expressly excluded from official consideration as shall be 
seen and most thinkers did not wish to see infantry added 
to mechanized forces except when needed. (39) 
Liddell Hart professed himself disappointed with the 
exercises and again stressed that the units making up the 
Force should be free to move around and that Egypt was the 
ideal place for training. Cavalry men should be put in 
charge of mechanized forces because of their mobile 
training and their eye for ground. (40) In another article, 
he called for an increase in light tanks and called for 
the inclusion of "picked bodies of skirmishers" in place 
of regular infantry units. (41) Another writer was scornful 
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of the mobility of the Force: it was so dependent on 
ground conditions and its average speed at night over 
unreconnoitred ground was only about 2mph. Mobility must 
be increased. (42) 
A Staff Conference in January 1929 considered all 
these matters and Collins reported as above: bearing in 
mind the defects of the medium tank, the Force was capable 
of the three roles it had been created to test although it 
could not yet replace cavalry in the scouting role. 
So ended the great experiment. It had produced 
positive conclusions as Collins' reports show and had 
generally been found valuable. As a result, the probable 
composition of an armoured brigade would be headquarters 
and signal section, one medium and two light tank 
battalions and a close support battery. It was necessary 
to test the value of light tanks and tankettes in the 
infantry formations and that was why the Armoured Force 
had been broken up. But it was hoped that a permanent 
armoured brigade would be formed in 1930 or 1931. (43) 
The Experimental Force had had a mixed reception: it 
was a good idea, but... It could not hold ground, but 
that did not matter too much as its role was to hit, not 
hold. But was it fast enough? The consensus was that it 
was not although it was a good deal faster than anything 
else. It was extremely sensitive to ground and its 
performance varied with the terrain much more than that of 
a horse or a man. The Vickers Medium was a hindrance and 
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a liability and the reaction against that tank has been 
described. Perhaps more important, it was very difficult 
to control the Force -a small, efficient and reliable 
radio for tanks did not exist at the time. On the whole 
however, as a first step, the experiment had been 
successful -a prototype "armoured" brigade had been put 
together and had demonstrated that such a formation was a 
practical proposition. The 1927 and 1928 experiments led 
directly to the first official statement on mechanization. 
Mechanized and Armoured Formations (or the "Purple 
Primer" as it was nicknamed from the colour of its cover) 
appeared in 1929. It had been largely written by Broad. 
It is worth quoting from extensively as it, and its 
similar successor, was the only statement officially 
issued by the War Office on the subject and because it was 
read with interest in other countries. (44) It began with a 
general introduction which stressed the importance of the 
Army's being mechanized: 
The Army in its general form must be 
modelled on civil life and, consequently 
must mechanize gradually. (45) 
Armoured units were to function both as mobile and as 
combat troops: 
The higher organization of the Army will 
be as under: - 
i Mobile troops 
(a) Cavalry divisions or brigades 
(b) Light armoured divisions or brigades 
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ii Combat troops 
(a) Divisions with non-divisional troops 
(b) Medium armoured brigades. (46) 
The characteristics of AFVs are great 
mobility combined with a considerable 
degree of invulnerability under fire, 
together with great fire power in 
movement. (47) 
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In open undulating country, tank forces would be very 
effective but in close country it was infantry that would 
have the advantage. However, one of the powers of 
armoured forces would be their ability to prevent infantry 
unescorted by tanks frcm leaving such close country. (48) 
It was noted that, because of track problems, tanks were 
better advised to travel on soft roads than hard and to do 
long distance moves by rail. (49) 
Two proposed formations were set out. The medium 
armoured brigade would have headquarters and signals, one 
battalion of medium tanks and two of light tanks, two 
close support batteries and an anti-aircraft battery with 
a total of 32 medium tanks, 115 light tanks, 16 signals 
tanks, 18 close support tanks, 163 other vehicles and 
1,871 officers and men. (50) The light armoured brigade 
would have headquarters and signals, two or three light 
tank battalions, a close support battery, an anti-aircraft 
battery and an armoured car regiment to be added as 
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needed. Vehicles would be (including armoured cars and 
with two battalions) 111 light tanks, 16 signals tanks, 9 
close support tanks, 49 armoured cars, 195 other vehicles 
and 1,737 personnel. (51) It will be noted that there was a 
very high proportion of light tanks in the so called 
"medium" brigade. 
In the summer of 1931 appeared Modern Formationst an 
updated version of the 1929 handbook. This was 
essentially the earlier book with much of the wording 
unchanged to which had been added a foreword by Milne, 
some data on cavalry divisions, a number of references to 
anti-tank defence and new organization tables. 
In his foreword Milne explained the reasoning behind 
the second book and added a disclaimer: 
In the preparation of the present 
volume... fuller consideration has been 
given to the modernization of the older 
arms as distinguished from the tank arm. 
The scope of the book is therefore greater 
than that of Mechanized and Armoured 
Formations, 1929, which it supersedes. (52) 
Though published by command of the Army 
Council, this pamphlet does not of 
necessity represent the considered views 
of that body, but is the result of five 
years' study and experiment by the general 
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staff. (53) 
The business about the Army's needing to modern ize in 
order to keep up with civilian life was repeated in a 
somewhat stronger form: 
In view of the trend of modern 
civilization, mechanization must be 
accepted as the inevitable stage in the 
evoluticn of army organization. Its 
acceptance or rejection may have seemed at 
one time to be a matter for choice, but 
this is no longer the case. (54) 
The advantages of the machine in war were outlined: 
It is clear, however, that the machine can 
carry armour capable of resisting any 
bullet which can be propelled from a man 
carried lethal weapon. Further, the 
machine, while doing this, has a general 
mobility far in excess of that enjoyed by 
man, except in certain limited 
circumstances. (55) 
It will be noted that this claim for the protective power 
of a tank is modest - it is limited to small arms. This 
edition had good news for the small British Army: 
... it may be deduced that the modern 
tendency is for armies to become 
smaller. (56) 
Anti-tank weapons were mentioned and it was stated that 
"offensive anti-tank action is entirely a matter for fully 
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armoured units". (57) The section went on to describe the 
anti-tank weapons available: 
For defensive action, in addition to the 
artillery, three special types of weapons 
are available: - 
i The anti-tank machine gun 
ii The 6-pr. Q. F. qun on pedestal mounting 
iii The contact mine. (58) 
Again two proposed formations were set out. The 
mixed tank brigade would have headquarters and signals, 
three mixed tank battalions, one light tank battalion and 
a light anti-aircraft section. There would be 63 medium 
tanks, 131 light tanks, 4 signals tanks, 20 close support 
tanks, 163 other vehicles and 1,735 officers and men. (59) 
The light tank brigade had headquarters and signals, three 
light tank battalions and a light anti-aircraft section 
with 7 medium tanks, 171 light tanks, 3 signals tanks, 15 
close support tanks, 121 other vehicles and 1,267 officers 
and men. (60) 
In comparing the two sets of formations from these 
two handbooks, several points stand out. The first is the 
increase in supply of medium tanks in 1931 - nearly 
doubled in the mixed brigade and an addition of seven to 
the light brigade. This is surprising when the general 
dissatisfaction with the Vickers Medium at this time is 
recalled. However, even in the 1931 mixed brigade -a 
formation which was to de the heavy fighting - less than 
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half of the fighting tanks were mediums. Added to which, 
these were paper formaticns and were a long way from being 
filled. The medium tank referred to may well be the 
Sixteen Tonner. The second point of interest is the great 
reduction in signals tanks in 1931. This reflected the 
improvement in communications which were to be 
dramatically demonstrated by Broad in the 1931 manoeuvres. 
It will also be noted that there was a very high 
percentage of "tail" to "teeth" in these formations and it 
was not for some years that Hobart, when Brigade 
commander, could reduce the ancillary vehicles to more 
maneagable levels. 
In 1930 armoured experimentation took another 
cautious step forward with the construction of a prototype 
"armoured brigade" made up of the 3rd and 5th Battalions 
RTC. These two battalions had formed the RTC portion of 
the Experimental Forces and, so far as information is 
available, were organized in the same way as they had been 
then: that is, about 20 armoured cars and 10 light tanks 
in the first and about 50 Vickers Mediums in the second. 
Nothing much of importance was discovered except the 
usual: the force was reasonably effective against 
infantry, communication problems were still evident and 
the speed of the force was not very great. More data on 
movement was amassed. The longest "march" was 80 miles 
covered in 17 hours which included a night march of 21 
miles. After the first 63 miles, there had been 15 
temporary and 2 "workshop casualties" among the medium 
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tanks. These 17 casualties were put right in about two 
hours and they rejoined the column. (61) This was not a 
very good performance: the average speed was a paltry 
4.7mph and over the first 75% of the run, 30% of the 
medium tanks were casualties. It is true that these 
casualties were temporary but a temporary breakdown has 
the same effect as a permanent one if it keeps the tank 
from being where it is needed. A dispassionate observer 
could have been forgiven for saying that tanks were a long 
way from demonstrating their "general mobility far in 
excess of that enjoyed by man". 
1931 represents the tank's coming of age in the 
British Army. In the spring of 1931, Charles Broad left 
the War Office and Milne asked him to command a tank 
brigade and see whether he could do what the "Purple 
Primer" said. Broad decided that the exercises should 
demonstrate tanks manoeuvring in mass and "no longer 
single monsters to roam about the battlefield". A Colonel 
A. C. Fuller, identified by Broad as the "Fuller of the 
Fullerphone", (62) who was in charge of the Experimental 
Signals Establishment at Woolwich, had approached Broad in 
1930 with a new type of crystal set. (63) Using this 
device, Broad worked out a series of simple code signals 
and, at long last, became the first man to control an 
entire armoured brigade from his command tank. 
Control was complete and I could move the 
brigade about as I liked. (64) 
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Before 1931 and Broad's innovations, the "tank idea" 
was more theory; after him, it was practical. The 
difficulty of control had long been realized and there had 
been a number of articles in the journals which vividly 
illustrated this fact. In 1922 wireless telephony was 
possible but impractical - needed for a range of five 
miles was an aerial of two wires each as long as an 
armoured car and spaced as far apart as an armoured 
car. (65) That is to say, signals could be received; there 
was as yet no practical transmitting aerial for an 
AFV. {66) Flags were suggested in 1924 (67) and different 
kinds of shapes to be hcisted from a tank in 1925. (68) An 
RTC officer recognized communication as the greatest 
problem of tank warfare: 
... communication, both internal and 
external, are at present the 'Achilles 
Heel' of the armoured fighting vehicle. 
This was so because there was simply no way of controlling 
tanks: 
At the moment <March 1928>, control of an 
armoured force, once it has been launched 
into action, is practically 
impossible. (69) 
Another author in 1928 pcinted out that writers were fond 
of comparing an army to a body but that the body's 
communications were a great deal better than an 
army's. (70) The extent of the problem may be graphically 
shown by the fact that the MA set, with a range of 30 to 
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50 miles weighed 1,594 lbs; the MB set for tanks weighed 
234 lbs and, with its ancillary bits and pieces, occupied 
more than 24 cubic feet; for this it had a range of only 5 
to 12 miles. (71) Broad had solved the problem by means of 
his simple two letter battle code transmitted by flags and 
by radio signals. Liddell Hart observed 180 tanks moving 
at speed and executing complicated battle drills to the 
command of one voice. (72) 
The brigade of 1931 was, again, a rather scratch 
force. Three mixed tank battalions were found and, at 
virtually the last minute, a light battalion was 
organized. The brigade had 85 medium tanks and 95 light 
tanks. 
After this experimentation tended to peter out and, 
according to Broad, "Nothing more really effective was 
done in the tank line right up to 1939". (73) In 1932 the 
brigade was again formed this time fortified with 50 
additional light tanks and further experiments in control 
and movement were carried out. Liddell Hart was 
enthusiastic about the light tanks and stressed their 
speed; as was by now the custom, he condemned the medium 
tanks as too old and as ill armoured. (74) Owing to the 
financial crisis and the May Committee cuts, no brigade 
scale training was held for the Tank Corps in 193.3. At 
last, in late 1933, the decision was made to establish 
permanently the )st Brigade, Royal Tank Corps. The 2nd, 
3rd and 5th Battalions and the newly formed 1st (Light) 
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Battalion were assigned to this formation following the 
organization set out in Modern Formations. 1931 for a 
mixed tank brigade. 
The question of the composition of armoured or 
mechanized formations did not attract very much attention 
in the journals and most of what was written was published 
at the time of the Experimental Forces. The reason for 
this limited interest in such an important question is 
presumably that such a matter could best be settled by 
experiment. The experiments were duly carried out and 
most soldiers were content with their conclusion that an 
armoured brigade was a valuable formation. Therefore, 
there was little cause to write articles calling for all 
armoured formations. 
A few articles were written however. In his Gold 
Medal Essay for 1919, Fuller had proposed a "new model 
army" and he believed that such a thing could become a 
reality in ten years. This army was to be made of 
divisions of 12 battalions of infantry, tanks and machine 
gun companies combined together; in each division there 
would be in addition artillery, cavalry (two regiments) 
and tank battalions. The British Army could be organized 
into eight of these new divisions with another 12 brigades 
in the Dominions (of which half were to come from Canada - 
a most unrealistic assumption). (75) Two things will be 
noted in this proposal of the new army of 1929: the basic 
unit was to have been an all arms formation both in the 
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battalions and in the divisions (something which Fuller 
apparently later changed his mind on) and Puller had 
included cavalry in his model army. In another article in 
1924 Fuller set up a future battle. In this article he 
was mainly arguing for the utility of tanks but he had the 
army with its tanks organized independently defeat the 
army with its tanks organized as infantry support (so much 
for the all arms units of 1919) . (76) Another article 
protested against the "awful mathematical allotment" of 
one tank battalion for each division and argued for an 
independent tank force. (77) A paper written by Lindsay in 
1924 and published in late 1927 argued for the formation 
of an experimental mechanized force but, of course, by 
then events had passed the article by. (78) Two other 
articles in 1928 proposed armoured brigades (79) and 
Burnett-Stuart called for a mechanized force properly 
organized although he admitted that financial problems 
would make this difficult. (80) The last article written on 
this subject during the period suggested a new army 
orqanizaticn. There should be a mobile division of light 
tanks and cavalry, one motorized infantry division and two 
regular divisicns and, in the corps and army troops, two 
medium tank battalions. (81) 
As the above demonstrates, there was little debate in 
the journals and there was little reason: there was an 
experimental force and it led to the formation of an 
armoured brigade which, with the probable addition of 
cavalry, would have served as the mobile force of any 
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Expeditionary Force organized for a major war before 1933. 
There was nothing to debate about; experiment was 
proceeding slowly but regularily. 
The question of future tank formations had not been 
settled by 1933: experiments would continue up to the 
beginning of the war. What had been decided by 1933 was 
modest. A mechanized force had been tried and been found 
to be valuable. This had led to further experiments with 
tank brigades. The brigade had been found valuable as 
well and one had been permanently established and a 
tentative organization had been worked out. There was a 
tendency towards not including infantry in such formations 
on the principle that infantry could be added when needed 
and, when not needed, was a hindrance to such a force. By 
1933 much of the problem of communication had been solved 
internally by the laryngaphone and externally by the 
provision of an increased number of radios and new 
developments in the state of the art. Light tanks were 
being added to the RTC and the critical equipment 
shortages were becoming less critical. Regular progress 
had been made and the RTC was daily becoming more 
proficient at working out the detailed problems of 
gunnery, drill, maintenance and so forth for which there 
were no ready made solutions. The British were later to 
regret their insistence on all tank formations but in 1933 
they were well enough satisfied with progress in 
organization and formations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Strategy_and Tactics_for_Armoured Forces 
6 171 
In the early postwar years there was a good deal of 
uncertainty about the future organization and purpose of 
the British Army. Thinking on this subject began before 
the war ended and, in April 1917 the Army Council created 
a committee to consider the future size and composition of 
the Army 
on the assumption that at the conclusion 
of peace, and for the first few years 
afterwards, the size, composition and 
distribution of the Regular Army, speaking 
generally, may have to be the same as 
before: the war. (1) 
In 1920 Churchill praised the pre-war arrangements 
and stated that their excellence was proved by the fact 
that the Army was returning to them. (2) Later in that 
year it was pointed out that many army units were confused 
about the future and did not know what stores they were to 
keep up. (3) Much of the confusion was caused by the 
matters of econcmy, the adoption of the ten year rule, the 
large scale of post war responsibilities and the 
uncertainties over the future of mechanization which have 
been mentioned. But there was another problem: the 1914 
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Army had had an enemy against which to measure itself but 
by 1919 Germany was a negligible factor and where was 
there a likely or even possible enemy? This matter came 
up in the CID in 1920. There discussing naval matters, 
Lloyd George pointed out that there were only two major 
naval powers remaining besides Britain: the USA and Japan, 
- and that Britain was on friendly terms with both of 
them. while the possibility of future hostility of these 
powers towards Britain or each other must be kept in mind, 
Britain could not compete against the USA in naval 
construction. The solution, he thought, was that each 
power should build for supremacy in $#its sea". (4) 
Hankey, always influential on such matters, suggested to 
the Foreign Secretary that the political assumption for 
defence planning should assume a war with Japan or one 
with France. He did not think that either situation was 
likely but "They provided the best criterion by which to 
measure our defensive arrangements". (5) 
In the years before the appearan 
enemies, the CID discussed various 
enemies. Hankey's rule seems to have 
these countries were taken not as 
enemies but as convenient standards 
British defences could be tested. 
ce of more likely 
powers as possible 
been followed and 
genuinely potential 
against which the 
In 1921 A. J. Balfour was of the opinion 
that the danger cf an air attack by France 
constituted a grave menace to the country 
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but Churchill more realistically stated that such a war 
was "at the present time, practically inconceivable. " (6) 
The CIGS shared this latter opinion. (7) The alleged air 
menace from France was to crop up from time to time in the 
1920's but no one, with the possible exception of the RAF 
which found the French air force a convenient measure, 
took it very seriously. It came up again in 1922 and it 
was said that Britain could be rendered "almost impotent" 
by "a continuous stream of aeroplanes from France dropping 
bombs by day and night"; this was, however, unlikely. (8) 
In 1923 it was estimated that the "continuous stream" 
(presumably immune to any and all defensive action or 
mechanical breakdowns) could drop 168 tons of bomts on the 
first day, 126 tons the next and 84 tons a day thereafter 
on Britain. Again it was stressed that France had been 
chosen not because of fears of a war with her but "because 
at the present time she is the strongest air power". (9) 
From this time on, the French "air menace" virtually 
disappeared from serious consideration. 
If France was not to be taken seriously as a possible 
enemy, some thought that the Soviet Union should be. In 
1926 the Foreign Secretary deprecated the idea that Japan 
should be considered an enemy and continued: 
I have no hesitation in stating that our 
policy should be based upon the assumption 
that Russia is the enemy and not 
Japan. (10) 
A Russian descent on India was an old British fear and was 
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repeated in a paper written by the General Staff in 1927. 
(11) Regardless of whether such a fear had been justified 
in the nineteenth century, the new Soviet government was 
ccncerned at that time with its internal problems and had 
no desire for such a large foreign adventure. Because of 
a complete lack of evidence of Soviet desires for conquest 
in India, the fear of Soviet attack does not figure much 
in British sources apart from these two references. 
If not France or the Soviet Union, then perhaps Japan 
should be considered to be the enemy. Certainly, the 
minutes of the CID show considerable discussion of the 
situation in the Par East but was there anything to 
suggest that Japan might fight Britain one day? Most 
people thought not. In 1925 Chamberlain could not 
"conceive of any circumstances" in which the two countries 
might singlehandedly fight and saw the only possibility of 
war as following from a major redistribution of European 
power - for example a German-Soviet-Japanese agreement - 
which he thought unlikely. (12) As has been mentioned, he 
repeated his conviction that Japan was not the enemy the 
next year. there was some concern that the cessation of 
the Anglo-Japanese treaty might cause friction but, in 
1930, relations between the two countries were still 
considered "excellent". However, by 1932, relations had 
worsened and the ten year rule was finally cancelled 
because "Recent events in the Far East are ominous". (13) 
Next year Mont gomery-Massingberd objected to the inclusion 
of France in the COS report because 
6 
it may divert the attention of the CID 
f rcm what are much more real dangers, 
Germany in the west and Japan in the east. 
The latter is a possible enemy. (14) 
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A memorandum from Milne in 1930 marks the last 
confidence in the 1920's spirit. He felt that war was 
unlikely either with Germany, Italy or Japan although (on 
no evidence submitted) he remained suspicious of Soviet 
intentions. (15) The near future seemed secure from major 
war. 
A revisionist Germany was a more likely enemy than 
either France or the Soviet Union and the General Staff 
had been keeping abreast of developments there. In 1921 
it was estimated that the Germans could put ten divisions 
into the field but since France, Poland and Czechoslovakia 
could produce 105, a threat from Germany was not to be 
taken too seriously yet. (16) It was evident that Germany 
was evading the military provisions of the Treaty and this 
was known to the General Staff not later than 1928. It 
was estimated that Germany had a strength of about 
2,000,000 men fully or partially trained and it was clear 
from the sums allocated to the army that she was building 
up a war chest. This was a conservative estimate but it 
was certain that Germany was "building up reserves for 
future use". On hearing this, Churchill said that he 
thought there was little danger so long as the French Army 
remained stronq and he said that the British should not 
6 176 
oppose French Army size. (17) In 1930 Milne warned that 
Germany was undoubtedly evading the provisions of the 
Treaty of Versailles 
not only as regards the provision of 
trained reserves, but also as regards the 
use of forbidden weapons and the provision 
of illegal war material. 
The General Staff had probably been reformed and much 
assistance was being given to "patriotic" organizations. 
He felt that the German Army was not at present a threat 
to peace but that it was being made as large and as 
efficient as possible and that the military spirit was 
being kept alive. MacDonald agreed with this assessment 
and suggested that, in the event of a breakdown in the 
disarmament negotiations, Germany might claim the right to 
rearm. (18) Next year another General Staff officer 
warned 
To sum up: leaving Russia as a colossal 
and unsolved problem on one side for the 
moment, the main problem of future 
European peace is bound up with the future 
of Germany... should, however, as is more 
probable, a more violent and determined 
element seize the reins of government, it 
is difficult to see how, sooner or later, 
war can be avoided unless France is 
prepared to knuckle under completely <and 
such a course is unlikely>... (19) 
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These assessments were, of course, perfectly accurate and 
the possibility of war with Germany grew year by year. 
We have now looked briefly at the candidates for the 
position of enemy-in-chief and have seen that throughout 
the 1920's there was no convincing enemy. However, by 
1931 or 1932 Japan presented itself and it was soon 
followed by Germany. Where Was the British Army in all 
this? It is evident that a war with Japan would be 
principally a naval war which would not require much of an 
army but that a continental war with Germany probably 
would. The purpose of the British Army at home was 
defined in 1931 in an addition to Army Training-Memorandum 
4A 
An overseas major expedition is the 
problem for which the army at home is 
directly organized. This is the #a verage 
condition' quoted in FSR, Vol. it 1930, 
Ch. 1, Sec. 1, Para. 3. " 
Confusion arose over this point more than over anything 
else and it was often said that such an enemy must be as 
modern and as good as the British Army. But that was not 
true and a hypothetical enemy army of that calibre was 
described. The description is of an army of twelve 
battalions, six cavalry regiments, 36 tanks and six 
armoured cars including supporting units. The $'national 
war" (ie a very large scale war) was remote and "in the 
background". Such a war would likely be fought by "new 
armies" like those of 1916. (20) This terminology was 
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derived from a pair of definitions which had been 
developed in 1923. A "small war" was one which could be 
dealt with on the voluntary principle by a force of 12 
infantry and one cavalry divisions; a "great war" would 
require the full resources of the nation. (21) 
The future employment of the Army could not be safely 
predicted: 
unlike the armies of other military 
powers, the British Army at home has no 
single predominant objective towards which 
its training can be categorically 
directed. 
In order of probability, the tasks of the Army at home 
were: imperial policing, minor expeditions, and, a very 
distant possibility, the national or great war. 
Preparation of bodies of troops for the last would be 
"premature$' but officers would be allowed to study the 
possibility. (22) 
The fact is that, between 1919 and 1933, what with 
financial problems, the ten year rule, the strategic 
situation and the general lack of interest in the country, 
the British Army did not develop a comprehensive policy. 
General Sir Edmund Ironside was one of the inheritors of 
the drift of the time and this is what he had to say: 
As we stood at the end of 1937 we had no 
such Doctrine <i. e. as that which the BEF 
of 1914 had had>. We had no plan even for 
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the assembling of an army to go to France 
in case of war with Germany. 
The maddest thing of all was that the 
RAF had carved out for itself a special 
character. They made no effort to join in 
any war doctrine, much less a doctrine in 
tactics with either Army or Navy. 
I_thought it a most dangerous 
situation . (23) 
There was plenty of time in the future and, in any case, 
the ten year rule inhibited the sort of preparations that 
were to be so lacking when the war came. 
Whatever would be the employment of the Expeditionary 
Force, it was planned that the RTC would take part. In 
1923 it was laid down that the first contingent, to take 
the field immediately, wculd be three infantry and one 
cavalry divisions, ancillary troops and three tank 
battalions, two armoured car companies and a tank salvage 
company. Four months later another two divisions and two 
more tank battalions and another tank salvage company 
would be available. In the final organization given, it 
is clear that each tank battalion was to be attached to an 
infantry division and the armoured cars would be in the 
cavalry division. A note reminded readers that the tanks 
might not be available for some time. (24) In 1924 the 
structure was substantially the same. Another note stated 
that there were only two tank battalions available and 
that the remainder of the paper formations would not be 
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available for some time. (25) This organization lasted 
until 1930 when it was modified in a number of important 
ways. The first c cntingen t, to arrive "x" weeks after 
mobilization, would only be a partial cavalry division and 
an infantry division with its attached medium tank 
battalion. The force would be fully assembled at '"x +6 
months" and would again be five infantry divisions, five 
tank battalions, one cavalry division and supporting 
troops. As may be seen, since 1923 the initial contingent 
had shrunk and would take longer to arrive. Among the 
supporting troops was to be the Armoured Force "if 
formed". (26) Not only was this a slower mobilization, 
but, with only four tank battalions not at full strength, 
there were not nearly encugh tanks to form five battalions 
and an armoured force. By 1932 the armoured force had 
still not been formed and there were complaints that there 
was not even a paper formation from which a start in 
planning could be made. (27) The Expeditionary Force 
outlined in 1930 lasted with periodic updating for the 
rest of the period; it is of interest to note that by 1933 
"x'" had still not been defined. Therefore, not only was 
there no such doctrine as had existed in 1914, but there 
was no such BEF. The trained and equipped six division 
force which mobilized in 1914 had been replaced by 1933 by 
a partly worked out paper force lacking much of its 
equipment. 
We cannot escape the conclusion that, so far as the 
Army was concerned at least, Ironside's comments were 
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accurate. There was almost no planning for the Army and 
such planning as there was was quite unrealistic. The 
mobilization plans dealt with non-existent units equipped 
with non-existent equipment assembling some time in the 
vague future. No mention or thought was given to what 
would happen during the '"x +6 months" that the five 
divisions were being created. The British shyed away from 
any thought of a "continental commitment" and dismissed 
such problems as being in the class of the "great war" for 
which there would presumably be enough time to create the 
"new armies". In 1915 France had held the line while the 
British created their armies; who would hold the line in 
the future war? The British could not assemble fast 
enough to prevent the "minor war" from turning into a 
"great war" or a defeat and there was no planning 
whatsoever for the "great war". In this atmosphere of 
hope and procrastination, it is not surprising to find 
that there was no discussion on the official level on the 
strategic uses and implications of tanks. 
Indeed, in the discussions of Imperial strategy and 
defence which occurred between 1919 and 1933, tanks and 
mechanization are virtually never mentioned. There are no 
references at all to "tanks", "armour" or "mechanization" 
in the Cabinet minutes. (28) Neither is there anything 
directly relating to these matters in the minutes of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. (29) There is one 
reference only, and an unimportant one, in the minutes of 
the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee. (30) A perusal of the CID 
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minutes shows that the principal concerns of defence 
planners were air defence and the Far East. 
Tanks figured not at all. Only the Army Council had 
anything to to do with tanks and, even there, there are 
more references in the index to details of uniform design 
than to tanks! This lack of consideration of such a 
revolutionary weapon displays, to say the least, a 
deficiency of imagination among the senior officers. As 
the tank propagandists correctly perceived, the invention 
of the tank had qualitatively changed the nature of war 
and changed it in a way that all powers must adapt to. 
Great concern and thought was expressed over the 
implications of the aeroplane in war but, when it came to 
tanks, such an appreciation was missing. Not all the lack 
of interest was a result of conservatism however. Tanks 
were experimental and very little was known about them; 
furthermore, the relatively fast post war tanks were so 
qualitatively different from the war time rhomboids that, 
clearly, much time and experiment was necessary. It was 
not clear at all what the future of the tank would bring. 
Therefore, it may well be that the reason that there was 
so little consideration of tanks in these committees was 
that everything depended upon the results of experiments 
and, until those experiments were concluded, there was 
little to be gained from speculation about the strategic 
import of tanks. As has been shown in the preceding 
pages, there were sound reasons for doubting the potential 
of tanks: they might never be mechanically sound, or they 
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might be so vulnerable to anti-tank defences so as to be 
virtually useless; only experiment over a long time could 
tell. 
If there was no official strategic thought or 
conclusion about tanks, there were at least semi-official 
conclusions about tanks in a tactical sense. Reference 
has been made to the "Purple Primers" and in them some 
tentative remarks were essayed about tanks in a tactical 
context. First, the two kinds of tanks were defined in 
their purposes: 
The medium tank is at present the most 
powerful AFV in the service. 
Its main role in battle is to destroy the 
enemy by fire or shock action. 
The tank is, therefore, designed as a gun 
platform for the delivery of fire on the 
move.. . 
Definite periods each day are required for 
maintenance and repair - these periods 
will become more prolonged as operations 
continue. (31) 
<As to the light tank> Speed is, however, 
of more general importance than fire 
power, as the finding of the enemy or the 
anti-tank device is the first function 
required from this machine, neutralization 
by fire being the second. (32) 
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The above two sections were repeated verbatim in Modern 
Formations and the role cf the light tank was expanded: 
Light tanks are to be used to reconnoitre 
for, and co-operate with, medium tanks, to 
co-operate with armoured cars, cavalry and 
infantry, and for other tasks mentioned in 
Section 15. (33) 
Section 15 gives: 
i close co-operation with medium tanks 
ii Reconnaissance for the operations of 
tank brigades 
iii Light fighting in general in co- 
operation with armoured cars, aeroplanes, 
cavalry and infantry 
iv operations within the division either 
in a protective or reconnoitering role; 
especially with bus columns. (34) 
The objectives of the armoured brigade were set out: 
objectives suitable for an armoured 
brigade acting independently are as 
follows: - 
i. Hostile cavalry formations 
ii. Hostile infantry formations 
iii. Posts on the lines of communications 
etc 
iv. Hostile armoured formations. 
Such formations <ie hostile armoured 
formations> do not, however, exist at the 
6 
moment, and as the subject is therefore 
purely theoretical, it will not be further 
discussed on these pages. 
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This section, with its very important last sentence, was 
quoted verbatim by the later publication. (35) 
This small number of statements represents the sum 
total of official or semi-official pronouncements on the 
tactical role of tanks in the period under consideration. 
It is not very much. Therefore, in conclusion, from the 
official side, there was no consideration at all of the 
strateqic role of tanks and very little of the tactical 
side. All that may be said in mitigation of this lack is 
that experiment had not yet resulted in sufficiently firm 
conclusions by 1933 for the role of tanks to be adequately 
taken into account in planning. 
Turning to the military journals of the period, we 
find that this indifference to the strategic possibilities 
of tanks was not wholly shared. Fuller, in particular, in 
a series of articles outlined the effect that the tank 
would have on the future. However, we find here again 
that the pattern noticed in other places was repeated: an 
early overconfidence in the powers of tanks gives place to 
doubts and criticisms of the extreme positions taken by 
the tank propagandists after 1929. The propagandists did 
not change their opinions but the early confident articles 
were replaced by the more sceptical efforts of others. 
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In Chapter 2 the arguments for tanks were outlined 
and many of these have a bearing on the strategic uses of 
tanks. It was shown that it was generally accepted that 
tanks, in principle at least, promised economies in men, 
effort and money and that they were more effective than 
anything else, so much so, that one day tanks might 
replace all the other arms. 
In these arguments and in their application to 
strategic thinking, Fuller was preeminent. In 1919 he 
argued that tanks could replace most of the other arms and 
could, by virtue of their effectiveness and economy, 
fulfil most battlefield missions. (36) He returned to this 
theme in 1921 and prophesied a future war in which 
floating tanks would be landed from ships and moving 
straight inland at a speed of 10mph would be, in 24 hours, 
150 miles inside enemy territory. While this force was 
raiding like "Vikings" a determined mechanized invasion 
would be landed elsewhere. Tanks would unite the three 
services - floating tanks would link the Navy to the Army 
and the ground gaining potential of tanks would free the 
Air Force from the necessity to return home to its bases. 
A mechanized army would be more effective than an army 
based on "muscle power" and, therefore, could result in 
savings. (37) This article represents the clearest and most 
confident statement of the "tank philosophy" and the 
changes in strategy and tactics made possible by the 
invention of tanks and other AFVS. Next year Fuller 
surveyed the history of transportation and observed that 
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armies were hindered by the fact that they could move in 
two dimensions but that their supplies could move in one 
dimension only (ie along roads or railways and not in any 
direction overland). Tracked vehicles would enable the 
two dimensional movement of supplies and fundamentally 
change the nature of war. Gone would be the days of the 
slow buildup and future armies would be able to organize 
for immediate and decisive battle. (38) In another article 
that year replying to the belief that future wars would be 
entirely decided in the air, he observed that aircraft had 
to land and that the tank because of its qualities would 
be of great value in capturing airfields. (39) In 1924 he 
posited an imaginary future battle in which the issue was 
entirely decided by the activities of the opposing tank 
forces with the cavalry and infantry looking on in a 
passive role. (40) 
After 1925 Fuller became silent in the journals - of 
the 16 of his articles considered, no less than 14 were 
written before 1925. He was by far the most imaginative 
of the tank writers and his writings had all the 
advantages and the defects of an active imagination. 
Nowhere did he consider the effects of anti-tank defence 
and, as in his article suggesting the "Viking" force, 
there is a lack of a realization of the possibility that 
the enemy might also have tanks. This confidence that 
Britain had some sort of monopoly on tank expertise was to 
be later criticised. It was all very well for Fuller to 
talk about fast forces of tanks doing what they pleased 
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but the uninspiring performance of the Vickers Medium 
brought one down to earth with a bump. 
The first sceptical article on the strategic role 
appeared in 1929. A future British Expeditionary Force 
would, it was said, prcbably be outnumbered by other 
nations' even if both were mechanized. The reason was 
(quite correctly as we have seen) that the other nations 
would say "if we mechanize, for the same money we can get 
more power" whereas the British would say "if we 
mechanize, we can save money'. (4 1) This was a fair comment 
and exactly summed up the early discussions on the 
economic advantages of tanks. Germains had much to say. 
He observed that, in British training, the tank vs 
infantry battle had been taken almost exclusively as the 
paradigm, but, he said, it was much more likely that tanks 
would find themselves fighting other tanks. In any event, 
there was nothing that the British could do in terms of 
mechanization or anything else that would enable their 
army to stand up against a non-mechanized continental army 
ten times their size. There was no reason to suppose that 
other countries could not match British science with their 
own science. (42) In another article he examined three of 
the extreme claims. Could machines replace men? He 
thought not, that had not happened in naval history and 
there was nothing to suggest that it would in the Army. 
He did not believe that the strength of nations would be 
measured by the size of their tank fleets because he could 
not bring himself to believe that the tank had much 
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utility. The notion that only long service armies could 
handle tanks he dismissed: knowing that he could assume 
strong infantry and artillery forces, a continental 
designer could modify designs; for example, knowing that 
he could rely on his own artillery for protection against 
the enemy artillery, he could dispense with speed in a 
tank in return for gun power and armour. Germains did not 
believe that tanks had reduced the value of infantry; 
after all, infantry could operate under all conditions 
whereas the tank had certain limitations. 
It is impossible to lay down hard and fast 
rules. Under certain conditions a tank 
attack may be decisive; under other 
conditions it may be a disastrous failure, 
and an infantry attack should have had 
greater prospects. (43) 
While he did not think that the tank was useless, 
Germains did not believe that it could do everything 
alone. One reason why some claimed that the tank could do 
everything by itself was that in the exercises of the time 
tanks seldom fought cther tanks. As has been mentioned, 
the "Purple Primer" dismissed tank-tank battles from 
consideration. This airy dismissal was not to everyone's 
liking: 
The tendency to assume that all the 
strategy, all the 'mechanical mindedness' 
and every neu conception of the Art of War 
are going to be found on one side alone, 
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sconer or later must lead to a disastrous 
disillusionment. (44) 
And so it did. 
As regards the tactical employment of tanks in 
future, the journals of the period provided a number of 
suggestions and arguments. One of the earliest of these, 
and in some respects the model for subsequent discussions 
of tank tactics, was Fuller's "Plan 1919". Conceived by 
Fuller when he was Staff officer to the Tank Corps in 
1918, the plan was for a decisive battle on the Western 
Front in 1919 which would lead to victory. After a short 
introduction describing the effect that the tank would 
have on mobility, security and offensive power, Fuller 
posited that the only way to win the war was to strike at 
the enemy's "brain" - his headquarters. After this "shot 
in the brain", he proposed a "shot in the stomach" - an 
attack on his bases. The enemy "body" would thereupon 
starve to death in disorganization and victory would be 
won. The Medium D was to be the means of victory thanks 
to its speed and radius of mobility. After the enemy's 
reserves had been attracted to a carefully chosen sector 
of the front, a force of thousands of Medium Ds, motorized 
infantry and marauding aircraft would smash through the 
line and make straight at the enemy's army headquarters. 
Bombers would attack his supply depots but his signals 
would be left alone so that bad news and rumour could 
circulate freely to the troops at the front. After 
sufficient time had been allowed for confusion and 
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demoralization to set in, the line would be assaulted by a 
force of Mark VIII tanks, medium tanks and infantry. This 
force, he estimated, would require 12,000 tanks and 
240,000 men. (45) Here was the essence of the tank battle: 
high mobility, brain warfare and deep penetration. The 
enemy's morale would be sapped before the attack and the 
attack would go all the more easily for it. During the 
whole of the battle, the enemy would be trying to hold the 
line with the knowledge that, behind the front line 
soldiers, there were thousands of tanks destroying their 
supplies, their lines of retreat and their command 
structures. In this brilliant plan were the seeds of the 
blitzkrieg of 1940. 
Speculative articles of prophetic plans were one 
thing but tank tactics were a matter to be settled by 
trial and error. Experiment did not end in 1933 and 
therefore, no definite conclusions can be drawn about the 
prevailing point of view in the period. Generally it was 
accepted that, in a future war, tanks and other armoured 
vehicles would form the strike force of the British Army. 
Exactly in what way, if at all, tanks would co-operate 
with the other arms, or how they would be organized within 
their formations or their actions when attacking, 
defending or fighting other tanks had not been decided. 
Most people seem to have assumed that light tanks would 
lead the attack with the mediums with their superior gun 
power bringing up the rear in case the light tank 
spearhead ran into trouble. Farther than this, it seems, 
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no one, in the absence of data gathered from manoeuvres, 
was prepared to go. 
There were opinions however. We have seen earlier in 
the section dealing with the anti-tank controversy that 
many thinkers assumed that the best defence against a tank 
was another tank. This was questioned by a tank officer. 
He did not think that there would ever be enough tanks to 
provide both the strike force and an anti-tank force. In 
any event, enemy tanks would likely attack friendly 
infantry and defending tanks would be faced with the 
possibility of harming their own infantry more than they 
helped. For these reasons he foresaw tanks being kept 
back to attack infantry and rarely if ever fighting other 
tanks. (46) This writer returned to the subject again in 
1925: "the normal employment of tanks is when infantry 
themselves cannot get on... " And "there will seldom be a 
tank battle, because the attacker, if he knows his job, 
will always have the greater strength of tanks. " (47) This 
writer saw tanks as being sparingly used and always to be 
directed against the infantry, assumed to be helpless in 
those days before anti-tank opinion changed. There is, of 
course, a flaw in this thinking - if tanks were so 
effective and infantry so helpless, a commander could not 
risk losing all his infantry to the enemy tanks and would 
therefore oppose the enemy tanks with the only force which 
was capable of dealing with them - his own tank force. 
This was seen by Pile when he suggested that, far from 
these pictures of the tank forces ignoring each other in 
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order to cut up the helpless infantry, the opposing tank 
forces would gc for each other and the resulting tank 
battles would quickly exhaust both side's tank forces. (48) 
In many respects, what Pile was saying was that tanks were 
mainly useful because they could cancel out the effects of 
the enemy's tank forces. 
More space was devoted to the role of the light tank 
than to the tactical role of tanks generally. Liddell 
Hart suggested in 1927 that the tankettes lead the attack 
and "smother" the defence with machine gun fire. Only if 
they were held up, would it be necessary to call up the 
medium and close support tanks. (49) Martel advocated an 
entire army in tankettes and stated that such a fully 
mechanized force would be far more effective than a 
conventional four division force. Again, the light 
vehicles would do most of the work with fire support from 
the heavier machines. (50) This tactical construction was 
supported by another officer the same year. 151) In 1928 a 
tactical formation was suggested which had armoured cars 
forming the outer perimeter, inside was another perimeter 
of light tanks and, in the middle, ready if required, were 
the medium tanks and self-propelled guns. The roles of 
the light tank were given as reconnaissance and 
protection. It is not clear whether this officer believed 
that the light tanks should do most of the fighting but 
his formation suggests that they would and that, again, 
the medium tanks would function as an emergency reserve. 
Of interest in this article is one of the rare calls for 
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practice with armoured melees so that tank forces would 
gain valuable practice instead of more or less 
effortlessly shooting up infantry columns. (52) 
Such a warning was necessary because of the 
(misplaced and groundless) confidence that the ]RTC would 
never have to fight other tanks. Indeed, the whole 
growing emphasis on the light tank from 1927/1928 onwards 
was a product of this Panglossian attitude. what would 
happen to the light tanks if they ran into real tanks? 
Fast though they may have been and small though they may 
have been, their armour was so weak that real tanks would 
have easily destroyed them. And the machine guns of the 
light tanks would have been no use against tanks. The 
whole concept of a tank armed with nothing more than a 
machine gun assumes that it will never have any other 
target than infantry. As it happened, the British light 
tanks were not fast enough and they were not small enough 
and they were shot to pieces by the German tanks. 
Tactical doctrine had to await practical 
experiment. (53) The Experimental Forces of 1927 and 1928 
provided a great mass of practical experiment. The 
lesscns were summarized by Brig. Collins in a series of 
articles written to inform the Army about the lessons of 
the forces. The conclusions of the two years' experiments 
were that, although subject to the expected "teething 
troubles", such a force could operate on its own in most 
kinds of terrain with the exception of forests, swamps and 
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mountains. Its mobility and endurance were much greater 
than those of a normal infantry force and likely to 
increase. In almost every way a mechanized force was 
superior to a normal infantry force - it possessed a great 
moral effect, it could so inhibit the infantry so as to 
render it virtually immobile, it was less vulnerable to 
air attack and so on. He felt that the mechanized force, 
at least at that time, had some drawbacks in the tactical 
sense. It was "peculiarly sensitive to ground", and he 
did not think that it could replace cavalry in all 
functions as yet. As anti-tank weapons improved, tank 
attacks were likely to become more costly. Nonetheless, 
tactically the armoured force was capable of what the tank 
pioneers had been claiming - it could move long distances 
and deliver a powerful blow and it was most useful in 
supporting and co-operating with other arms. (54) In 
another article, he stressed that much of the force had 
been vulnerable to small arms fire and that this problem 
had to be solved soon. When asked whether the force could 
hold the ground that it had taken, he replied that it 
could not but that that was not its business - its role 
was to strike hard at the enemy. (55) He did not go into 
tactical detail in these articles because the situation 
was still very much experimental. 
In 1932 an anonymous author summed up the indecision 
by stating the possibilities. Tanks could attack in First 
World War style, in support of infantry against prepared 
positions; they could attack a small objective at right 
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angles to the main infantry attack; or they could be used 
in far ranging attacks to the enemy's rear or flank. (56) 
Tactics were still fluid and the future activities of 
tanks depended on what the next war would turn out to be 
like. 
Therefore, as the period drew to a close, there were 
no formal doctrines on the uses of tanks and armoured 
forces either strategically or tactically. Experiment 
continued, and just as new formations and combinations of 
light and medium tanks were tried out in the summer and 
autumn manoeuvres, so new tactical ideas were experimented 
with. However, there were visible by 1933 the beginnings 
of firm conclusions. Although it was seldom clearly 
stated, it was usually assumed that tanks would be used 
only against first class enemies; for the normal run of 
police work in the Empire, armoured cars were more use. 
An underlying assumption, that was not often made clear, 
was that tanks would find themselves attacking infantry 
most of the time - so presumably, it was assumed that the 
enemy would not have very many tanks. Present was a very 
strongly held belief that, having taken and held the lead 
in armoured development, Britain could continue to enjoy 
this superiority. The strategic role of armoured forces 
would probably be, once the details had been worked out 
and the obsolete medium tanks replaced, that of the 
cavalry in its great days - the infantry would fix the 
enemy and the armour would hit him, break him up and 
pursue the remnants. Tactically the rise of the light 
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tank has been noted. Beginning as a cheap tank, the 
tankettes and later light tanks rapidly came to inherit a 
number of other developments which stressed mobility and 
smallness of size. Beginning as an auxilliary to the main 
force of medium tanks, the light tank in the British Army 
was, by 1933, moving to the pre-eminent position on the 
battlefield. Future battle, it was believed by many, 
would be principally carried out by light tanks appearing 
and disappearing on the field, blanketting enemy positions 
with a "cone" of machine gun fire, attacking infantry and 
disappearing suddenly after sowing death and panic. 
Armoured forces would be preceded by swarms of light 
tanks, penetrating weak positions and bypassing strong 
ones. Medium tanks were becoming relegated to the role of 
self-propelled artillery - ironic in view of their weak 
armament. 
There is an air of unreality in this picture of the 
enemy infantry digging in and wiring their positions as if 
they were back on the Somme and the time was 1916. In 
little of the writings of the tank propagandists of the 
time was there much appreciation of the problems of tank 
battles. Indeed, a number of articles (57) speak of light 
tanks armed with .5 inch machine guns functioning as tank 
destroyers: that thinking assumed that the enemy would 
have the same under armoured vehicles as the British. 
Experience in the next war would change many of the ideas 
of the Royal Armoured Corps. The legacy of British 
tactical thinking and the resulting designs was to become 
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apparent in the war with the adoption of many American 





An excellent introduction to the cavalry question 
between the wars is provided by the debates in the House 
of Commons in 1921. In two debates, the first on the Army 
Estimates in March and the second on the cavalry itself in 
April, are found the principal arguments, good and bad, 
for and against the retention of horsed cavalry in the 
British Army. 
Worthington-Evans opened the Army Estimates debate by 
referring to a "fast moving, powerful tank which would be 
more effective than the cavalry". (l) That statement 
expressed the view of many that the tanks could replace 
the cavalry. This was riposted by Major General Seely who 
as commander of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade had had war 
time experience of one of the more effective cavalry units 
on the Western Front: 
... I believe that the Bight Honourable 
Gentleman and his advisors are entirely 
wrong in thinking that they can substitute 
tanks for cavalry... That seems to we to 
be a most extraordinary misreading of the 
lessons of the War... Every advance in 
science has made the horse a more and more 
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indispensable weapon of war. 
Cavalry, he continued, were essential in the provision of 
speedy reconnaissance and had proved its value in the 
battle of the Marne and again in Palestine. (2) Seely was 
denying that the cavalry could be replaced by the, at that 
time, slower and noisier tank for certain purposes. Not 
only had cavalry proved essential in the last war, 
declared another Member, but "cavalry training is probably 
the most successful of any branch" in encouraging 
quickness of reaction. (3) These statements affirming the 
value of cavalry were answered by counter claims and 
another Member denied that cavalry could have any use in 
war - machine guns had slaughtered cavalry in the past and 
they would do so in the future. (4) Another speaker 
admitted that cavalry could not play much of a role in 
Europe but argued that it bad considerable utility in 
Asia. (5) 
In April the cavalry supporters in the House returned 
to the attack with the proposal of a motion which read: 
That, in the opinion of this House, the 
proposal to reduce the mobile forces of 
the Crown, and especially the disbandment 
of four British cavalry regiments, is 
contrary to the experience gained in the 
late War and inimical to the best 
interests of the defence of the Empire. (6) 
The seconder of the motion argued that tanks were 
essential in some areas but that there were types of 
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terrain in which they could not operate; for movement in 
these areas, cavalry remained essential. (7) Another 
speaker questioned the utility of tanks - "a well placed 
mine or field gun would quickly place a tank out of 
action". (8) Another speaker drew the attention of the 
House to the excellence of cavalry training: of the eight 
Field Marshalls then alive, no less than four were cavalry 
men. (9) It may have been true that cavalry were not much 
needed in the last war, argued another,, but the next war 
might duplicate the ccnditions of South Africa or Egypt 
"where tanks could not be used". (10) Other speakers 
attacked the cavalry and declared that it had been no use 
and never would be again: 
... I can honestly say that if the war on 
the Western Front proved anything it 
demonstrated beyond all doubt the utter 
futility of cavalry being employed in 
modern warfare. (11) 
Worthington-Evans defended the Government's actions. It 
was nonsense to talk of a reduction of the mobile forces 
of the Empire for the four regiments would be replaced 
with four battalions of tanks. In any case, the 
Government did not contemplate abolishing the cavalry 
altogether. When the motion was voted upon, it was 
defeated 143 to 34,24 Army officers voted with the "Ayes" 
and 25 with the "Noes". (12) the debate was not important 
and, as the voting tally shows, the Government was never 
in any danger; nor does the fact that only 177 HPs took 
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the trouble to vote on the matter suggest that it vas held 
in much interest. 
But the debates are interesting to us for in them 
were given all the reasons for retaining cavalry and all 
for abolishing it. It was suggested that cavalry should 
be got rid of because it was completely obsolete both now 
and in the future and the tank could perform every one of 
its functions. But, the other speakers argued, cavalry 
ought to be retained because war experience had shown it 
to be valuable, because it gave incomparable training in 
judgement and command, because cavalry was needed in 
certain parts of the Empire, because cavalry may be needed 
in the next war which would not necessarily be like the 
last one, because cavalry could carry out certain kinds of 
reconnaissance which tanks could not. These arguments 
were repeated throughout the period in the House of 
Commons. They were not peculiar to that venue, however, 
but were to be repeated wherever there was an argument 
about tanks and cavalry. (13) 
This handful of charges and counter charges may be 
broken down further: the cavalry debate hinged on two 
inter related questions - had the cavalry justified its 
existence during the war; could its continued existence in 
the 1920s and 1930s be justified? The two sides of the 
debate took up differing positions on these questions and, 
as so often happens in arguments which pecple take very 
seriously, extreme charges were made by both sides. In 
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what follows it will be shown that, right up to 1933, it 
was possible for a reasonable man to hold the position 
that cavalry had been some use in the past and was of some 
use in the present. Cavalry had not been a complete waste 
of money and effort during the war and it was possible to 
see that it still could be of use to the British Army 
throughout the period being examined. 
in weighing the claims of the various arms to share 
in the credit for victory in 1918 it is clear that, on the 
Western Front at any rate, the artillery, infantry and 
tank arms had all done more to win the war than the 
cavalry had done. The cavalry supporters were prepared to 
admit this; they maintained, however, that there had been 
occasions when the cavalry had "saved the day". Two of 
these, and the most important, were the two great retreats 
- that from Mons in 1914 and those in March and April 
1918. In these cases, it was claimed, the cavalry, by 
reason of its mobility, had enabled gaps in the line to be 
plugqed. After Mons, the two corps of the BEF began to 
fall back in the face of superior German forces and a gap, 
caused by the Forest of Mormal, had opened between them. 
The cavalry, by use of aggressive patrols and its 
superiority in rifle skill, had kept the German cavalry 
from penetrating this gap or from gaining accurate 
information about the BEF. So effective had the British 
cavalry been at keeping the German cavalry away that the 
German high command was consistently wrong in its 
intelligence of the location and size of the BEF. It 
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seems that the British cavalry could claim to have 
justified its existence during that retreat - it protected 
and covered the retreat, guarded the flanks of the 
retreating corps and kept the enemy from exploiting his 
position and superiority. (14) Again in March 1918 the 
cavalry's role was similiar. The great German attacks 
were overwhelming in their power and skill and the cavalry 
was the only available fcrce which could move quickly from 
danger point to danger point. General Gough, who 
commanded the Fifth Army on which the worst blows had 
fallen, wrote: 
The cavalry had played a great part in the 
battle. Their mobility, and their 
capacity to cross any country on horses 
and... to get rapidly from place to place, 
made them more powerful than their mere 
numbers would suggest ... They were rushed 
f rcm cne position to another to fill a 
gap, and saved many a crucial situation. 
They fought mounted or dismounted as 
opportunity offered. (15) 
Again, it seems, as at Mons, the cavalry had done useful 
work. 
But, it may be asked, were the cavalry at Eons and 
the 1918 retreats really acting as cavalry? The 
importance of the cavalry had lain in the horse's mobility 
which had enabled cavalry units to rush from emergency to 
emergency. They had not fought with swords and lances 
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and, with rare exceptions, they had not charged the enemy 
in the old way. The cavalry men used their horses to 
convey themselves from one part of the battlefield to 
another and, once there, they had generally dismounted and 
used their rifles. They were in fact not cavalry at all 
but mounted infantry. Therefore, the actions of the 
British cavalry in 1914 and 1918 did not really prove the 
necessity of horsed cavalry but the necessity for mobile 
infantry; if reliable cross country vehicles could be 
developed, there no longer would be any need for the 
mounted infantryman. 
With these two exceptions, the Western Front did not 
provide many examples of the value of cavalry. Perhaps a 
typical example of the use of cavalry in large scale 
attacks was provided by the battle of Cambrai in 1917. 
Part of the plan of battle had been that the 51st Highland 
Division, assisted by tanks, should take Plesquieres and 
four cavalry divisions were then to pass through the 
infantry and chase the Germans through Bourlon Wood. The 
commander of the infantry division, however, did not 
follow the instructions of the Tank Corps regarding the 
employment of the tanks and, probably as a result, did not 
take Flesquieres. The cavalry could have bypassed the 
town and headed towards the wood, but that required new 
orders. While someone had been sent back to get these 
orders, the Germans recovered and closed the gap that had 
existed and it was too late. The only cavalry unit which 
managed to get up to the front line was a part of the Port 
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Garry Horse which successfully charged and captured some 
guns. (16) 
A similiar thing happened at Amiens where, again, 
large cavalry forces were held in reserve to exploit the 
tanks' successes. At noon of the first day, the German 
line was broken and the cavalry moved up so as to be ready 
to exploit the opportunity. When it reached the third 
objective which was already held by the infantry, the 
cavalry divisions dismounted to await orders and another 
opportunity had been lost. (17) What would have happened 
had the cavalry attacked is open to speculation. But it 
is clear that the initial days' attacks at Cambrai and 
Amiens had seriously dislocated the Germans and had broken 
their lines; it is reasonable to suppose that the sudden 
irruption of several thousand cavalry men into the 
demoralized and disorganized German rear might have 
resulted in a greater victory than was actually gained. 
Did cavalry justify its existence on the Western 
Front? It is difficult to say. Certainly its mobility 
was of inestimable value in the two retreats and the 
British Army would have fared much worse had it had no 
cavalry. In the other attacks where cavalry sat in the 
rear areas waiting for the chance that never came, it 
could have been dispensed with. But the cavalry cannot be 
blamed because the infantry was unable to breach the 
German defences. But when the German defences were 
breached at Cambrai and Amiens, the reaction of the 
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cavalry was disappointing. Quicker reaction on the part 
of the forward commanders might have resulted in 
something, but they preferred to send back for 
instructions which were inevitably out of date by the time 
that they arrived. And yet, can anyone say with certainty 
what would or would not have happened had four divisions 
of cavalrymen come through Bourlon Wood into the rear 
areas where the Germans were desperately trying to mass 
men to stop the attack? The fact remains that, on the 
Western Front, cavalry was the only mobile force available 
for exploitation - tanks were too slow and their range was 
too limited for that role. Nonetheless, the cavalry saw 
little action on the Western Front. It seems, therefore, 
that cavalry was generally of little use on the Western 
Front although its actions during the retreats should not 
be forgotten. 
When we turn to Palestine, however, the lesson seems 
much clearer. The final campaign in Palestine was almost 
entirely a cavalry victcry. Furthermore, it was a cavalry 
action of a kind that had not been seen for a hundred 
years or more. It was on the success of the battle of 
Megiddo that the cavalrymen hung their arguments. 
Allenby's plan for the battle had been essentially a 
simple one. He intended to gain control of every line of 
communication in the area and for this the mobility of 
cavalry was essential. The attack began on 18 September 
1918 and by nightfall the infantry had opened a corridor 
for the cavalry to ride through. By the morning of the 
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20th the 5th Cavalry Division had taken Nazareth, the 
Turkish headquarters; the 4th Cavalry Division had 
captured El Affule, a vital railway junction and the 
Australian Mounted Division had crossed the Jordan: the 
Turkish forces on the west bank of the Jordan had been 
completely cut off in two days. By 1 October, the cavalry 
forces had cleared Palestine of all Turkish resistance and 
had captured Damascus. In 38 days Allenby's forces, 
spearheaded by the cavalry, had advanced 350 miles and 
captured 75,000 prisoners for casualties of less than 
5000. The cavalry had lost 125 men killed, 362 men 
wounded and 43 men missing in its triumphant advances. 
Allenby could not possibly have won this battle 
without the cavalry. The cavalry had been assisted by 
armoured cars but the armoured cars had not proved the 
decisive element. This was shown by the fall of Aleppo. 
Hama fell on 21 October and the next day the 7th Light Car 
Patrol was ordered on to Aleppo where it arrived early the 
next morning; the commander thereupon called on the 
garrison to surrender but it refused until the cavalry had 
caught up. The cavalry was the decisive element. 
In their arguments, the cavalrymen took every 
opportunity of mentioning Megiddo. Their opponents 
countered with the charge that the cavalry had beaten a 
"straw man" - the Turks' morale had been so low that all 
the cavalry had had to dc was round them up. (18) However 
low the Turkish morale may have been (and it cannot be 
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overlooked that the cavalry's penetration had contributed 
to this lowering), had not Fuller been fond of saying 
"that war is a matter of tools, and the highest mechanical 
weapon nearly always wins"? The Turks had had machine 
guns and with these "higher mechanical weapons'# they 
should have been able to slaughter the cavalry. Yet, on a 
number of occasions, the cavalry had been able to charge 
successfully. On 20 September the 2nd Lancers came across 
a force of about 500 Turks dug in and prepared. One 
squadron with the armoured cars and the machine guns held 
the Turks from the front and the other two squadrons 
worked their way around the flanks and charged - with the 
lance. No less than 46 Turks were speared and 470 taken 
prisoner - cavalry casualties were one man wounded and 
twelve horses killed. This charge was by no means an 
isolated example and the battle gives many more cases of 
cavalry successfully charging parties of infantry. (19) 
For that matter, there were even a few successful 
charges on the Western Front. At Cambrai the Fort Garry 
Horse charged some artillery (20) ; at Amiens British 
cavalry captured a wood in front of the Canadian Corps and 
held it until relieved (21) ; on 24 March 1918 about 150 
troopers from three different regiments charged a 
battalion of the 5th German Guards Division, although the 
cavalry lost half its numbers it killed or captured about 
200 of the enemy and stopped the attack for a time (22); 
on 30 March the Canadian Cavalry Brigade captured Moreuil 
Wood Ridqe from German infantry. (23) These are only a 
7 211 
few of the examples of cavalry fighting infantry from 
their horses and winning; there were more. Of course, 
usually the cavalry was unsuccessful and the machine gun 
won (24) but it is important to remember the exceptions. 
The defenders of the cavalry certainly did. 
what then were the conclusions about the utility of 
the cavalry that could be drawn from the war? The Kirke 
Committee was set up in 1932 to consider the lessons of 
the war. In its repcrt it stressed above other 
considerations that the great problem of the war had been 
the achieving of a breakthrough. Tanks were the answer to 
this problem, the Committee agreed, and, in a future war, 
a force of AFVs could probably make a breakthrough. 
Cavalry was seldom mentioned in the Report and when it 
was, it was disparaged as being too slow, too vulnerable 
and too lacking in fire power for any future war. (25) But 
the Kirke Report was not an historical enquiry; it was 
more concerned with making the Army better prepared for 
the next war. So the report from this committee does not 
answer the question. It is very difficult to know how to 
judge the effectiveness of cavalry in the First World War. 
In the first place, there was not very much of it, in the 
second place, it was not very well handled and, on the 
Western Front, threw away what chances it had and, in the 
third place, conditions seldom existed for its employment. 
Only in Palestine and only in that one battle did it 
shine. Cavalry certainly did not win the war and it is 
true that, most of the time, cavalry men would have been 
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doing something else than waiting on their 
call that never came. Nevertheless, it is 
n that cn three occasions, in British 
least, it was useful and perhaps even 
The purpose of the foregoing brief discussion of some 
cavalry successes in the war has been not to show that the 
defenders of the cavalry were right and that cavalry was 
as essential to modern war as it had been to medieval war 
but simply to show that there had been some cases in the 
war that could be taken to show that the cavalry was not 
utterly in eclipse. There was enough doubt on the future 
of the cavalry to cause argument and there was enough 
reason to justify its retention that its defenders cannot 
be condemned out of hand as reactionaries. We now know 
that Megiddo was not in fact the harbinger of a new and 
glorious future for the horse and that the real lesson of 
the cavalry in the First World War was that there must 
always be mobile troops. But that judgement is based on 
half a century of war; wars which have seen the tank 
evolve far past the specimens of the 1920's and 1930's. 
The knowledge of the next fifty years did not exist then 
and there were some reasons for thinking that the war had 
shown that, in some limited cases, there was still a need 
for the horse on the modern battlefield. 
However, the war was in the past. Cavalry might have 
played a part in it but could it have any function in a 
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Fuller in a three part article in 1920 summed up his 
thought on the matter. Cavalry, he said, had lost its 
preeminence in the Fifteenth century. Megiddo was 
dismissed with the customary charge: Turkish morale had 
been low and the cavalry had won a moral victory which 
could have been done just as well by tanks. On the other 
hand, he saw the true lesson of the war in the exploits of 
"Musical Box" in 1918; just imagine, he invited the 
reader, what would have happened if all 96 Whippet tanks 
had broken into the rear areas in the same way. But, he 
admitted, the tank at the present time had defects: 
At present, however, these difficulties 
are not overcome; it, therefore, may with 
some reason be accepted that the Cavalry 
must exist as such until they are 
<overcome>. 
So, Fuller was saying that the cavalry should be retained 
for the moment at least until the performance of tanks 
could be improved. But, in the third part of the article 
he announced that, with the Medium D, all the above 
difficulties had been overcome. Therefore, he was 
claiming that the cavalry could be replaced immediately by 
Medium D tanks and that "the horse <was> doomed". (26) But, 
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later that year, while again claiming that the tank could 
replace the cavalry because the two arms had the same 
function and the tank was better, he included two cavalry 
regiments in his "new model division" which he proposed 
for the Army of 1930. (27) In 1922 he again declared 
cavalry useless and again claimed that the tank could 
replace it. (28) By 1925, having presumably suffered some 
disappointment at the Medium D's lack of success, he was 
maintaining that the Vickers Medium could entirely replace 
cavalry. (29) In later years he seems to have moderated; 
perhaps he came to realize that the tank that could 
replace the cavalry had not yet been built. At any event, 
in 1927 when Milne asked him for justifications of the 
cavalry he replied: 
So lonq as the infantry divisions remained 
unmotorized, they would want divisional 
cavalry, and directly they were, then 
their cavalry brigades... should be 
motorized. (30) 
In his book, Lectures on FSR_IIIL Fuller repeated this 
statement. (31) It seems, therefore, that Fuller's position 
was that tanks would, 
in time, replace horsed cavalry but 
that in 1932 the moment had not yet come. 
Liddell Hart agreed in 1924 that cavalry should be 
retained until such 
time as mechanical vehicles could 
replace it. (32) 
So did Burnett-Stuart in 1928 (33) and an 
RTC officer in the early 
1920's. (34) In short, although 
tanks and other AFVs would 
in the future probably replace 
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the cavalry in most or all of its functions, that 
replacement awaited first a suitable machine and second 
more money. In the meantime, the cavalry, inadequate as 
it was, was all the mobile force that the British Army had 
at its command. 
The strongest arguments for the cavalry hung on the 
assertion that there were certain things which horses 
could do that tanks and other APVs could not. Whether or 
not this would always be the case was something on which 
few people cared to hazard an opinion but, it was 
maintained, at the present state of development of tanks, 
they could not substitute for horses. The claims rested 
on the fact that tanks could not enter certain types of 
terrain and that, for certain kinds or reconnaissance, 
tanks were inadequate. 
Tanks and armoured forces were limited in the terrain 
in which they could cperate. Collins, after his 
experiences with the Experimental Forces, concluded that 
an armoured force could operate in most areas except in 
forests, mountains and swamps. (35) For these areas, it was 
argued, only the cavalry could do. A Captain H. P. Holt, 
who had served in both tanks and cavalry during the war, 
told the House of Commons that he was not at all certain 
that the cavalry was as useless as some people were 
claiming. Tanks could not operate over marshy ground and 
required bridging equipment in order to cross most 
streams; cavalry would still be necessary to cover those 
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areas. (36) A cavalry officer, writing in 1927, admitted 
that tanks and aircraft would dominate most future warfare 
but that there was a continuing need for horses in close 
areas where tanks could not go and aircraft could not 
see. (37) Another cavalry officer reiterated these 
statements in the following year. (38) In 1929 a writer 
speaking of mechanized warfare in Asia was careful to 
retain cavalry for covering mountainous areas although he 
conceded the plains to the mechanized forces. (39) In 1929 
much the same thing was said: in the right circumstances 
AFVs had "greater speed, endurance and power of self 
protection than cavalry" but mechanized forces were likely 
to be "severely hampered" by "normal accidents of weather 
and ground". The decision that had to be made was not 
whether to replace the one arm by the other but to 
determine the best combination of the two. To guide this 
decision, the writer maintained: 
In very general terms we may say that the 
mobility of the cavalry is extremely 
flexible, but is deficient in speed and 
radius of action; the mobility of the land 
machine has great speed and radius but 
lacks flexibility. 
It was the greater "flexibility" of the cavalry's 
mobility - its ability to cross any kind of terrain - that 
justified its retention. (40) General Sir George Barrow in 
1929 was prepared to admit that, in the future, machines 
might very well replace horses in the Army but he doubted 
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their ability to do so immediately. Terrain was the 
limitation on AFVs. Be illustrated his argument with an 
example from the Palestinian campaign. In the winter of 
1917 a cavalry patrol climbed a very narrow trail and 
captured a hill. Vehicles could never have climbed the 
defile and, in any case, the Turks had been in possession 
of the only road along which petrol and lubricants could 
have been supplied to tanks making the attempt. In a 
future war mechanized forces would be essential - as 
essential as artillery - but there would be a need for 
cavalry operating in terrain impassable to tanks. (41) 
Again in 1930 a cavalry officer, cognizant of the 
necessity of mechanized forces, argued that cavalry must 
be retained for close country. (42) 
These are reasonable arguments and the men offering 
them were not reactionaries. Tanks cannot climb high 
mountains along narrow paths, they cannot get through 
thick forests and, at that time, swampy ground would 
generally stop them. These are reasonable, sober 
arguments and deserve to be taken seriously. So also were 
the arguments which called for a role for cavalry in 
certain types of reconnaissance. 
Fuller combined the two arguments and, in 1925, 
opined that the cavalry ought to be used for 
reconnaissance in areas where the tanks could not go. (43) 
Major General Davidson went a little further the next year 
when he said that cavalry were absolutely essential for 
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tactical reconnaissance and that aeroplanes could never 
replace it in that role. (44) Captain Holt, in his defence 
of the cavalry, stated that there was no substitute for 
cavalry for short distance reconnaissance - aeroplanes 
could be too easily deceived and tanks, in addition to the 
limits of terrain placed on them, were too noisy to be 
able to q et close to the enemy secretly. (45) In 1927 
another writer stated that some were saying that tanks and 
aeroplanes could replace cavalry and that he proposed to 
test the fitness of these two claimants to replace it. As 
to aircraft, they were too easily fooled and he 
illustrated this by giving examples of large bodies of men 
concealing themselves by keeping to the shadows along one 
side of the road. As for tanks, they could not search 
close areas where men were likely to be hiding. (46) In 
Parliament it was argued that cavalry was irreplaceable 
for close, silent reconnaissance. (47) A cavalry officer 
admitted that the lack of firepower of cavalry meant that 
it must be protected by AFVs but, still, he maintained, 
cavalry was necessary for close reconnaissance. (48) For 
strategic reconnaissance, formerly carried out by the 
independent cavalry division, Montgomery-Massingberd in 
1928 proposed a formation of mechanized units with a 
cavalry contingent for those areas which tanks, because of 
their "sensitivity to ground" could not enter. (49) In 1929 
it was claimed, with truth, that there existed at that 
time no vehicle which was capable of doing what the horses 
and their riders could do - pass over any kind of ground 
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and carry out intimate reconnaissance. (50) 
General Barrow gave more detailed reasons for 
cavalry's advantages in this role. Cavalry could build up 
or down rapidly from one man to a brigade; it could, 
therefore, quickly split up into very small units and as 
quickly come together again. When a tank ran out of fuel, 
it stopped, it could not continue on half or quarter 
rations as could a horse. A small reconnaissance force of 
AFVs could not always be assured of an open supply line 
but a horse could always find something to eat. Generally 
speaking, he concluded, the tank was probably better than 
the horse at most things, but, nonetheless, the cavalry 
ought to be kept because of its "flexible mobility" and 
its ability to reconnoitre. (51) 
An observer of the Armoured Force exercises wrote of 
the cavalry's ability to discover the whereabouts of the 
Force although, he admitted, this no doubt owed something 
to the small size of the manoeuvre area. Cavalry could 
reconnoitre because of its high mobility: 
Cavalry as now organized is very mobile, 
and during a week of recent training 
covered an average of thirty miles a day, 
while for patrols the average was much 
higher. (52) 
As will be recalled, this rate compared very favourably 
with that of the Armoured Force. At the conclusion of a 
training exercise in 1931, the GOC Aldershot Command 
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stated that in his opinion cavalry and tanks were 
complementary - cavalry for scouting and tanks for 
fighting. (53) It has been shown that Fuller in 1925 
accepted the necessity for cavalry in the reconnaissance 
role, so did Liddell Hart in 1933, albeit grudgingly, in 
his report on the training in 1932: 
The cavalry, also, played its part in the 
tactical reconnaissance, and proved that 
hoof mobility may mean superiority of 
force against foot mobility even if it 
does not equal tracked mobility. (54) 
These too are reasonable arguments. Those offering 
them were not claiming that cavalry was the wave of the 
future but something much more modest. Generally 
aeroplanes were capable of taking over the role of 
strategic reconnaissance from the cavalry and tanks could 
do a good deal of the tactical reconnaissance. But, in 
close terrain, or when it was necessary to live off the 
land, or when it was necessary to get very close to the 
enemy without his knowing; it was in those cases that the 
horsed cavalry would be needed. These men were not 
arguing that no changes should ever be made but simply 
that not all the cavalry should be mechanized. These were 
reasonable arguments. 
Some of the cavalry arguments were pretty silly, 
however. General Egerton thought that horse handlers had 
more intelligent faces than machine handlers; therefore, 
7 221 
horse handlers were more intelligent; therefore, cavalry 
should be retained lest the intelligence level of the Army 
fall! (55) An elegy on the abolition of the lance in 1928 
advised its readers to keep their hopes up as "history has 
a happy knack of repeating itself! " (5b) An Indian Cavalry 
officer warned that the next war would not be like the 
last one and that there was likely to be open fighting (he 
did not say how he knew this) and the cavalry would ride 
again. The cavalry would be "ruined" if it were converted 
to the rcle cf mounted infantry. (57) In 1922 Haig argued 
that the tanks, although "indispensable", had not replaced 
the man. That is to say, the man and his horse, for a 
well trained horse was part of its rider. (58) These were 
the cries of men completely out of touch with reality: the 
machine handlers might lcok stupid, but "the circus that 
smelled like a garage" was something that the cavalry men 
had to come to terms with. In the main, most cavalry men 
accepted the value of tanks although they may have had 
doubts on matters of detail. But did the coming of the 
tank have to mean that the horse had to disappear 
immediately? There were good reasons to keep it for a 
little while longer. 
Most of these articles recommending the retention of 
the cavalry seem to have been written around the years 
1927,1928 and 1929. Part of the cause of this may have 
been the decline in confidence in the tank in these years 
but by far the greater reason was the official 
examinations into the future of the cavalry which were 
7 222 
conducted then. There were three official enquiries 
between 1926 and 1928: the Montgomery-Massingberd 
Committee, the furore resulting from a letter from 
Churchill advocating the reduction of cavalry and a sub- 
committee of the CID formed to consider the cavalry role. 
In the autumn of 1926 a committee chaired by General 
M ontgomery-Massingberd was created to examine the cavalry 
requirements of the Army. Meetings were held by the 
Committee in October and a questionnaire was sent to men 
in prominent positions in the Army. The questionnaire 
asked the respondents to suggest the role of the cavalry 
given two assumptions: first, that 
A Continental wa r is of extreme 
improbability 
and second, 
<that> the Expeditionary Force... will be 
organized primarily with a view to a 
possible war in an undeveloped country, 
with probably an indifferent line of 
communication. 
These questionnaires were also sent to a number of 
officers who were connected with the Royal Tank Corps or 
with the mechanization question. G. M. Lindsay (the 
Inspector of the RTC) in a very long submission argued 
against the horse as no longer being sufficiently mobile 
and advocated a completely mechanized cavalry regiment. 
Fuller stated that the only remaining function of cavalry 
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was reconnaissance and, even so, armoured cars were better 
than horses at strategic reconnaissance. He suggested 
replacing the cavalry division with a strategic 
reconnaissance force of three cavalry regiments and three 
armoured car companies, a protective reconnaissance force 
of five cavalry regiments and a pursuit force of three 
cavalry regiments and six armoured car companies. Men for 
the armoured car units could be found by converting three 
cavalry regiments into nine armoured car companies. 
Burnett-Stuart argued that, on the contrary, a continental 
war was a possibility and that the cavalry division should 
be entirely mechanized because the horses would be no use 
in such a war. His entry was marked "useless" in 
Montgomery-Massingberd's handwriting, no doubt because he 
would not accept the given conditions. Sir Hugh Elles, 
the wartime commander of the Tank Corps, called for a new 
armoured car design and maintained that the cavalry after 
complete mechanization should be swallowed up by the RTC. 
These four responses, representing the men questioned 
who had tank experience are all that we need consider. It 
is significant that Fuller evidently believed that there 
was at least a short term future for the cavalry. In his 
submission, Lindsay wanted to abolish horses but, when he 
appeared before the Committee, he stated that, so long as 
the infantry division remained unmotorized, there would 
continue to be a need for mounted men to supply 
reconnaissance and protection. He did not think that the 
infantry divisions could be motorized for some time. 
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Therefore, of the three RTC men considered, only Elles 
thouqht that the cavalry ought to be done away with 
immediately and even he implied that this must await a new 
armoured car design. Burnett-Stuart's answer was rightly 
ruled out -a major European war was not to be planned for 
according to the Ten year Rule. At the time, many of the 
tank supporters believed that the cavalry had a use in 
modern war, however limited. The Committee itself agreed; 
... while it would eventually be possible 
to replace mounted men, to some extent at 
any rate, by men carried in some form of 
armoured car, there can be no question of 
doing this until a cross country armoured 
car has been produced and proved, by 
thorough trial, to meet all 
requirements. (59) 
The Committee, Fuller, Lindsay and Liddell Hart agreed - 
until such time as new machines made their appearance, the 
horse could not be completely replaced; it still had a 
limited future. These people would all have disagreed on 
the timing of the change from horses to machines but they 
were all in agreement that the time for the change was not 
yet. 
An earlier report on a cavalry staff exercise at 
Aldershot was also considered by the Committee. This 
report had recommended a cavalry division of six horsed 
regiments, two companies of armoured cars, one regiment 
each of light tanks, motorized machine guns and cyclists 
7 225 
and four units of motorized artillery. This suggestion 
cannot be described as an example of conservative reaction 
on the part of the "horse worshippers". (60) 
The Committee presented its interim report to the 
Army Council in early 1927. The Committee recommended 
that no decrease be made in the number of cavalry 
regiments; that the number of machine guns be increased 
and that the regiments at home be reorganized so as to 
reduce each one by 28 men and 42 horses. The 
mechanization of the cavalry should proceed in three 
stages: first the first line transport must be motorized, 
second should be the provision of more machine guns and 
third should be the partial replacement of mounted men by 
armoured cars. This last was to be carried out within the 
cavalry regiments because of their esprit du corps. 
The reasons for the first recommendations were: 
It is the practically unanimous opinion of 
those officers who have been consulted by 
the Committee that the cavalry, as at 
present organized and equipped, has 
neither sufficient mobility nor sufficient 
firepower to enable it to carry out its 
duties in modern war. 
The horses were expected to carry too much weight, the 
Hotchkiss machine guns supplied to the cavalry were not 
satisfactory and the first line transport was too 
dependent on horses. 
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The suggestion that the cavalry should be entirely 
replaced by armoured cars had been considered and rejected 
by the Committee. The advantages claimed for such 
replacement were considered to be greater speed and radius 
of action, the security of armour, the saving of manpower, 
the decrease in supplies to be carried and the fact that, 
with the mechanization of civilian life, the supply of 
horses for the Army might give out. The disadvantages of 
armoured cars were their inability to carry out detailed 
reconnaissance in close areas, the feeling that there 
would not be enough manpower in an armoured car unit to 
provide protection when the cars were at rest, the longer 
and more complicated training of personnel required and 
the "possible difficult upkeep of machines under active 
service conditions". Nevertheless, despite all this 
criticism of machines, the Committee agreed 
that, if and when a reliable cross country 
armoured car is produced, it may be 
possible, after experiment, partially to 
replace mounted men by armoured cars. 
The Committee called for research into cross country 
armoured cars so that a suitable vehicle could be 
produced. The cavalry should man these cars because it 
had had experience of the cavalry role of reconnaissance 
and the Tank Corps had not. 
To these proposals the CIGS agreed as did the QMG, 
Lieutenant General Campbell, although the latter could not 
resist recommending the abolition of the RTC with the 
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tanks to go to the artillery and the armoured cars to the 
cavalry. (61) 
The final report of the Committee left the interim 
recommendations untouched and added that the Committee had 
considered calling for the abolition of the lance as a 
weapon of war but that experience in Palestine had 
convinced them that the lance (with the rifle of course) 
might still have a use from time to time. A new lance 
should be designed and if it could not, then the lancer 
regiments should be given the sabre. (52) 
Probably connected with this enquiry into the future 
of horsed cavalry was a letter which Winston Churchill, 
then Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote to Worthington- 
Evans. The letter, dated 27 October 1927, suggested a 
very large reduction of the cavalry and the amalgamation 
of the twelve regiments into six. He suggested this on 
the grounds of economy and from a belief that cavalry was 
not worth the money spent on it. 
Worthington-Evans passed the matter on to Milne and 
he invited submissions from Field Marshals Haig, Robertson 
and Allenby. Allenby's reply, dated 1 November 1927, 
dealt with the suggestion that cavalry be replaced with 
AFYs. There were, he admitted, excellent reasons for such 
an action but there were disadvantages too: AFVs could not 
operate on certain terrain, their armoured protection 
tended to make the crews blind, they were entirely 
dependent upon a reliable supply of petrol and mechanical 
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skill. Distant strategic reconnaissance was now the job 
of aircraft and AFVs were more and more replacing cavalry 
for close tactical reconnaissance but the "work of 
maintaining contact and linking together units on wide 
battlefronts will still fall to cavalry". Cavalry men had 
better opportunity for vision and their mentality was more 
alert. Allenby then made an appeal for "cold steel": 
In addition <the cavalry trooper> carries 
the lance and the pointing sword; and 
experience in the Great War has shewn that 
Cavalry, under a leader possessed of a 
quick brain and sound judgement, can still 
use the cold steel with as deadly effect 
as did the Paladins of old. 
He backed up this contention with the examples of six 
successful "cold steel" charges in Palestine. In summing 
up his arguments, he returned to the argument from 
terrain: 
Mechanical fighters are... under certain 
conditions of ground, helpless; but there 
is practically no country in which cavalry 
cannot act. 
For reconnaissance cavalry could be more easily concealed 
than could tanks and it was "silent as well as swift". 
The hcrse compared favourably with the tank in endurance. 
Robertson's paper arrived two days later. The war 
did not prove that cavalry could not attack forts or dug- 
in infantry - that had been known for fifty years and in 
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fact cavalry could do many things outside of the battle 
line which AFVs could not. The British Army might find 
itself involved in any one of several theatres of war and 
it would be a mistake, he argued, to lean too heavily on 
the results of a major European war - in many parts of the 
world, cavalry would be more suitable than tanks. There 
had already been enough cavalry reductions and more would 
be danqerous. 
Haig believed that money could be saved in other 
directions than in reducing cavalry regiments "which once 
abolished cannot be replaced without years of labour". He 
thereupon suggested several things which would not have 
saved very much money. 
Haigs answer was of little use and suggested that he 
was out of touch with currents of opinion - as, indeed, he 
was in 1927 - but the answers of the other two were 
reasonable. Basically Robertson and Allenby argued that 
cavalry could do certain things better than the existing 
APYs could and these things were the usual two - the 
cavalry could scout more effectively at times and it was 
not as limited as to terrain as were tanks. Allenby's 
remarks about the sabre and the lance need not, perhaps, 
be taken too seriously and he did not devote much space to 
that part of his answer. 
The submissions of these three old soldiers display a 
touching ignorance about the machine. Allenby had worried 
about ensuring a supply of mechanics for armoured car 
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units. He should better have worried about ensuring a 
supply of trained horse handlers - car ownership in 
Britain was growing much faster than horse ownership. One 
wonders whether any of these men had thought much about 
mechanization or knew much about it. These three 
submissions illustrate Broad's remark that the British 
were "slow to take to the machine". (63) 
On 3 November Milne produced his statement and sent 
it to the Secretary of State for War: 
Ultimately cavalry must give way to a 
mechanized arm <but, until mechanization 
be completed> there must be an interval 
during which the Army in war must have 
some fast moving troops which will be able 
to protect it and to perform the close 
reconnoitering duties which aeroplanes 
cannot do. Both these functions must be 
performed for the present by the cavalry 
until we can afford mechanization. 
With this memorandum he enclosed Robertson's and Allenby's 
letters. 
while he presumably had been awaiting letters from 
the three Field Marshals, Milne had composed a letter to 
Worthington-Evans which had been sent the day after 
Churchill's letter had been written. Milne stressed the 
importance of cavalry for scouting and denied that 
armoured cars could replace them as yet: 
7 
These machines are at present no more fit 
to replace the horse than the early motor 
cars were to replace the wagon. 
For the present a force of cavalry is the 
only one that can be relied on to perform 
reconnaissance duties in ordinary broken 
country such as forms the great proportion 
of the earth's surface. 
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Included in this submission was a memorandum on the 
reorganization of the cavalry signed by the Military 
Members of the Army Council. (64) The cavalry depot was to 
be abolished and training handed over to the home 
regiments; in each home and Egyptian regiment one of the 
three squadrons should be done away with (this should also 
be done in India if the Indian government were agreeable) ; 
the number of machine guns in the regiments should be 
increased to twelve; first line transport should be 
motorized; the lance should be abolished as a weapon. 
Since 1914 nine regiments had disappeared and these new 
reductions which were being proposed would do away with 
6,373 officers and men. But the cavalry would keep their 
horses: "... an efficient mechanical substitute for the 
horse does not at present exist". AFVs were in the 
experimental stage 
and to spend money on production now, even 
if it were available, would be a reckless 
waste of public funds. 
To mechanize the cavalry would require a large increase in 
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the number of trained mechanics but there was not even 
enough money to maintain the existing armoured vehicles. 
In conclusion, Britain's leading soldiers agreed: 
Replacement of mounted troops by 
mechanized forces must be gradual... <there 
was much to be perfected in the machines' 
performances and> ... the capital 
expenditure will be great... Meanwhile we 
cannot dispense with the mobile arm we 
have... 
Most arguments for the abolition of 
cavalry are based on the state of static 
warfare which arose in France in 1915... tie 
are much more likely in the future to be 
engaged in a ccuntry resembling Palestine 
rather than France, and against an enemy 
more like the Turks than the Germans. 
When a suitable machine has been 
devised, it may, and probably will, be 
advisable to replace the horses, but that 
time has not come yet, nor is it likely to 
for some time. 
Faced with this unanimity, Worthington-Evans wrapped 
the whole file up and passed it along to the Prime 
Minister expressing his agreement with it and that was the 
end of Churchill's scheme. (65) 
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On 16 November 1927 the Cabinet agreed to appoint a 
sub-committee of the CID under Lord Salisbury to "enquire 
and report what strength of Cavalry of the Line should be 
maintained in the British Army and how it should be 
organized". The Committee duly reported and the Cabinet 
considered its report on 6 June 1928. After the enquiries 
that had gone before, it is not surprising that the 
Salisbury Committee had nothing new to say. It could not 
recommend any changes in cavalry organization (leaving 
aside the Indian cavalry over which it had no authority); 
it approved the War Office's policy of "progressive 
mechanization" of equipment; it drew the Cabinet's 
attention to the traditions of the cavalry and their 
importance. No doubt because it was a committee of 
cabinet ministers, it recommended that the conversion of 
cavalry units to mechanized units should proceed "with due 
regard to financial consideration". That i s# slowly. 
Churchill and the Secretary of State for Air dissented 
from the Cabinet's approval and urged greater haste in 
mechanization. Appended to the report was a chart which 
showed that France, the Soviet Union and the United States 
all had a greater proportion of cavalry in their armies 
than Britain and that Britain's cavalry had been much 
reduced: in 1914 the Regular Army at home and abroad (but 
excluding India) had had . 66 cavalry squadrons per 
battalion; the figure in 1928 was exactly half that. (66) 
We have now heard from some of the military heads of 




Here we find 
the interest is 
enquiries. 
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on the reasons for the retention of horsed 
what of the political heads of the Army? 
the same arguments and, once again, most of 
centred around the time of the cavalry 
In 1926 Worthington-Evans was asked in the House of 
Commons whether it was not true that the experience of the 
war had shown that the cavalry had "ceased to be a 
necessary element as an eye of the Army" and useless for 
attack. He replied: "No Sir, and France was not the only 
seat of war". (67) He made a fuller statement the following 
year. Some people said that the day of the cavalry was 
over and some said that it was still necessary for certain 
things. He said that there was not yet enough information 
and that "the best solution appears to be a combination of 
the two <AFVs and horses>". The recommendations of the 
Montgomery-Massingberd Committee on increasing machine 
guns and motorizing transport would be put into effect 
(typically only half the recommended number of machine 
guns would be added). Mechanization, he added, should not 
be too hurried lest mistakes be made. The horse still had 
its uses and could not yet be replaced because machines 
capable of taking over from horses had not yet appeared. 
Cavalry had been reduced and, when money permitted, would 
be further mechanized. (68) In 1928 a Member attacked tanks 
and praised cavalry and was told by the Financial 
Secretary of the War Office, Duff Cooper, that the 
position of the War office lay between the two extreme 
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positions in the debate. (69) Tom Shaw, the new Secretary 
of State for War in the Labour Government, did not differ 
from his Ccnservative predecessors: horses would be kept 
in the British Army until it was certain that they had no 
future "and I think it is a fairly long time ahead before 
they can be dispensed with fully". (70) In 1933 Duff Cooper 
pointed out that the British Army 
has never been designed to take part in 
great Continental Wars. It has been 
designed for... the purpose of maintaining 
order in the British Empire. 
The next war the British would fight might well require 
cavalry. 
As far as my own opinion is concerned... I 
am convinced that the cavalry has been 
sufficiently reduced already... (71) 
Therefore, three war Ministers, in office from, 
effectively, 1924 to the end of the period (72) all 
accepted the arguments advanced by the Montgomery- 
Massingberd and Salisbury Committees - cavalry was still 
useful for certain things and, until there was a lot more 
money available, mechanization of the cavalry must proceed 
slowly and carefully. 
From the enquiries of 1927 and 1928 the cavalry 
slowly began the process of conversion from horses to 
armoured cars. it was accepted policy that eventually the 
cavalry would be mechanized, as a committee formed to 
7 236 
consider the mechanization of the 11th Hussars and the 
12th Lancers admitted in 1927: 
... the Committee wish to submit the view 
that the conversion of these two regiments 
is the first step in a policy leading to 
the manning of the main fighting tank by 
the RTC and of armoured cars by 
Cavalry. (73) 
Milne himself wished to see preparation for this coming 
mechanization begin early: 
I would make it an essential that no 
officer in due course is given the command 
of a cavalry regiment unless he has put in 
four years$ seconded service in a cavalry 
armoured car regiment. (74) 
The reorganization proceeded slowly and equipment was 
found for the new armoured car regiments by disbanding RTC 
armoured car ccmpanies and retaining their personnel to 
form new tank battalions. 
How did the cavalry itself take the loss of its 
horses? There are two differing indications. The first 
is a bit of doggerel in the Cavalry Journal of 1928 which 
ends: 
And a bloke wot's fond of ' orses and been 
soldiering for years 
Don't want to be a 'shuvver' in the 
Armoured Car-biniers. (75) 




the Colonel of the 11th Hussars, Major 
General T. T. Pitman. He condoled with the regiments for 
the loss of their horses but declared that the future of 
cavalry depended upon its being made hard hitting and that 
meant AFVs. He concluded on the optimistic note that now, 
after 3000 years, the cavalry was again being put in 
chariots. (7b) Pitman's response was the more important of 
the two and prcbably represented majority opinion - the 
cavalry men were sorry to lose their horses but, in the 
end, most of them did their duty and adapted to the new 
situation. 
The increased provision of mechanized transport 
enabled a considerable reduction to be made in the weight 
carried by the horse as a demonstration in 1930 showed. 
The weight carried by the horse (assuming the rider to 
weigh 160 lbs) had been reduced from 282 lbs 15 3/4 oz in 
1918 to 250 lbs 4 1/2 oz in 1930 -a reduction of 32 lbs 
11 1/4 02. (77) Needless to say, this made the horse and 
its rider rather more mobile than they had been. 
The gradual and progressive mechanization of the 
cavalry after 1926/1927 may be shown by the Army 
Estimates. In 1926/1927 there were about 7000 horses in 
the cavalry and by 1933/1934 this had been cut to about 
4500; fodder showed a similiar reduction: in the first 
case nearly 700,000 Pounds had been spent and in the 
second year, this figure was down to 400,000 Pounds. (78) 
It cannot be denied that real and substantial progress was 
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made on the mechanization of the British cavalry in this 
period. 
The cavalry controversy, now surveyed, can be fitted 
into the larger picture of the tank controversy. Certain 
accusations may now be seen to be unfounded. It is not 
true that "the British Generals wanted cavalry, not 
tanks" (79) ; the British Generals tried to find a balance 
between the two arms. It is not true that the "majority 
of the cavalry officers were reluctant to admit the 
necessity for any change"(80) ; they were prepared to 
concede most of the traditional cavalry roles to armoured 
vehicles and aircraft. It is not true that "important and 
intelligent commentators were prophesying that the horse 
would play a vital and possibly even decisive role" in the 
next great war (81); it was believed the horse would have 
a small but important role in colonial wars, but few if 
any thought there would be much need for a horse in 
Europe. No published evidence (and that is the only 
evidence that remains) suggests that the cavalry had a 
"deep seated... dislike" of the RTC. (82) According to 
Broad, the battles of the Second World War were not lost 
in the Cavalry Club as Liddell Hart had said. (83) The 
cavalry has been unfairly maligned and the reasons for its 
retention have been unjustly ridiculed. 
Every time that the cavalry role was questioned or 
examined in this period the same arguments cropped up with 
monotonous regularity. Horses could go places which were 
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closed to tanks; horses could do a certain type of 
scouting in a way that tanks and aircraft could not; there 
was no vehicle that could replace the horse in these roles 
yet; therefore, the horse must be kept a little longer. 
There was a remarkable degree of unanimity in these 
arguments. Leading cavalry men, politicians, senior 
officers and the principal tank spokesmen (regardless of 
what they miqht have claimed later) all agreed - one day 
the cavalry would leave its horses but that day was not 
yet. The traditional roles of cavalry had been strategic 
reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance, protection and 
the charge. The charge was dead and had been for years; 
no responsible spokesman forsaw cavalry charging the enemy 
unless that enemy be ill-armed tribesmen. Protection of 
columns on the march was a matter for the greater 
firepower and mobility of armoured vehicles. Strategic 
reconnaissance had been taken over by aircraft which could 
do it faster and more accurately. All that remained for 
the cavalry to do was tactical reconnaissance and even 
that was admitted to be principally a task for AFVs. 
When, however, it was necessary to get close to enemy 
formations in silence, there was no machine that could 
replace the horse. When it was necessary to send forces 
up narrow mountain paths or through thick forests or 
across swampy ground or into towns, the horse was the only 
mobile transport available. The new role of the cavalry 
was to be a modest one. Transport in close areas, very 
close reconnaissance and dealing with mobs. That is a 
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very limited role. The cavalry was not, in fact, basing 
its arguments on its role as cavalry per se; all that was 
argued was that the horse represented a "prime mover" in 
certain limited conditions. No one seriously suggested 
that the cavalry would ride into the charge with sabre and 
lance and scatter the enemy to the winds. A small number 
of hcrses were still necessary pending their replacement 
by machines. There was nothing reactionary or blinkered 
in these assertions - responsible spokesmen simply said 
that, until vehicles were produced in adequate quantity 
and quality, there remained a small but important role for 
the horse. 
It was probably not even believed that the horse 
would have even this small role against a first class 
ennmy. But the Army was not allowed to think about first 
class enemies - there was to be no great war for ten years 
and no preparations could be made for one. if the cavalry 
could be shown to have a role in small scale war and in 
the normal peacetime occupations of the Army abroad, that 
was enough. 
But, the tank advocates argued, money was spent on 
cavalry which could better have been spent on tanks. Had 
the cavalry been entirely abolished in, say, 1923, this 
would have freed several hundred thousand pounds a year 
which could have been applied to the increase of the Tank 
Corps and in research and development and in production of 
new tanks and armoured cars. It is true that this could 
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have been done had there been a will. But, the thing that 
the tank advocates forgot and still forget is that, if 
this had been done, the British Army would have been 
entirely denuded of its only mobile arm for several years. 
The cavalry could not have been mechanized instantaneously 
and, in the time between the abolition of the horses and 
the production of the new tank units, there would have 
been no mobile troops at all. in any case, easy as the 
transformation might sound on paper, what tanks were to be 
used? The Vickers Medium? But the Vickers Medium was too 
slow, its armour was inadequate, it broke down too easily, 
it was too noisy. The Sixteen Tonner? But it cost too 
much and, furthermore, could not have been in production 
until the 1930's. The Independent? But it took too long 
in the development stage and was even more expensive than 
the Sixteen Tonner. Such mechanization awaited a new 
tank, but the new tanks were not forthcoming. Ignoring 
the prcblem of the tanks, could not the RTC have been 
built up until it could take over from the cavalry? 
Perhaps, but only if there were the money to pay for both 
the cavalry and an expanded Tank Corps. But there wasn't 
and there wasn't going to be any. What other possibility 
was there than what was done? It was all very easy for 
the tank prophets to talk about the future mechanized 
British Army, but the future they spoke of would have to 
be free from Treasury control. The mechanized Army came 
to pass but only after the emergency of war had loosened 
the purse strings. The problem of the peace time Army 
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reformer was vividly described by Wavell, himself no 
reactionary. It was that of an architect who had to 
modernize a house with the people still living in it; to 
modernize the house, further, with no more money than that 
allowed for normal housekeeping expenses. (84) The Army had 
to be modernized and the cavalry had to be mechanized - 
that was recognized by all the commissions and by all the 
enquiries - but, at the same time there must be enough 
Army and there must be enough cavalry to do their jobs. 
Two important and hitherto unnoticed facts stand out 
in the cavalry controversy. The first is that the cavalry 
men were on the defensive. For the most part responsible 
spokesmen did not deny the more important ex-cavalry roles 
to the tanks and the aeroplanes. This talk about cavalry 
men being against tanks is not true: the cavalry men were 
concerned to defend a limited role for the horse against 
the attacks of the tank men who, untruthfully for 
conditions at that time, claimed that the tank could 
immediately take over from the horse. The second fact is 
that it was the horse which was being defended and not the 
cavalry. All the arguments hung on the ability of the 
horse to move in country closed to vehicles. The cavalry 
argument was simply that the horse, as a vehicle, had 
still a limited part to play in war. 
Historians of the controversy are ignorant of cavalry 
actions after the First World War. It is bad enough that 
Megiddo is treated slightingly but let us mention some 
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other facts. What is to be made of Budyenny's use of 
cavalry in the Russo-Polish War? Or the use of cavalry 
units by the Red Army in the Second World War wh en the 
cold had stopped tank engines? What is to be made of the 
following episode? 
Reed rounded up some 60 captured German 
Artillery horses, improvised saddles and 
other equipment, and mounted a troop under 
the command of Captain Tom Stewart, son of 
the Tennessee Senator. 
The Troop operated very successfully 
for more than a week, capturing a number 
of small towns and several hundred 
astonished Krauts <sic>. 
Patton was very much elated over the 
innovation and sent a detailed report on 
it to SHAEF... 
'If I'd had a division, or even a 
brigade, of horse cavalry in Tunisia and 
Sicily, ' he declared, 'the bag of Germans 
would have been a good deal larger. Very 
few would have escaped, because Cavalry 
can conduct a pursuit much faster than 
tanks under certain conditions. ' (85) 
This happened during the Third US Army's campaign in the 
Saar in November 1944. No one can say that Patton was a 
reactionary or a man who did not understand the use of 
armour. The Israelis today use camel patrols in the Sinai 
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to check smuggling and infiltration. There is apparently 
a movement away from snowmobiles in the Canadian North and 
a return to dogs: dogs don't break down and one cannot eat 
a snowmobile. The cavalry men in the 1920's and 1930's 
were right - in certain, limited circumstances, horses and 
other animals can do things that machines cannot. 
The relative value of horse cavalry was 
certainly diminishing, but to write of it 
as if it had none is unjustified and 
unjust. (86) 
We will leave the final verdict with General Sir 
Charles Broad, one of the leading practical tank men. He 
did nct agree with Liddell Hart's alleged remark that the 
battles of the Second World War had been lost in the 
Cavalry Club. In the early years, "tanks could not 
compete with cavalry for speed". There was prejuduce 
against the "greasy mechanic" he thought, but the reasons 
for the retention of the cavalry were the varied terrain 
in the Empire, the memory of its importance in the South 
African War not long before and the Battle of Megiddo. 





was there an official policy on tanks between 1919 
and 1933? It seems that there was. Implicit in the 
foregoing chapters is a blueprint. There was orderly 
progress from the smaller to the larger - by 1933 there 
was a tank brigade and the tank brigade had the beginnings 
of a doctrine. There was never very much doubt about the 
principle of tanks - however organized or of whatever type 
to be decided later, the British Army must have them. 
Various designs were tried out and, at the end of the 
period thinking had settled on three kinds of tanks - 
medium tanks, close support tanks and light tanks. Trial 
and error established the fact that tanks, organized into 
all tank units, would prove of great value in what had 
been traditionally cavalry roles. We have seen a large 
measure of agreement that, eventually, pending designs and 
money, the cavalry would be almost entirely mechanized. 
Underlying all this was a policy of small scale and 
careful experiment. The small scale of the experiments 
was dictated by the parsimony of the governments towards 
the defence services; the care was dictated by a desire to 
get it right. This was a policy implicit in events, the 
policy could be named "slow and steady". 
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Was this an explicit policy? "Slow and steady" may 
be seen in practice but was it admitted in fact? Let us 
examine the statements of the Secretaries and 
Undersecretaries of State for War made in Parliament and 
see whether we can discover a policy. In 1920 appeared 
the following: 
These next years may be considered an 
interim period... Our finances are so 
limited that we must look to every penny. 
We cannot afford at this stage to make a 
false step. (1) 
That year Churchill stated that, so far as mechanization 
was concerned, the par office must move carefully and see 
what developed. (2) Worthington-Evans made a statement in 
1921: 
The ultimate practical use of tanks and 
armoured cars and their relation to the 
other arms of the service has not yet been 
finally settled. The general view is that 
mechanical means of fighting must be 
developed to the fullest extent. (3) 
He returned to the fact that, unlike other armies, the 
British Army was not based upon the size of other armies 
but in relation to its numerous responsibilities. (4) 
The Earl of Derby repeated this in a lengthier 
statement in 1923: 
We have to provide an army sufficiently 
biq to garrison our various ports all over 
8 
the world, and provide drafts for them; 
and at the same time provide a small 
mobile force... Which can be rapidly 
mobilized and sent abroad. Our Army has 
never been formed... to provide in 
peacetime for a great European 
conflagration. We must try to have a 
nucleus so that we can extend it in time 
of war, if a war ever occurs again. In 
time of peace it would be folly to attempt 
to keep up any such Army as foreign 
nations maintain. (5) 
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In 1924 Stephen Walsh, the Labour War Minister, 
answered a question calling for a statement on 
mechanization by saying that advances were being made and 
that the subject was under constant consideration. (b) That 
year, Atlee, the Undersecretary, made another statement: 
Our Army is essentially... a nucleus army; 
it is there to support the various 
garrisons we have... all over the world... 
Every step in the organization of the 
Army... Brill be taken with the utmost 
care. (7) 
Worthington-Evans returned to the War Office and in 
1925 made the following remarks: 
Continual progress has been made during 
1924-25 in the experimental work necessary 
8 
before a definite policy regarding the 
mechanicalization of the transport of the 
fighting units of the Army can be decided, 
and the coming year will be devoted to 
further experimentation. (8) 
and 
... the future of mechanicalization is full 
of difficulties which must be gradually 
studied before definite decisions are 
made. 
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But, he warned, so far as mechanizing the transport was 
concerned, unless and until a machine with commercial 
possibilities had been built, mechanization would be too 
expensive for the Army to attempt by itself. (9) In 1928 he 
promised to increase the number of tanks as funds 
permitted (that is to say slowly). (10) In the House that 
year he returned to the theme. The war office would keep 
the tried and true until experiment clearly pointed to the 
new way. If he were free to do so, he said, he would 
produce the new modern units first but, because he was 
forced to be as thrifty as possible, he must scrimp and 
save and make small experiments. 
The policy we are pursuing is gradually to 
convert existing formations... into 
formations based on increased mobility and 
firepower given by the use of the internal 
combustion engine... (11) 
Next year he boasted 
8 
we can confidently claim to lead the world 
not only in our equipment of tanks but 
also in our ideas as to their use in war. 
Money voted is being used on a definite 
and progressing plan. (12) 
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In 1930 Labour was back in power and its Secretary of 
State for War, Thomas Shaw, stated that his predecessor 
had made a full statement on mechanization and, as this 
plan was progressing satisfactorily, he had nothing 
further to add. (13) Later in the debate, he said that the 
Government had somewhat cut down on mechanized vehicles 
because they were all experimental and that it did not 
want to find itself in the future with a lot of obsolete 
vehicles should new improvement in design make the old 
ones out of date. (14) Next year Shaw expanded on this: 
<The policy of the Government> is not to 
pile up material of a character which is 
affected day by day as inventions or 
science move forward, but rather to 
experiment until a satisfactory type has 
been found, and then build up the stocks 
that are required. (15) 
Later that month he repeated that it was policy to 
experiment slowly and carefully with mechanization until a 
proven solution appeared. (16) 
Next year Duff Cooper appeared to contradict these 
assertions that there indeed was a policy on 
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mechanization: 
<mechanization in the past> has been 
governed from year to year by the 
financial and other considerations 
involved. (17) 
He did not mean that the new National government was 
overthrowing the previous policy of "slow and steady" but 
simply that the period of experimentation had not ended - 
there was no final policy on the matter. Next year, 1932, 
it was stated that progress of mechanized experiments were 
provinq of increasing value although their speed was 
hampered by financial considerations. (18) In 1933 Duff 
Cooper flatly stated that there had been no change in the 
mechanization policy. (19) A few days later he restated the 
proposition that the War Office must move slowly on the 
matter. (20 ) 
... we are... anxious... to bring the Army up 
to date in every way... hampered and 
delayed by the limitations of 
expenditure... <and>... also by the natural 
caution which must accompany any progress 
in that direction owing to the 
uncertainty... as to whether the latest 
invention is the last invention, and 
whether the newest thing is really the 
best. (21) 
With 1933 we come to the end of the period which we 
have chosen to examine but, because they could have been 
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said at any time from 1919 until 1933 we should consider 
two others of Duff Cooper's utterances in 1934. The four 
purposes of the British Army were the protection of naval 
bases, the maintenance of defence and order in certain 
territories, the protection of Great Britain and "in 
addition to the three great purposes" (and presumably, 
therefore, least in importance), the provision of a force 
to defend Empire interests outside the United Kingdom. 
Certain military critics, he said, seemed to think that 
the last menticned purpcse was the most important; it was 
not. (22) Later that year General Spears pointed out that 
the Army had been making experiments with mechanization 
for ten years; when were the experiments going to end? 
When was something positive and permanent going to be 
decided? Duff Cooper replied that experiments must 
continue and must never stop. (23) 
In these statements from the responsible ministers 
concerned we find once again the unanimity which we have 
seen before on matters of mechanization. The governments 
from 1919 to 1933 (and beyond) had a clear and consistent 
policy regarding the mechanization of the British Army. 
This policy may be described under seven parts and all the 
Secretaries of State for War, regardless of party or time 
would have agreed with these seven: 
1. Mechanization is of great value both as a means to 
efficiency in the Army and as a means of reducing 
expenditure thanks to its greater economy of effort. 
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2. The British Army is not now, and never has been, 
organized either to fight a major continental war or 
scaled according to possible major enemy armies. The size 
and composition of the British Army is now, and always has 
been, determined according to the responsibilities of the 
Empire which do not, generally, require forces organized 
to the last pitch of modernity. The British Army at Home 
is a nucleus which exists partly to assist the overseas 
detachments and partly to provide a basis from which an 
expanded army may be created. A large war which would 
necessitate such an expanded army is not likely in_: th2 
near future. 
3. Financial restrictions of overriding importance 
preclude a high level of spending on new machines and 
large scale experimentation. 
4. In a time of such progress and development in science 
and technology it would be a serious mistake to acquire a 
large number of a particular vehicle because it may be 
made obsolete in the near future by some further 
development. 
5. Mechanization of the Army is a complex and difficult 
matter and therefore calls for careful and continuing 
experimentation before permanent decisions are made which 
may turn out later to be in error. 
6. There is no particular hurry. There is no evidence of 
a great war in the near future which would require 
mechanized forces. In the meantime, the existing forces 
of the Army are adequate to maintain order in the Empire. 
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7. Therefore, progress in re-equipping and re-organizing 
the Army must be slow and steady. 
We who have seen a savage and destructive war and the 
resultant Cold War with its miseries both of which are, in 
part, attributable to the British Army's policy of not 
expecting a major war in 1939, may call this policy short 
sighted or even criminally irresponsible. And it is true 
- had the British had a larger and more powerful Army 
organized for continental war it is at least conceivable 
that Hitler and Mussolini might have thought more about 
risking Britain's enmity; failing that, it is possible, as 
Liddell Hart believed(24), that a larger and better 
equipped British armoured force might have made a decisive 
difference in 1940. However this may have been, such 
speculations, however interesting and provocative, are 
merely speculations; they are hindsight, that false friend 
of the historian. The British Army did what it did and, 
given the circumstances - the financial situation, the ten 
year rule, the problems with tanks, the cavalry question, 
the general atmosphere of international amity, could 
anyone have done better? The men of 1919 to 1933 did not 
know that there would be a war in only twenty years after 
the last one had ended with such high hopes; they could 
but make their decisions living forward one day at a time. 
Whatever cne may think of it, however, the British 
governments had a policy on mechanization and they kept to 
it throughout the period under consideration. "Slow and 
steady" seemed the best idea at the time. 
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And what where the times? In 1932 Burnett-Stuart 
(himself no "reactionary of the bow and arrow school") 
wrote a letter to Liddell Hart. Because it so eloquently 
and even movingly sums up the background against which 
mechanization had to contend and because it was written by 
a man who had been associated with the early experiments 
on Salisbury Plain in 1927 and 1928, it deserves to be 
quoted at some length: 
... I can offer you a brand of criticism 
(if you want it) rather different from 
that which you can get from junior General 
Staff officers or professional reviewers 
or the outside public. 
Imagine yourself the responsible head 
of the army and read your book <The 
British-_Way_in tarfare> from that 
standpoint. Wouldn't you rather resent 
your own accusations of incompetence and 
rather contemptuous assumption of 
superiority? And wouldn't all sorts of 
difficulties confront you, which as a 
critic you make no allowance for? 
Here are some of them: - (1) Your army 
is supposed to act as a police force in 
peace, and as a thunderbolt in war. The 
two functions are incompatible. I, for 
instance, in the Near East must have men. 
I cannot with machines occupy and control 
8 
large cities, protect scattered 
communities, deal with civil unrest, or 
occupy and pacify areas. Partial 
mechanization simplifies my task, but 
total mechanization would make my task 
impossible. The same considerations apply 
to India and to every other overseas 
garrison. Meanwhile the army at home is a 
mere skeleton and a feeder for the 
overseas garrisons. No doubt, if you 
could reduce your garrisons abroad (which 
you cannot do as they are far below the 
safety mark already) you could reduce the 
feeding establishment at home also, and so 
save money with which to form a small 
ultra modern striking force. Although as 
a matter of fact if you dared to show a 
possible saving on minimum peace 
requirements, the army vote would be cut 
at once and you would be worse off than 
before l 
(ii) <sic> All progress towards 
increased military efficiency in 
peacetime, especially if new appliances 
are involved, is at once branded as 
offensive militarism, and our own so 
called statesmen at once rush to Geneva to 
have such aggressiveness stopped. Look 
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how inconsistent you are yourself! You 
say you would like to abolish all air 
forces - and yet you demand tanks! 
(iii) All the army's work is done in 
an atmosphere that is not only 
unsympathetic, but definitely 
antagonistic. Neither the Cabinet, nor 
Parliament nor the public nor the Civil 
Service (including the War office civil 
staff) care two hoots about the army. 
Finance is a constant nightmare. So long 
as there are three services and three 
staffs, there is interservice rivalry in 
which the dice are loaded against the 
army; and that is likely to continue as it 
is the policy of all governments to play 
the services off against each other. 
Finally all press criticism of the army 
command is either contemptuous or hostile, 
and incredibly ill-informed. The result 
of all this is that the energies of the 
Higher Command are exhausted in efforts to 
keep what they have, in living from hand 
to mouth, and in making bricks without 
straw - hardly the atmosphere in which to 
fashion the Army of a Dream. 
I could go on for a long time in this 
stream, but I cnly want to make the point 
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that you, in common with most critics and 
students however erudite, do not make 
enough allowance for the practical 
difficulties of those who bear the 
responsibility for keeping the army going 
at all. 
I never for a moment suggested that 
the army was 'impeccable' - it is just a 
human show like other shows. But it is 
hardly fair to condemn it for having made 
a complete b-s of its four last major 
wars, in which the preparations, the 
policies, and to a large extent the 
operations were dictated by ministers and 
not by soldiers, while withholding all 
credit for what the army had done before, 
and in between, and is doing now. Heaven 
knows the army is not 'complacent' - it is 
merely helpless and a little cynical. 
After all it is the army itself that is 
going to be killed, and so it is naturally 
interested about its own efficiency or 
lack of it. 
You ask me if I 'seriously contend 
that if the General Staff said that our 
divisions must be reorganized, the 
government would interfere? ' I do. The 
Cecils and Hendersons would say we were 
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crashing the disarmament conference, the 
Foreign Office would say that we were 
taking a new lead in the competition in 
armaments, the Treasury would say that we 
were wasting money, and all the ex 
soldiers in Parliament would say we were 
doing it wrong. We all know that our 
present old-fashioned divisions are 
suicide clubs; but <it> is not merely a 
question of reorganizing them, but of 
remodelling our whole military machine and 
its responsibilities in peace so as to 
admit the creation of modern war 
formations. We are bound to the wheel and 
there is no free-wheel attachment to our 
Wheel! 
However, I must stop. Don't think 
that I am a defeatist, far from it - 
things might be much worse and are getting 
better. And don't think I am registering 
resentment. I have no use for anyone who 
doesn't say what they <sic> think (so long 
as they think intelligently! ), and if I 
wasn't genuinely interested in your views 




Liddell Hart's answer to this letter did not respond 
to the principal point that Burnett-Stuart was making. 
Liddell Hart merely said that he did not believe that the 
politicians were the enemies of the soldiers and that, in 
his opinion, the "frccks" were not to blame for all the 
Army's misfortunes. (26) He did not defend himself against 
the charge of not making enough allowance for the 
practical difficulties of the senior officers. 
It is unfortunate that he did not respond to this 
charge because it concisely states one of the difficulties 
of the position of the tank reformers. It was all very 
well to talk, and as we now know, to talk accurately of 
the future importance of AFYs, but there really was 
neither money nor apparent need for such forces on the 
large scale that Liddell Hart, Fuller and the rest were 
calling for. We have already seen some of the 
difficulties presented by the situation: the fact that, 
whatever the future might bring, the British tank 
designers could not produce a satisfactory medium tank 
that was either effective or economically worthwhile. (27) 
It has been shown that, before Broad's experiments in 
1931, there was simply no means of controlling large scale 
armoured formations. We have seen that, after about 1927, 
there were good reasons to suggest that, in future 
actions, tanks might fall easy prey to light, rapid-fire 
anti-tank weapons. Given the absence of a satisfactory 
medium tank, the lack of adequate control of armoured 
formations, and the possibility that such armoured 
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formations might be too vulnerable to have much use, was 
the future of the tank indeed so obvious? When we add to 
these internal problems connected with tanks, the 
undoubted desire of all the inter-war governments, at 
least until war seemed more likely, to spend no more than 
the bare minimum on defence, can we say that, even if 
desirable, it was practical to expect the British Army to 
go in for tanks in a large way? Burnett-Stuart was 
describing the situation to Liddell Hart: the Army was at 
the very lowest priority of the three defence services, 
and they themselves were probably at the lowest priority 
in government spending. Within the Army itself, tanks 
could only be bought after the essential overseas 
garrisons were provided for. But the garrisons took up so 
much of the Army's time, money and effort that there was 
very little left over. Indeed, in many ways, it was a 
wonder that the Army was able to do what it did in 
connection with tanks. 
And what had been done in these years of experiment? 
In the first four or five years, not very much was done. 
But, by 1923, the Tank Corps was permanently established 
and established free from the control of the other arms 
(something that was not done in other countries). Between 
then and 1927, the Royal Tank Corps slowly equipped itself 
and got used to comparatively fast tanks and the resultant 
tactics. In 1927 were held the experiments which were to 
be followed with such interest in other countries. These 
led directly to further experiments with brigade size 
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armoured units and, eventually, to the formation of such 
units. 
This does not, perhaps, sound like much at first. 
But consider what it entailed. Tactics had been developed 
for tanks in the First World War and they had been worked 
out to a fairly high degree of sophistication. But these 
were tactics for a tank with a top speed of about 4mph and 
a tank which was designed to assist the infantry through a 
very small and lethal area. After the tanks had done 
that, they could fall apart - their job was done. 
Obviously, such tactics were no good at all as a basis for 
the Vickers Medium. That tank, for all its deficiencies, 
was a great deal faster than any of the war time models 
and it had been designed for a much different purpose. 
Therefore, tactics had to be developed by the ETC from a 
completely fresh start after it began to get its new 
machines. Furthermore, such high speed tactics were much 
more difficult than the war time tactics. In the war, 
sophisticated communications had not been necessary but, 
in a high speed attack into the enemy's rear areas, good 
communications were essential. In the war, logistics had 
not been very important in tank attacks - the tanks could 
carry all that they needed themselves for their short 
range movements. But, again, this could not be so easy in 
the new tactics. All these matters had to be worked out 
by the Tank Corps. Obviously, such things took time. 
S 263 
There were still more problems. Maintenance of tanks 
in action had not figured very largely in the war but, in 
long distance sweeps, the tanks would have to be able to 
be repaired by their crews away from complicated 
workshops. There was a need for a great deal of firing 
practice. There were a host of details to be worked out 
in connection with the co-operation of tanks with the 
other arms. Tanks in the war had not done scouting, but 
that was a new role for the post war tanks. The fact that 
is often forgotten is that there was virtually no 
similarity between the wartime tanks and the post war 
tanks. The fact that both vehicles are named "tank" has 
tended to conceal their differences. In 1923 the Royal 
Tank Corps had to start completely anew - the only legacy 
from the past was a confidence in the future. 
Between 1923 and 1933 - ten years only - the RTC made 
a very good beginning at fashioning the host of doctrines 
on tactics and maintenance, gunnery and all the rest of it 
that was necessary before the dream of the tank pundits 
could come true. However, it must not be forgotten that 
this development did not take place in a vacuum. The 
background factors mentioned in Chapter 2 made it clear 
that a large scale, rapid development of tanks was simply 
not feasible. 
Lest it be thought, in all this criticism of the Tank 
Corps and its spokesmen that has been in evidence above, 
that this work is taking a one sided or purely negative 
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view of the tank controversy, a number of things hitherto 
taken as understood must be made explicit. Generally 
speaking, with a few exceptions on points of detail, the 
tank propagandists were reasonably accurate in their 
forecasts of the tank in future wars. We have seen tanks 
come to dominate land warfare; nowadays, infantry do ride 
around in "tanks" (armoured personnel carriers) ; the 
existence of real cross-country machines has changed 
logistics; armoured spearheads have put mobility and 
generalship back into war. Had the tank pioneers of the 
time - Fuller, Liddell Hart, Martel, Broad, Lindsay and 
Hobart - had their way in mechanizing the British Army, it 
is possible that subsequent history might have been very 
different. As we now know, they were generally correct in 
their percepticns of the First World War - the lessons 
they derived concerning the importance of tanks from the 
limited experience of that war were substantially 
accurate. The influence of Liddell Hart and Fuller 
especially on matters of strategy and tactics can hardly 
be over emphasized - so much of what is now accepted 
military practice had its origins in their writings that 
their influence cannot be ignored. The tank pioneers were 
prophets and, in company with other prophets, they had a 
distressing disinclination to pay much attention to 
details. But they were true prophets. 
Nevertheless, even bearing in mind the long range 
accuracy of much that they said, it must be remembered 
that, at the time, matters were not so clear and distinct 
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as they are today. The tank of the 1920's was not the 
proven, reliable weapons system that it is today. There 
were reasons that seemed good at the time for thinking 
that the tank spokesmen might be over estimating the 
potentials of the tank. It was not possible, for reasons 
of control and logistics, to make the sort of long range 
movements that they were calling for. These matters were 
all satisfactorily worked out later, as the tank pundits 
were sure they would be, but they were worked out under 
pressure. This pressure was not present between 1919 and 
1933. Tanks were a weapon that would only be needed 
against first class enemies and there was nothing to 
suggest at the time that there would be any first class 
enemies for some considerable time. Had there been the 
pressure of preparing for war before 1933, then, probably, 
tank development in Britain would have been as fast as it 
was in revanchist Germany. 
As it was, very early a policy was adopted by the 
government. The policy was slow and cautious: experiments 
were to proceed in a small scale and a cadre would be 
established which could be expanded in time of need. This 
was not a dramatic policy and it was too slow for the 
liking of the tank men who did not believe that there was 
much to experiment about, but it was a policy nonetheless 
and one well suited to the financial and strategic 
climate. 
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The tank controversy therefore stands revealed not as 
a Manachaean struggle between "progressives" and 
"reactionaries" but as a much smaller disagreement. The 
"progressives" and the "reactionaries" agreed on a lot of 
things: tanks were here to stay and, in future, tanks 
would supply most of the hitting power of the Army - in 
short, tanks were essential. They disagreed on the 
smaller matters of how much time was available for 
experimentation and on how much of the tank case had been 
established already by the war. The "progressives" wanted 
progress to be as fast as possible; the "reactionaries" 
felt that there was lots of time. The "progressives" 
believed that the tanke s case had been finally established 
as true when it "won the war"; the "reactionaries" felt 
that much was left to be proved. it was the signal 
failure of pre war British tank policy in the second world 
War - the inadequacies of British tank designs and tactics 
against the skilful panzer divisions - that added the 
venom to the debate. This thesis has been based on 
contemporary sources and the venom and the "if only they'd 
listened to we, Dunkirk wouldn't have happened" elements 
of post war writings is missing from the contemporary 
sources. In short, the policy of "slow and steady" was 
reasonable at the time but later events were to make 
people wish that there had been a more adventurous policy; 
the tank pioneers' policy of "full steam ahead" was quite 
impossible in the context but it is that policy that later 
reflection wished that there had been. 
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There is a curious symmetry in the tank controversy - 
one side was wrong for the right reasons and the other was 
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wooden mock-up A8 (Vickers-Armstrong) 1933 
different marks of Carden-Loyd Tankettes 1927-1930 
Vickers_Medium Mark_I and Mark_II Experimental Variants 
1 Hark I Wheel and Track 1926 
3 Birch Guns 1926-? 
1 Mark II Bridgecarrier 1927/28 
2 Mark II Females 1927 
5 Mark II Tropical Tanks 1928 
1 Mark II Box Tank 1928 
4 Mark II* Specials 1929 
1 Mark II Command Tank 1931 
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1 Light Infantry Tank (Johnson) 1921 
2 Vickers Light Tanks 1921 
1 Vickers Medium C 1925? 
8 Morris-Martel Two Man Tankettes 1927 
8 Carden-Loyd Two Man Tankettes 1927 
3 A7 Medium Tanks (Made by Woolwich Ordnance Factory - 
began 1929 and the design was finally abandoned in 
Between 1919 and 1934,24 completely different tanks 
or tankettes were designed; counting the experimental 




Crow, D. (Ed)., British Armoured Fighting Vehicles 
1919-1940. 
Ogorkiewicz, E. M.: RSsignand DeVelorment of Fighting 
Vehicles. 
Notes: 
The figures for "Effective BHP"", "Effective HP/Ton" 
and "Speed on Soft Clay" are based on calculations drawn 
from Ogorkiewicz, R. M.: Op. Cit. 
30% to 40% of the gross horsepower of a tank is lost 
in "driving the cooling fans, in the transmission and 
elsewhere". (p. 87) Z have taken 33 1/3% as the loss for 
these tanks. This is probably generous as the automotive 
parts of those tanks were not as good as they would now be 
and their suspensions contributed greatly to high 
friction. 
11... a typical vehicle which needs 0.2 hp/ton per mph 
on concrete, requires 0.6 on sandy soils and as much as 1 
hp/ton per mph on soft clay soils. " (p. 103) It is 
nearly impossible to estimate the cross country 
performance of these vehicles today but, on the basis of a 
combination of the estimated net bhp and these figures I 
have attempted to estimate. Again, it is probably over 
generous to the tanks because these vehicles had narrow 
tracks and poor suspension units. It is likely, 
therefore, that over soft ground they would do even worse 
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Sources 
The Army Estimates, published annually in Accounts and 
Papers` Airý_Armyý 
Notes;. 
1. For the Estimates of 1926/27, the War office 
reverted to a style of showing the costs which had been in 
use before the war. Consequently it is not possible to 
compare directly the Estimates before that year with those 
after as different costs came under different headings. 
2. Until about 1924 the Army was using up its war 
time stocks of petrol, forage and mechanical transport 
and, therefore, accurate figures of these are not 
available for those years. 
3. From 1921/22 to 1923/24 inclusive the Colonial 
Office reimbursed the War Office for expenses in the 
Middle East. The sums were 28,515,000,4,930,000 and 
553,000 Pounds respectively. 
4. In several years there were Supplementary 
Estimates added to the Army Estimates either because the 
figures had been wrongly estimated or because of 
unexpected expenses like the Shanghai emergency in 1927. 






BROAD, Charles Noel Frank 1882- 
Joined RA 1905; South African War, World War 2; 1924 took 
charge of RTC Gunnery School; 1925 Chief Instructor RTC 
Central Schools; 1927 to War office under DSD to plan war 
organization; 1931 commanded Tank Brigade, autumn 
Brigadier General Staff Aldershot. 
In 1933 he was a Brigadier and he ended his career as a 
Lieutenant General. 
BURNETT-STUART, John Theodosius 1875- 1958 
Joined Infantry 1895; North-West Frontier, South African 
War, World War I; 1920 GOC Madras District; 1922 DMO&I; 
1926 GOC 3rd Division; 1931 GOC Egypt. 
In 1933 he was a Lieutenant General and he ended his 
career as a General. 
COLLINS, Robert John 1880-1950 
Joined Infantry 1897; South African War, World War I; 1919 
Instructor at Camberly; 1924 DMT India; 1926 Colonel 
Commandant 9th Infantry Brigade; 1927 Colonel Commandant 
7th Infantry Brigade and Experimental Forces; 1929 
Commandant Small Arms School. 
In 1933 he was a Ma jcr General and he ended his career 
with that rank. 
FULLER, John Frederick Charles 1878-1966 
Joined Infantry 1897; South African War, World War 1; 1917 
GS01 Tank Corps; 1918 to War office, 1923 a Chief 
Instructor at the Staff college; 1925 Military Assistant 
to the CIGS; 1926 Ceases position as Military Assistant 
and sent to India. When he returns is offered command of 
7th Infantry Brigade and Experimental Mechanized Force; 
1927 Writes out resignation in protest about the terms of 
his command, talked out of this and takes up position as 
GS01 to 2nd Division; 1929 Commands 2nd Rhine Brigade and, 
later, 13th Infantry Brigade; 1930 Promoted and offered 
appointment in Bombay which he refuses; 1933 Retires from 
Army. 
In 1933, upon retirement, he was a Major General. 
HOBART, Percy Cleghorn Stanley 1885-1957 
Joined RE 1904; North-West Frontier, world War I; 1921 
Waziristan Force; 1923 Joined Tank Corps in India; 1927 On 
Collins, staff for Experimental Force, second in command 
of 4th Battalion RTC; 1930 To India as commander of 
Armoured Car Southern Group (4 companies); 1933 Inspector 
RTC and commander of ist Brigade RTC. 
In 1933 he was a Colonel and he ended his career as a 
Major General. 
LIDDELL HART, Basil Henry 1895-1970 
Joined Infantry 1914; World War I; 1917-1918 Wrote parts 
of the Infantry Manual; 1920 Begins writing, contacts 
Fuller; 1923 Applies for RTC but medical record prevents 
his application from being accepted; 1924 Placed on half 
pay list as a Captain because of health, in Summer made 
Assistant Military Correspondent for Mornin1_Post_ 1925 
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Full time military Correspondent for Daily Telegra Pht 
military advisor to 13th Edition of Encyclopaedia 
Britannica; 1927 Retires from Army; 1932 Makes "offensive 
weapons" proposal at Disarmament Conference, considered as 
Deputy to Hankey at CID but nothing comes of it; 1933 
Assists with Kirke Committee Report. 
LINDSAY, George Mackintosh 1880- 1956 
Joined RE Militia unit 1898; Joined Infantry in South 
Africa 1900; South African War, World War I; 1919 
Commanding 41st Battalion MG Corps Germany; 1920 Staff 
College; 1921 Commanding Number 1 Armoured Car Group Iraq; 
1923 Transfers to RTC, Chief Instructor RTC Central 
Schools; 1925 Inspector RTC; 1926-1929 Member of 
Mechanical Warfare Board; 1929 Brigadier General Staff 
Egypt; 1933 Ccmmanding 7th Infantry Brigade (partly 
mechanized). 
In 1933 he was a Brigadier and he ended his career as a 
Major General. 
MARTEL, Guy LeQuesne 1889-1958 
Joined BE 1909; World War I; 1916 Sent to England from 
France to construct a practice ground for tank training 
and in September joins Headquarters in charge of tank 
units; 1918 Commanding a tank bridging battalion in 
England, develops "RE tank"; 1919 Develops numerous 
articles of bridging equipment adopted as standard until 
the war; 1920 Staff College; 1923 To War office; 1925 
Designs and builds the first light tank or tankette; 1927 
Commands RE company in Experimental Mechanized Force; 1930 
Instructor in mechanized war at Staff College, Quetta. 
In 1933 he was a Lieutenant Colonel and ended his career 
as a Lieutenant General. 
MILNE, George Francis 1866-1948 
Joined Army in 1885; Sudan, South African War, World War 
I; 1919 GOC Constantinople; 1923 GOC in C in C Eastern 
Command; 1926 CIGS; 1928 Field Marshal; 1933 Retired as 
CIGS. 
MONTGOMERY-MASSINGBERD, Archibald Armar 1971-1947 
South African War, World War I; 1920 Deputy CGS India; 
1922 GOC 53rd Welsh Division; 1923 GOC 1st Division; 1928 
GOC in C Southern Command; 1931 Adjutant General; 1933 
CIGS. 
In 1933 he was a General and he ended his career as a 
Field Marshal. 
PILE, Sir Frederick Alfred (Bart) 1884- 
Joined RA 1904; World War I; 1927 Commanded reconnaissance 
battalion in Experimental Mechanized Force; 1928 Assistant 
Director of Mechanization; 1932 Commander Canal Brigade 
Egypt. 
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15. France and_Belgium 1918 Vol. IV, p. 156. 
Fuller, J. F. C.: Op. Cit., pp. 223-226. 
16. France and Vol. Vol. III, p. 90, n. 1. 
17. Fuller, J. F. C.: Op. Cit. Of the total of 688 tanks 
which saw action in the battle, 480 (69.77%) were handed 
over to Salvage and all of the remainder required a 
"thorough overhaul". (p. 227. ) 
18. "The designers <of the original tank> indeed claim 
that they were verbally instructed that the tank should 
'run 50 miles and might then fall to pieces'". Elles, 
Col. Cmdt. Sir Hugh; Art. Cit. 
19. Elles, Col. Cmdt. Sir Hugh: Art. Cit. 
20. The "Gunner of Flesquieres" became quite a legend in 
later years to people concerned to prove that tanks could 
not live in the face of guns. Haig sent a despatch about 
Cambrai which read, in part, "Many of the hits upon our 
tanks at Flesquieres were obtained by a German artillery 
officer who, remaining alone at his battery, served a 
field gun single-handed until killed at his gun". In 
Conan Doyleys history cf the war, this brave officer was 
credited with destroying 16 tanks. (Liddell Hart, B. H.: 
The__TanksL Vcl I, p. 142) In 1933, Major Hot black 
(Intelligence officer to the Tank Corps in 1917) gave it 
as his opinicn that the matter was very doubtful. The 
Germans themselves had looked for traces of this officer 
after the war but had been unable to turn anything up and 
Hotblack, who actually saw the destroyed tanks afterwards, 
was sure that they had been destroyed by a battery. 
(Hotblack, F. E.: "A Cambrai Myth? ", Royal Tank-C2r2s 
Journal, Vol. 14, p. 285, March 1933) A later 
assessment, which is free from partisanship in the matter, 
authoritatively gives the facts of the case as follows. 
The German 54th Division garrisoning Flesquieres was 
commanded by Lieut. Gen. F. Von Watter who had made a 
special study of anti-tank gunnery and had practiced his 
gun crews. He expected a tank attack and his guns were 
fully prepared when it came. The tank tactics used at the 
Ridge had been modified by General Harper so that the 
tanks were unprotected by infantry. As they came slowly 
over the Ridge, they were perfect targets and the German 
gunners were able to hit perhaps forty of them. 
(Woolcombe, 8.: The First Tank Battle: Cambrai_ 1917I. pp. 
104-117) It seems therefore, that Haig' s mysterious gunner 
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was a whole battery. 
21. "Anti Tank Defence "# Royal Tank Corps_Journalt Vol. 
6, September and October 1924. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Browne, Capt. D. G.: The _Tank 
inActionipp. 163-176. 
He estimated that one shell per minute fell near his tank 
and neither the tank nor any of the crew was hit once. 
24. Browne, Capt. D. G.; 
British thought that the tank 
Germans and began to fire 
hadn't and they also fired at 
able to keep up a fire on the 
a great number of the enemy". 
and 24 October 1917. 
Ibid. , pp. 237-238. The had been captured by the 
at it; the Germans knew it 
it. Meanwhile the tank was 
Germans "killing or wounding 
This took place between 22 
25. Browne, Capt D. G.: Ibid., p. 479. This happened on 
30 September 1918 to his tank and it was a 5.9 inch (sic) 
shell. 
26. Jones, Rarey and Icks: The_FightingTanks 1916-19331 
p. 22. 
27. The Germans developed an anti-tank rifle of 13mm 
calibre; it could penetrate half inch armour (12.7mm) at 
400 metres but it was heavy and unpopular with the troops. 
This rifle was to have been superseded by a machine gun 
with similiar characteristics. It was planned to build 
6000 by April 1919 with the first deliveries in December 
1918. Its manufacture was to take priority over 
submarines and aircraft. It was of course too late but 
its effect would have been considerable as it could easily 
have penetrated any French or British armour. (Browne, 
Capt. D. G. ; Op. Cit., pp. 299-300). 
28. Quoted in Sixsnith, E. K. G.: BritishGeneralship_in 
the Twentieth Century, p. 128. 
29. One "lesson of the war" that was rather overdone by 
the Tank Corps in later years concerned the adventures of 
"Musical Box" on 8 August 1918. "Musical Box" was the 
nickname of a Whippet tank of B Company, 6th Tank 
Battalion commanded by Lieut. C. B. Arnold. The tank 
passed through the Australians and came upon a battery 
firing on two Mark Vs; Arnold attacked the gunners and 
killed them. "Musical Box" then moved around the 
battlefield giving assistance to parties of infantry and 
cavalry. It continued east, by now far in front of the 
other troops, and shot up parties of Germans for about an 
hour. By now the crew was in considerable discomfort from 
exhaustion and bullet splash but they pressed on and 
attacked a supply column. In the resulting fight "Musical 
Box" was finally put out of action but its guns killed and 
wounded many more Germans. The crew eventually 
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surrendered and one man was killed but the ether to 
survived to return from a POW camp after the Armistice. 
"Musical Box" had fought its lone war about ten miles from 
its start line without any assistance from other soldiers. 
(Liddell Hart, B. H.: The Tankst Vol. I, p. 182). To the 
tank enthusiasts this was proof: 
The confusion caused by these 12 armoured 
cars <a group of armoured cars had also 
broken into the German rear areas but 
without such spectacular results> and one 
Whippet tank was phenomenal, and should it 
be multiplied by the number of Whippets 
which took the field on the 8th <96>, it 
is probably no exaggeration to assume 
that, had they been concentrated around 
Chaulnes, they would have ruined the whole 
German command and 
administration... <on>... a front of some 50 
miles. (Fuller, J. F. C.: The Decisive 
Battles of the Western World, 
_ 
Vol. II, p. 
381). 
Tae reason why this did not happen, according to Fuller, 
was that the Whippets were linked to the cavalry and the 
two forces made unequal progress. Perhaps Fuller is being 
a little hopeful here - the other 95 Whippets had had the 
same chance as "Musical Box". In any case, one instance 
is a slender peg on which to hang a "lesson of the war". 
30. It is depressing to wonder what else could have been 
done with the 50 million Pounds squandered to no end in 
Russia. (Figure of 10,810,000 Pounds on military services 
and 40,000,000 Pounds on material given to the Russians 
from Higham, R.: Armed Forces inPeacetime, P. 33). 
31. For these and other figures from the Army Estimates, 
see Appendix II. 
32. An appendix to Precis 1074, PRO/W0163/26, p. 11, 
outlines the Treasury Memorandum. 
33. W. L. S. Churchill Was Secretary of State for War and 
Air from January 1919 until January 1921. 
34. The need for economy was stressed at Army Council 
Meeting 274,6 December 1920 and the figures were given at 
Meeting 275,21 December 1920, P80/W0163/25. 
35. Worthington-Evans thought that this reduction could 
be made without affecting the fighting strength of the 
Army but that further reductions would require a 
reorganization of the Army; he expected that the Army 
would have "to go further on the path of reduction". 
Worthington-Evans' report is contained in Precis 1056 (19 
February 1921) and it was considered at Army Council 
Meeting 276,21 February 1921, PRO/W0163/26. 
36. Sir Laming Worthington-Evans succeeded Churchill and 
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remained at the tsar office until October 1922 and again 
from November 1924 until June 1929. 
37. Precis 1073 and Army Council Meeting 280,25 may 
1921, PRO/WO163/21. 
38. Worthingtcn-Evans' report is in Precis 1074 (he 
called the economic position "a grave one"). Army Council 
Neetinq 281,2 June 1921, PRO/WO163/26. 
39. Lord Derby from October 1922 until January 1924. 
40. Precis 1120 and Army Council Meeting 309,21 November 
1922, PRO/W0163/28. 
41. Army Council Meeting 330,13 February 1924, 
PRO/WO 163/30. 
42. Eric Campbell Geddes had much experience of 
reorganization: general manager designate of the North 
Eastern Railway, he directed railway transport and naval 
supply during the war. He was Minister of Transport from 
1919 to 1922. (Taylor, A. J. P.: English Historl 19141945, L 
p. 124 n. 1). 
43. Sir Robert Horne, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 
151, Col. 427,1 March 1922. He was hopeful of cutting 
1922/1923 expenditure by 181 million Pounds. 
44. One cavalry and six infantry divisions. 
45. Both questions and answers are in Precis 1082, 
P80/W0163/26, p. 196. 
46. All that the Tank Corps had at this time was 36 
Medium C tanks and an unknown number of rhomboids and 
Whippets from war stocks. The Medium C was an improvement 
on the whippet but had similiar specifications (8mph, 12mm 
armour, 4 machine guns). it was patently obsolete. 
Experiments with Johnson's tank designs had gone awry and 
the Vickers Medium was still in the prototype stage. 
47. Fuller says that Sir Henry Wilson, when CIGS, was 
fond of asking the question: "Why do we have six divisions 
in our funny little army? " And answering it: "Nobody 
knows and nobody cares]" (Fuller, J. F. C.: Memoirs of_an 
Ugcon_veutional Soldiers p. 365). Wilson was being 
sarcastic but ~the fact that he thought he could make a 
joke about the subject is significant. The Cardwell 
System was retained because no one could think of any 
other means of providing the necessary overseas garrisons. 
See below Notes 77 and 81. 
48. The May Committee was of the opinion that the budget 
was unbalanced and the gap must be bridged. There were 
two ways to cover the deficit: retrenchment or increased 




first. The object of the reductions was "to restore 
international faith in Sterling and British credit". The 
Labour government accepted the recommended cuts but added 
temporary cuts of two million Pounds each for the Navy and 
the Army and one million Pounds for the Air Force. The 
National Cabinet wanted all over government cuts of 70 
million Pounds. (PRO/CAB21/349). 
49. Most of 
Considering the 
Depression, t hi 
might have been. 
of 1914". (Duff 
262, Col. 1651, 
it came from a 10% pay reduction. 
deflationary aspects of the Great 
was probably not the hardship that it 
The reductions were taken "in the Spirit 
Cooper, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 
8 March 1932). 
50. For example, Territorial Army and Territorial Reserve 
camps were suspended to save 940,000 Pounds; replacement 
of horses, Motor Transport and New Services were delayed 
or reduced to save 217,000 Pounds. 
51. Precis 1357,1 September 1931, PRO/W0163/37, p. 73 
contains the proposals and the Army Council's actions. 
The meetings at which the reductions were considered were 
373,31 August; 374,2 September; 375,17 September and 
376,25 September 1931. PRO/W0163/37. 
52. The argument that the Ten Year Rule was to blame for 
almost everything is put forth by Peter Silverman in the 
March 1971 issue of the Journal __. 2f 
the Royal United 
Service_Institution and, in my opinion, well refuted by K. 
Booth in the September 1971 issue of that Journal. 
53. Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Finance, 11 
August 1919, Conclusion 7 quoted in PRO/WO32/9314. (See 
Note 55 below for an explanation of this document. ) 
54. Meeting of the War Cabinet 616A. 15 August 1919, 
PRO/CAB23/15. 
55. Hankey gave this opinion on 14 December 1923 in a 
letter to E. B. B. Speed in answer to the latter's question 
about the origin of a "dictum of the Cabinet to the effect 
that there would be no war for ten years". 
(PRO/W032/9314) This document is the first of three which 
Hankey wrote explaining the origin of the principle. It 
was prepared for the information of the War Office which 
apparently had noticed a mention of the rule in the Geddes 
Report of 1921. In July 1928 he prepared a history of the 
principle of no great war for ten years for the CID as 
background to assist it in its consideration of 
Churchill's proposals. (CID Paper 892-B) In June 1931 he 
brought that paper up to date for the CID in light of the 
COS Subcommittee's proposals. (CID Paper 1055-B) 
56. CID Meeting 199,2 April 1925, PRO/CAB2/4. At its 
previous meeting the CID had accepted the Foreign 




discussion at the April meeting. 
57. Cabinet Meeting 57(25) 3 December 1925, PRO/CAD23/51. 
It was postponed again until 1938 by the Cabinet on 11 
December 1929. (Cabinet Meeting 52 (29) PRO/CAB23/62) 
58. Cabinet Meeting 45(27) 28 July 1927, PR0/C&B23/55. 
The Secretary of State for War had asked the CID in July 
1927 to renew the 1919 War Cabinet decision but "great 
pressure of business" had prevented the Committee from 
doing so. (CID Paper 873-B) The CID took note of the 
Cabinet decision at Meeting 235,22 May 1928. 
(PLto/CAB2/5) 
59. CID Paper 891-B, June 1928; quoted in CID Paper 1055- 
B 
60. CID Meeting 236,5 July 1928, PRO/CAB2/5. 
61. CID Meeting 243,27 July 1929, PRO/CAB2/5. This 
meeting provides a question in the otherwise 
straightforward history cf the "Ten Year Rule". Both 
Snowden (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and MacDonald (Prime 
Minister) referred to a non moving rule which, they 
claimed, had been passed in 1921 referring to the chance 
of a great war before 1931. There does not seem to be any 
record of such a decision - the only thing that they could 
have been thinking of was the reference to the 1919 
decision which was published in the-Geddes Report in 1921. 
In none of his accounts does Hankey make any reference to 
a 1921 decision. 
62. CID Meeting 249,14 July 1930, PRO/CAB2/5. 
63. CID Meeting 253,29 June 1931, PRO/CAB2/5. MacDonald 
observed that "the present assumption that there would be 
no major war for ten years had been acted upon in one form 
or another by almost all governments since the War". An 
observation that is surely correct. 
The Foreign office placed a memorandum before the 
Committee which stated that the rule must be re examined 
"in the light of developments in 1932 on which so much 
must depend". The CID agreed to do this. 
64. CID Meeting 255,22 March 1932, PRO/CAE2/5. Almost 
everyone present at the meeting spoke against the 
continuance of the rule. Sir John Simon (Foreign 
Secretary) supported by Vansittart (his Permanent Under 
Secretary) stated the the "general view of the Foreign 
Office, which they reached with regret, was that the Ten 
Year assumption was a dangerous one". Sir Bolton Eyres- 
Monsell (First Lord of the Admiralty) said that it was 
"impossible to allow the assumption to continue 
indefinitely from day to days and that he thought the 
country would be "horrified" if it were to find out that 
the rule continued to be the basis of defence 
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preparations. Lord Hailsham (Secretary of State for War) 
agreed that "in present circumstances <it was> impossible 
to continue working on the Ten Year assumption". 
The COS Subcommittee Report gives an earlier version 
of the Silverman thesis in that it blames virtually all of 
Britain's defence weaknesses on the "Ten Year Rule". (CID 
Paper 1082-B, 23 February 1932) 
65. Cabinet meeting 19(32) 23 March 1932, PRO/CAB23/70. 
The rider about bearing the economic and financial 
situation in mind echoed a Treasury note to the COS report 
which said, in part: 
For some years past, and at the present 
time more than ever, the position and 
future of this country depend on the 
recovery and maintenance of sound finances 
and a healthy trading position. 
... the Zreasury submit that at the present 
time financial risks are greater than any 
other that we can estimate... (CID Paper 
1087-B, 11 March 1932) 
Roskill argues that the Cabinet did not in fact 
cancel the "Ten Year Rule" until 15 November 1932 (Cabinet 
Beeting 62(33) PR0/CAB23/77) when it accepted a CID 
recommendation that a COS recommendation concerning the 
preparation of a defence programme be accepted. It seems 
that this point depends on one's interpretation of the 
rather peculiar formula in the Cabinet Minutes used in 
1932 - "No dissent was expressed from the acceptance of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence of the recommendation of 
the Chiefs of Staff Sub Committee in favour of the 
cancellation of the assumption on which the Estimates of 
the Defence Departments have been based in recent years. " 
If this does not mean that the Cabinet accepted the 
cancellation of the "Ten Year Rule", what does it mean? 
(Roskill's argument is given in "The Ten Year Rule - The 
Historical Facts", Journal of the Royal_United Service 
Institution. 1972, p. 69. ) 
66. Barron, Lieut. Col. F. W.: "The New Responsibilities 
of the British Empire Created by the Assumption of 
Mandates in the Middle East and Their Strategic 
Significance with Specific Reference to the Defence of 
India", (Lecture RUSI, 8 March 1922), r Journal of the Royal United Service Inst_itutiont 1922, p. 255. Barron was on 
the General Staff in the department dealing with the 
Middle East. 
67. This amounted to something in excess of 200,000 
square miles - more than twice the size of the United 
Kingdom. 
68. Barron, Lieut. Col. F. W.: 59-6 cit. Lb-- 
69. "The Present Distribution and Strength of the British 
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Army in Relation to its Duties". PRO/W032/28 23. 
70. General the Earl of Cavan was CIGS from February 1922 
until February 1926. 
71. Great Britain: 9 cavalry regiments; 53 infantry 
battalions; 17 1 artillery brigades; 3 2/3 tank 
battalions; 2 armoured car companies 
Ireland: 5 infantry battalions; 1/4 artillery brigade 
Rhine: 1 cavalry regiment; 8 infantry battalions; 3 
artillery brigades; 1/3 tank battalion 
Constantinople: 1 cavalry regiment; 13 infantry 
battalions; 1 3/4 artillery brigades 
Egypt 3 cavalry regiments; 6 infantry battalions; 1 
artillery brigade; 1 armoured car company 
Tragt 2 infantry battalions; 1/4 artillery brigade 
Colonies: 3 British infantry battalions and 3 Native 
infantry battalions 
To confuse matters, the Estimates treat India separately 
so that I do not have exact figures except for the ETC 
Which had 6 armoured car companies and a Tank Corps 
Centre. Under the Cardwell System, however, India would 
have had roughly the same number of cavalry and infantry 
units as were at home. 
72. The units required were: 
Indias 8 cavalry brigades and 6 infantry divisions 
Iraq: 2 cavalry brigades and 2 infantry divisions 
Palestine: 1 cavalry brigade and 1 infantry division 
Egypt_ 1 cavalry brigade and 2 infantry divisions 
Constantinople: 2 infantry divisions 
The Occupied Zone of the Rhineland was confidently 
expected to require no reinforcements. The Report 
stressed that these reinforcement scales were for local 
hostilities only. The requirements for more serious 
hostilities are not given. 
73. Natigpal_ and ImperialDefence: Proceedings___of 
Subcommittee_ MLL File registered 14.3.23, 
PRO/CAB21/260. This document is also the source for Notes 
71 and 72. 
74. Precis 1296 representing a discussion by the Military 
Members of the Army Council on 22 June 1927, PRO/W0163/33, 
p. 234. It was considered at Army Council Meeting 358,8 
July 1927. 
75. General (later Field Marshal) Sir George Milne was 
CIGS from February 1926 until February 1933. 
76. PRO/W032/2823. 
77. "This review <BevieW ofImperial Defence, 1926_, by 
COS Sub-Committee> went on to explain that the size of the 
regular army was regulated by a system which demanded an 
approximate equilibrium between the number of units 
maintained overseas and the number maintained at home. 
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Consequently the Expeditionary Force in England is merely 
a by-product of this system, being organized from the 
units on the home establishment, from which sources have 
also to be supplied such regular units as may be required 
for home defence. " 
78. "In 1914 the Expeditionary Force, whose strength was 
regulated by the same factors <as described in Note 77>, 
was stronger by 1 division than it is today, yet it 
mobilized in under one month instead of the five now 
necessary. " And "... a ccmparison of our foreign garrisons 
today with the strengths at which they stood in 1914, 
shows that in nearly every case, they have been reduced". 
79. "... when trouble broke out on a large scale at the 
beginning of this year, we were compelled to send to the 
Far East reinforcements totalling 17 battalions". This 
would have been a quarter to a third of the home 
establishment. 
80. "Apart from the somewhat indefinite liability which 
we have assumed under the Locarno Pact, the chief military 
liability of the British Empire appears to be the defence 
of India against Russian aggression. A recent study of 
this question by a Sub-Committee of the CID has enabled us 
to arrive at the strength of the force which we, so far as 
can be calculated beforehand, shall have to send out to 
India during the first twelve months of such a war. This 
force would amount to the equivalent of 11 divisions which 
is more than twice the strength of the force which can 
today be organized cut of the regular units in England". 
81. "It is not considered that any further reduction can 
be made in the number of regiments abroad; the home 
establishments, which have been considerably reduced 
during the current year, are controlled by the drafts 
required to maintain the regiments on foreign service, and 
by the number of units required for the Expeditionary 
Force". 
82. "The Present Distribution and Strength of the British 
Army in Relation to its Duties", General Staff, 1 November 
1927, PRO/W032/2823. Notes 77,78,79,80 and 81 are also 
from this document. 
83. So different were the war time tanks from the post 
war tanks that it may even be said that the tank proper, 
as we know it today, is a post war invention. The 
rhomboids were so slow that they can hardly be said to 
have been anything other than self propelled pillboxes. 
Further, the tactical and strategic roles of the war time 
tanks were so limited in comparison to those of today's 
tanks or even those of the Vickers Medium that they would 
not be considered tanks by a modern definition. Perhaps 
the Vickers Medium (or even the Medium D) should be 
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2. Dundas, Lieut. Col. J. C.: "A New Road to Economy in 
the Army", Tank_ Corps Journals Vol. 3, p. 283, March 
1922. His final conclusions were that a cavalry regiment 
was worth . 45 of an "equivalent mechanized cavalry 
regiment"; a field artillery brigade worth . 88 of an 
"equivalent mechanized unit"; an infantry battalion worth 
. 40 of an "equivalent mechanized unit". 
3. Grove-White, Bt. Maj. M. FitzG.: "Machinery or 
Muscle", Cavalry_Journalt 1922, p. 307. A tank battalion 
equipped with a "battle tank" would cost 270,480 Pounds; 
one equipped with a "medium tank" 99,240 Pounds; one with 
a "scout tank" 39,648 Pounds. Since none of these types 
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assumed to be the armament for all types with the addition 
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of Mechanization", Army_ Qgarteriyt Vol. XVI, p. 30, 
April 1928. This article is the text of a lecture 
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delivered at the University of London on 8 March 1928. 
This is the sole evidence (and it isn't much to go on) I 
have been able to turn up of any interest in the general 
public on the mechanization question. It was probably not 
a coincidence that it was given just after the 
Experimental Mechanized Force exercises in 1927. 
Lindsay thought in 1928 that the prestige of the RTC 
in the universities seemed to be high. Report _on_Training of theRTC_Durin, _ 19281 Liddell Hart Archives, Lindsay., 
Papers 15/12/6. 
11. Rt. Hon. J. I. MacPherson, House of Commons 
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Lords Debates, Vol. 54, Cols. 620-636,27 June 1923. 
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Blailand, G.: Destination Dunkirk pp. 132-146). in my 
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his own ideas (or so he was told by Guderian in a British 
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approach to the tank controversy is too dependent on 
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BibliogräPhica 1_Note on Tank Sources 
There are a number of problems associated with 
sources on tanks which are not found in many other 
historical sources. 
1. Sources are especially hard to obtain although, with 
the reorganization of many archives, the situation is 
improving. in the British case, at least, many war office 
documents have been destroyed. 
2. Tanks are "high security" objects and information 
about them is usually classified for some years after 
their introduction. As a result, some tank books describe 
supposed models like the "Char 3C"" which never existed but 
which are the result of intelligence errors. 
3. In many other historical areas one*s common sense may 
be a quide as to whether something is probable or not. 
Unfortunately, this will not work with tanks. Tanks have 
been built with a crew of eighteen men, or with a weight 
of 180 tons - indeed it was even felt worth while to 
seriously consider an atomic powered tank before realizing 
that shielding problems made such a thing impossible! 
4. Even with the most meticulous effort, tank facts will 
vary. No two mass produced objects have exactly the same 
dimensions; no two guns have exactly the same 
characteristics. 
5. The presence of -amateurs- interested in tanks has 
caused a never ending flow of what are best described as 
"picture books". In these the pictures are the selling 
point and the text is often studded with numerous errors 
and examples of incomplete research. Frequently the 
authors have depended upon similar efforts and the same 
errors pass from book to book. 
6. Sources on tanks eschew the normal evidence of 
scholarship and I have never seen one with a footnote or 
other source for something said in the text. 
Because of these prcblems, the only way to be certain 
about something connected with tanks is to do the work 
oneself. Nevertheless, , one mu-st often make- ref. rence to 
secondary sources. Unless one has an exact and detailed 
knowledge of the subject gathered over years of research, 
one must judge the secondary sources on internal evidence 
alone. Following are some points which may be used to 
guide this judgement. 
1. Clear photographs of the model in question are fairly 
reliable. They should be of the highest possible quality 
and there should be as many as possible. 
2. The better tank books have masses of detail and are 
always careful to distinguish between, say, a Vickers 
Medium Mark II and a Mark IIA. Most tank designs went 
through aany changes and the books which carefully 
describe these changes inspire confidence by that evidence 
of careful research. 
3. one source can corroborate another and such 
consistency can make one quite certain. 
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However, none of these points is enough in itself: 
photographs can and have been faked, incorrect detail can 
be given and two authorm. can both be wrong. 
However, there exists at least a negative test. 
While many otherwise good tank sources may make small 
errors, there are some errors which show that the book is 
very suspect. An example is the "Char 3C11 which seems to 
have been a German intelligence error in which one version 
of the French heavy tank Char 2C was elevated into a 
complete fictional series of super heavy tanks. This 
particular model has been well debunked by now but, even 
so, the "picture books" repeat the error. More relevant 
to British tanks of the period of this thesis are the 
Medium D and the Johnson Light Infantry Tank. As I have 
indicated, this is a matter on which little is known. 
However, the weight of the Medium D is known and books 
which give it as 20 tons are wrong. And so are those 
books which refer to the Light Infantry Tank as having 
weighed 17.5 tons. There are other errors which are the 
result of careless or incomplete research. The existence 
of one of these errors makes the rest of the book very 
suspect. 
Nevertheless, internal evidence itself is not enough 
and an attitude of suspicion is required when assessing 
secondary works on tanks. 
Sources for British Tank Designs, 1919-1933. 
Major General Duncan's articles in British AFVs1919_ 
1940. 
This is cne of the best secondary sources. Duncan 
served in many of these tanks and he was the Curator of 
the RAC Tank Museum for some years. 
Official Vehicle Manuals. 
For self evident reasons, these are the best sources 
of all. Unfortunately they are available for the Vickers 
Medium only amcnq the designs of the period. 
Willoughby's Digests. (See Chapter 4, Note 54). 
These represent all that remains of many War Office 
papers. Unfortunately, he seems to have confused the 
Light Infantry Tank with the Medium D. For that reason, 
if no other, the digests should be treated with caution 
but it is almost impossible to do without them. 
Documents in the PRO and Hansard. 
I have been able to get a number of details about 
tanks from these sources but so many of the War office 
papers on the subject have disappeared that what one finds 
there is a matter of luck. There is much that is useful 
(particularly about performance) in the annual reports of 
the Mechanical Warfare Board but the Board was only 
created in 1928 and does not cover the whole of the 
Period. The "Purple Primers" contain some useful material 
ý9 
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mostly connected with the Vickers Medium and some of the 
early light tanks. 
Liddell Hart: The_TanksL Vol. I. 
Bearing in mind that Liddell Hart was arguing a case, 
there is no reason to suppose that he was incorrect in 
what he says about the tank designs. But he leaves many 
things out: a reader of the book would not be aware of the 
criticism which the Vickers Medium received from its users 
before the 1930's. 
The Journals and other Contemporary Sources. 
There are many useful tidbits concerning the 
performance of the tanks. There are also details about 
foreign matters (especially anti-tank weapons) but these 
need to be accepted with caution. -Papers in 
the --Liddell hart Centre for Military Archives are useful s, urces of 
pieces of info_rmation_ on the performance of , the vehicles 
and frequently _ _include 
valuable contemporaxy Qplnion3 on 
them. Fullerts publications are not very valuable on 
tank details because he does not seem to have been very 
interested in the mechanical side. Martel is better here 
although much of his writings are concerned with 
publicizing light tanks and tankettes. His in the Wake of 
the flank is very useful because it is a contemporary 
summary of the tank developments written by one who had 
much first hand knowledge. I found Rowan-Robinson's two 
books of great value because they were written near the 
experiments of 1927/1928 and demonstrate the doubts about 
the future of the medium tank at that time. 
With the above sources, it is possible to describe the 
tank designs and their characteristics with some accuracy 
and especially the most important one - the Vickers 
Medium. Other sources have also proved valuable. 
Jones, Ia rey and Icks. 
This book suffers from the fact that it was written in 
the United States in 1933 and therefore all information 
about non-American tanks must be treated with scepticism 
because of security difficulties. For example, they 
describe the "Char 3C'ß but they may be excused because 
they could not have had access to accurate but secret 
information. The book is useful in its attempt to provide 
a summary of everything connected with tanks - history, 
designs and ancillary devices. it is a useful period 
document. 
Chamberlain and Ellis 
! [heir books are a valuable and almost unique supply of 
photographs. Unfortunately the text is not as good. For 
example they make many errors in their description of the 
Johnson designs. 
Crow and Icks: Encyclopaedia_of Tank s 
This is more or less an updated version of what was 
attepted in The FightIng_Tanks of 1933. It too has some 
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fl errors (again on the Medium D) but is reasonably good. 
Ogorkiewiczi two books. 
One, Armoured Forces is a history of tanks and tank 
formations with some discussion of engineering problems; 
the other, Design_anä Dg_velopment_of_Flghting vehicle s, is 
a discussion of engineering problems and design matters 
connected with AFVS with some history. The first is a 
valuable survey of the field and the second, although more 
concerned with post Second World War developments, is a 
very useful and unique discussion of the problems which 
have been constant in tank design since "Little Willie" 
was made. 
Two examples of "picture books" are Macksey and 
Batchelor's Tank and, much worse, Halle and Demand's 
Tanks. The first has a collection of errors - the 
Johnson designs, that Christie built a flying tank - and 
seems to be principally a frame for Batchelor's drawings. 
The second book is quite remarkable. it, like the other, 
prefers drawings to photographs (a suspicious sign in 
itself) and virtually every drawing has some error or 
other. Even that well illustrated model, the Vickers 
dedium, is represented by a drawing which contains no less 
than 23 errors by my count! Perhaps the outstanding error 
in the latter is a photograph of the American Shillelagh 
anti-tank missile equipped M-60 medium tank which is 
captioned "The first tank equipped for shooting down 
aircraft'"! 
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I=1_Conte mFora _Sonrcest 
official Documents 
Public Record Office 
W032 Registered Papers, General Series 
W033 Reports and Miscellaneous Papers 
W0163 War Office Council and Army Council 
CAB2 Committee of Imperial Defence Minutes 
CAB4 Papers of Committee of Imperial Defence 
CAB21 Cabinet: Registered Files 
CAB23 Cabinet Minutes 
CAB53 Committee of Imperial Defence: COS Committee 
CAB54 Committee of Imperial Defence: Deputy COS 
Committee 
Index to Cabinet Conclusions 
Parliament 
House of Ccmmons Debates, Volume 113 (1919) to Volume 
280 (1933) 
House of Lords Debates, Volume 34 (1919) to Volume 87 
(1933) 
Memoranda of the Secretary of State for War Relating 
to the Army Estimates from 1920/1921 to 1933/1934, 
published annually in Accounts and Papers,. Aj: _rj_Arpy The Army Estimates from 1919/1920 to 1933/1934, 
published annually in Accounts and Paperst_Air_Army 
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I_2_Conte mporary rivate Papers and Collections 
a Liddell Hart Archives, States House, Medmenha m, Bucks. 
(NOTE: All references to the Liddell Hart Archives in the 
Notes, unless otherwise stated, are to Liddell Hart's 
papers) 
Papers of Major General Sir Percy HOBART 
Papers of Sir Basil LIDDE LL HART 
Papers of Major General George LINDSAY 
b Centre for Military Archives, King +s College, London 
Papers of Lieutenant General Sir Charles BROAD 
Papers of Major General John F. C. FULLER 
Papers of Field Marshal Sir Archibald MONTGOMERX- 
MASSINGBERD 
c The Library and Collection of the Royal Armoured Corps 
Tank Museum, Bovington Camp, Wareham, Dorset 
NOTE: Throughout I have referred to the "Liddell Hart 
Archives" and to the Centre for Military Archives, King's 
College" as if they were separate collections. Strictly 
speaking, this is misleading for these papers are now part 
of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. However, 
this collection is still split between States House and King's College and my dual system of reference is to be 
understood as a guide to the papers' physical location 
only. 
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